RUSTSEC-2026-0503
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-11-07 12:00 – Updated: 2026-11-12 07:53 – Source websiteWhen extracting archives, eazip validates symlink entries before writing
them. The validation function validate_symlink() (src/utils/mod.rs) scans
for backslash and NUL bytes, but passes the symlink's name where the
symlink's target was intended:
memchr2(b'\\', b'\0', name.as_bytes()) // should be target.as_bytes()
As a result, symlink targets containing backslash or NUL bytes pass
validation. On Windows, backslash is a path separator, so targets such as
..\..\..\Windows\system32\evil.exe also defeat the remaining depth check,
which splits on / only. A crafted archive can therefore create symlinks
that resolve outside the extraction directory — including UNC targets such as
\\host\share\... — redirecting writes to arbitrary filesystem locations
chosen by the attacker.
Applications that extract untrusted archives with eazip on Windows targets
are affected; on Unix targets backslash is not a separator, which limits
exposure there.
The vulnerability was introduced in version 0.2.5 and fixed in 0.2.7 (a1phyr/eazip@0e4caa13), which rejects backslash and NUL bytes in the symlink target. It was privately reported to the maintainer on 2026-11-06 and credited in the 0.2.7 release notes.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"categories": [
"privilege-escalation"
],
"cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"informational": null
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": null,
"affects": {
"arch": [],
"functions": [],
"os": []
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "eazip",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/eazip"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.2.5"
},
{
"fixed": "0.2.7"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": []
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC0-1.0"
},
"details": "When extracting archives, `eazip` validates symlink entries before writing\nthem. The validation function `validate_symlink()` (`src/utils/mod.rs`) scans\nfor backslash and NUL bytes, but passes the symlink\u0027s *name* where the\nsymlink\u0027s *target* was intended:\n\n```rust\nmemchr2(b\u0027\\\\\u0027, b\u0027\\0\u0027, name.as_bytes()) // should be target.as_bytes()\n```\n\nAs a result, symlink *targets* containing backslash or NUL bytes pass\nvalidation. On Windows, backslash is a path separator, so targets such as\n`..\\..\\..\\Windows\\system32\\evil.exe` also defeat the remaining depth check,\nwhich splits on `/` only. A crafted archive can therefore create symlinks\nthat resolve outside the extraction directory \u2014 including UNC targets such as\n`\\\\host\\share\\...` \u2014 redirecting writes to arbitrary filesystem locations\nchosen by the attacker.\n\nApplications that extract untrusted archives with `eazip` on Windows targets\nare affected; on Unix targets backslash is not a separator, which limits\nexposure there.\n\nThe vulnerability was introduced in version 0.2.5 and fixed in 0.2.7\n([a1phyr/eazip@0e4caa13](https://github.com/a1phyr/eazip/commit/0e4caa13d59f5ba15aaac332f5534260c3b8fc43)),\nwhich rejects backslash and NUL bytes in the symlink target. It was\nprivately reported to the maintainer on 2026-11-06 and credited in the\n0.2.7 release notes.",
"id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0503",
"modified": "2026-11-12T07:53:20Z",
"published": "2026-11-07T12:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/eazip"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0503.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/a1phyr/eazip/releases/tag/v0.2.7"
}
],
"related": [],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "eazip: symlink-target validation checks the wrong argument, allowing extraction path escapes on Windows"
}
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