RUSTSEC-2026-0499 (GHSA-9C8R-76F3-M426)

Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-11-11 12:00 – Updated: 2026-11-12 07:53 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
Signature::from_der reads a signature with bytes after it, a wrong sequence length or an unneeded zero as the signature
Details

Signature::from_der read a DER-encoded ECDSA signature leniently. It read as the signature: the signature followed by other bytes; a sequence length shorter than its contents, or longer with bytes after them (a length byte with its high bit set among them); and an R or S preceded by a zero byte it did not need. It read a lone-zero R or S as zero.

messages::verify, compat::bsm::verify_message_der, auth::Certificate::verify, auth::VerifiableCertificate::verify, wallet::ProtoWallet::verify_signature and kvstore::KVStoreInterpreter::verify_signature read through it, and each verified such a form of a valid signature. Given one signature a key holder made, anyone could produce other byte strings that verify as that signature over the same data. No form verifies over other data: an application that acts on the verdict alone is not affected; one that compares, hashes or stores a signature's bytes is.

0.8.6 refuses each form as Error::InvalidSignature. A signature's bytes are still not unique after the patch: the same signature with S replaced by n - S verifies, so an application that keys on the bytes also requires Signature::is_low_s().


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "crypto-failure"
        ],
        "cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [
            "bsv_rs::auth::Certificate::verify",
            "bsv_rs::auth::VerifiableCertificate::verify",
            "bsv_rs::auth::utils::validate_certificate_encoding",
            "bsv_rs::compat::bsm::verify_message_der",
            "bsv_rs::kvstore::KVStoreInterpreter::verify_signature",
            "bsv_rs::messages::verify",
            "bsv_rs::primitives::bsv::TransactionSignature::from_checksig_format",
            "bsv_rs::primitives::ec::Signature::from_der",
            "bsv_rs::wallet::ProtoWallet::verify_signature"
          ],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "bsv-rs",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/bsv-rs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.6"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "0.9.0-beta.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.0-beta.7.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "GHSA-9c8r-76f3-m426"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "`Signature::from_der` read a DER-encoded ECDSA signature leniently. It read as\nthe signature: the signature followed by other bytes; a sequence length\nshorter than its contents, or longer with bytes after them (a length byte with\nits high bit set among them); and an R or S preceded by a zero byte it did not\nneed. It read a lone-zero R or S as zero.\n\n`messages::verify`, `compat::bsm::verify_message_der`,\n`auth::Certificate::verify`, `auth::VerifiableCertificate::verify`,\n`wallet::ProtoWallet::verify_signature` and\n`kvstore::KVStoreInterpreter::verify_signature` read through it, and each\nverified such a form of a valid signature. Given one signature a key holder\nmade, anyone could produce other byte strings that verify as that signature\nover the same data. No form verifies over other data: an application that acts\non the verdict alone is not affected; one that compares, hashes or stores a\nsignature\u0027s bytes is.\n\n0.8.6 refuses each form as `Error::InvalidSignature`. A signature\u0027s bytes are\nstill not unique after the patch: the same signature with S replaced by n - S\nverifies, so an application that keys on the bytes also requires\n`Signature::is_low_s()`.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0499",
  "modified": "2026-11-12T07:53:20Z",
  "published": "2026-11-11T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/bsv-rs"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0499.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Calhooon/bsv-rs/blob/v0.8.6/CHANGELOG.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/Calhooon/bsv-rs/issues/842"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Calhooon/bsv-rs/pull/846"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Signature::from_der reads a signature with bytes after it, a wrong sequence length or an unneeded zero as the signature"
}



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