RUSTSEC-2026-0498 (GHSA-J8HR-PJHM-6H27)
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-11-10 12:00 – Updated: 2026-11-12 07:53 – Source websiteTransaction::from_binary and Transaction::from_hex read one transaction
from the front of their input, did not check that the input ended there, and
kept the whole input as the transaction's cached serialization: to_binary,
to_hex and id() then answered for bytes that are not the transaction's.
Transaction::from_json, given a hex field, reads it through from_hex and
answers the same. from_ef, from_hex_ef and parse_script_offsets also
read a prefix.
An application that takes bytes or hex from outside, parses them with these
readers and then uses id() or the serialization could be given one
transaction under another identity: the same parsed fields, a different id.
An application that passes them only bytes it produced or has already checked
is not affected.
0.8.5 refuses a byte after the transaction; Transaction::from_reader reads
from the front of a longer buffer. Where upgrading is not possible, parse with
Transaction::from_binary, call tx.invalidate_caches() (public from 0.3.16)
and require tx.to_binary() == bytes.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"categories": [
"crypto-failure"
],
"cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"informational": null
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": null,
"affects": {
"arch": [],
"functions": [
"bsv_rs::transaction::Transaction::from_binary",
"bsv_rs::transaction::Transaction::from_ef",
"bsv_rs::transaction::Transaction::from_hex",
"bsv_rs::transaction::Transaction::from_hex_ef",
"bsv_rs::transaction::Transaction::from_json",
"bsv_rs::transaction::Transaction::parse_script_offsets"
],
"os": []
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "bsv-rs",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/bsv-rs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0-0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.8.5"
},
{
"introduced": "0.9.0-beta.1"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.0-beta.7.0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": []
}
],
"aliases": [
"GHSA-j8hr-pjhm-6h27"
],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC0-1.0"
},
"details": "`Transaction::from_binary` and `Transaction::from_hex` read one transaction\nfrom the front of their input, did not check that the input ended there, and\nkept the whole input as the transaction\u0027s cached serialization: `to_binary`,\n`to_hex` and `id()` then answered for bytes that are not the transaction\u0027s.\n`Transaction::from_json`, given a `hex` field, reads it through `from_hex` and\nanswers the same. `from_ef`, `from_hex_ef` and `parse_script_offsets` also\nread a prefix.\n\nAn application that takes bytes or hex from outside, parses them with these\nreaders and then uses `id()` or the serialization could be given one\ntransaction under another identity: the same parsed fields, a different id.\nAn application that passes them only bytes it produced or has already checked\nis not affected.\n\n0.8.5 refuses a byte after the transaction; `Transaction::from_reader` reads\nfrom the front of a longer buffer. Where upgrading is not possible, parse with\n`Transaction::from_binary`, call `tx.invalidate_caches()` (public from 0.3.16)\nand require `tx.to_binary() == bytes`.",
"id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0498",
"modified": "2026-11-12T07:53:20Z",
"published": "2026-11-10T12:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/bsv-rs"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0498.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Calhooon/bsv-rs/blob/v0.8.5/CHANGELOG.md"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://github.com/Calhooon/bsv-rs/issues/840"
}
],
"related": [],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Transaction readers accept trailing bytes, so a parsed transaction can carry another transaction id"
}
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