RUSTSEC-2026-0499 (GHSA-9C8R-76F3-M426)
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-11-11 12:00 – Updated: 2026-11-12 07:53 – Source websiteSignature::from_der read a DER-encoded ECDSA signature leniently. It read as
the signature: the signature followed by other bytes; a sequence length
shorter than its contents, or longer with bytes after them (a length byte with
its high bit set among them); and an R or S preceded by a zero byte it did not
need. It read a lone-zero R or S as zero.
messages::verify, compat::bsm::verify_message_der,
auth::Certificate::verify, auth::VerifiableCertificate::verify,
wallet::ProtoWallet::verify_signature and
kvstore::KVStoreInterpreter::verify_signature read through it, and each
verified such a form of a valid signature. Given one signature a key holder
made, anyone could produce other byte strings that verify as that signature
over the same data. No form verifies over other data: an application that acts
on the verdict alone is not affected; one that compares, hashes or stores a
signature's bytes is.
0.8.6 refuses each form as Error::InvalidSignature. A signature's bytes are
still not unique after the patch: the same signature with S replaced by n - S
verifies, so an application that keys on the bytes also requires
Signature::is_low_s().
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"categories": [
"crypto-failure"
],
"cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"informational": null
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": null,
"affects": {
"arch": [],
"functions": [
"bsv_rs::auth::Certificate::verify",
"bsv_rs::auth::VerifiableCertificate::verify",
"bsv_rs::auth::utils::validate_certificate_encoding",
"bsv_rs::compat::bsm::verify_message_der",
"bsv_rs::kvstore::KVStoreInterpreter::verify_signature",
"bsv_rs::messages::verify",
"bsv_rs::primitives::bsv::TransactionSignature::from_checksig_format",
"bsv_rs::primitives::ec::Signature::from_der",
"bsv_rs::wallet::ProtoWallet::verify_signature"
],
"os": []
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "bsv-rs",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/bsv-rs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0-0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.8.6"
},
{
"introduced": "0.9.0-beta.1"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.0-beta.7.0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": []
}
],
"aliases": [
"GHSA-9c8r-76f3-m426"
],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC0-1.0"
},
"details": "`Signature::from_der` read a DER-encoded ECDSA signature leniently. It read as\nthe signature: the signature followed by other bytes; a sequence length\nshorter than its contents, or longer with bytes after them (a length byte with\nits high bit set among them); and an R or S preceded by a zero byte it did not\nneed. It read a lone-zero R or S as zero.\n\n`messages::verify`, `compat::bsm::verify_message_der`,\n`auth::Certificate::verify`, `auth::VerifiableCertificate::verify`,\n`wallet::ProtoWallet::verify_signature` and\n`kvstore::KVStoreInterpreter::verify_signature` read through it, and each\nverified such a form of a valid signature. Given one signature a key holder\nmade, anyone could produce other byte strings that verify as that signature\nover the same data. No form verifies over other data: an application that acts\non the verdict alone is not affected; one that compares, hashes or stores a\nsignature\u0027s bytes is.\n\n0.8.6 refuses each form as `Error::InvalidSignature`. A signature\u0027s bytes are\nstill not unique after the patch: the same signature with S replaced by n - S\nverifies, so an application that keys on the bytes also requires\n`Signature::is_low_s()`.",
"id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0499",
"modified": "2026-11-12T07:53:20Z",
"published": "2026-11-11T12:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/bsv-rs"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0499.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Calhooon/bsv-rs/blob/v0.8.6/CHANGELOG.md"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://github.com/Calhooon/bsv-rs/issues/842"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Calhooon/bsv-rs/pull/846"
}
],
"related": [],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Signature::from_der reads a signature with bytes after it, a wrong sequence length or an unneeded zero as the signature"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
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