RUSTSEC-2026-0500 (GHSA-J8HR-PJHM-6H27)
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-11-10 12:00 – Updated: 2026-11-12 07:53 – Source websiteBeef::merge_raw_tx and BeefTx::from_raw_tx accept raw bytes without a
Result. For bytes that are not exactly one transaction (a transaction
followed by bytes, a cut transaction, bytes that are no transaction at all),
Beef::sort_txs, verify_structure, verify_valid and is_valid could
answer valid, even with no BUMP and no parent in the BEEF, and, where the entry
carried a BUMP index, treat the hash of those bytes as a proven transaction id;
an entry that names it as a parent was answered valid too.
The wire readers (Beef::from_binary, verify_stream,
Transaction::from_beef, from_atomic_beef) parse every entry and are not
affected. Reaching this needs an application that passes bytes it did not
parse to merge_raw_tx or BeefTx::from_raw_tx and then relies on the verdict
or on the transaction the BEEF hands back.
0.8.5 refuses such an entry at all four verdict doors, with or without a BUMP
index, and every entry that names it as a parent. Where upgrading is not
possible, do not rely on is_valid or verify_valid alone for such an entry:
check that the bytes are exactly one transaction before merging them.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"categories": [
"crypto-failure"
],
"cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"informational": null
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": null,
"affects": {
"arch": [],
"functions": [
"bsv_rs::transaction::Beef::find_atomic_transaction",
"bsv_rs::transaction::Beef::find_transaction_for_signing",
"bsv_rs::transaction::Beef::is_valid",
"bsv_rs::transaction::Beef::merge_raw_tx",
"bsv_rs::transaction::Beef::sort_txs",
"bsv_rs::transaction::Beef::verify_structure",
"bsv_rs::transaction::Beef::verify_valid",
"bsv_rs::transaction::BeefTx::from_raw_tx"
],
"os": []
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "bsv-rs",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/bsv-rs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0-0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.8.5"
},
{
"introduced": "0.9.0-beta.1"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.0-beta.7.0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": []
}
],
"aliases": [
"GHSA-j8hr-pjhm-6h27"
],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC0-1.0"
},
"details": "`Beef::merge_raw_tx` and `BeefTx::from_raw_tx` accept raw bytes without a\n`Result`. For bytes that are not exactly one transaction (a transaction\nfollowed by bytes, a cut transaction, bytes that are no transaction at all),\n`Beef::sort_txs`, `verify_structure`, `verify_valid` and `is_valid` could\nanswer valid, even with no BUMP and no parent in the BEEF, and, where the entry\ncarried a BUMP index, treat the hash of those bytes as a proven transaction id;\nan entry that names it as a parent was answered valid too.\n\nThe wire readers (`Beef::from_binary`, `verify_stream`,\n`Transaction::from_beef`, `from_atomic_beef`) parse every entry and are not\naffected. Reaching this needs an application that passes bytes it did not\nparse to `merge_raw_tx` or `BeefTx::from_raw_tx` and then relies on the verdict\nor on the transaction the BEEF hands back.\n\n0.8.5 refuses such an entry at all four verdict doors, with or without a BUMP\nindex, and every entry that names it as a parent. Where upgrading is not\npossible, do not rely on `is_valid` or `verify_valid` alone for such an entry:\ncheck that the bytes are exactly one transaction before merging them.",
"id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0500",
"modified": "2026-11-12T07:53:20Z",
"published": "2026-11-10T12:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/bsv-rs"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0500.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Calhooon/bsv-rs/blob/v0.8.5/CHANGELOG.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Calhooon/bsv-rs/pull/852"
}
],
"related": [],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "BEEF validation answers valid for a raw entry that is not a transaction"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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