RUSTSEC-2026-0482 (GHSA-HP8F-XMX4-4QRG)
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-08-20 12:00 – Updated: 2026-11-11 08:37 – Source websitecap-primitives resolves a path inside a sandboxed directory one component at a time and opens the last component with O_NOFOLLOW, so that a symlink there cannot lead out of the directory. When the path ended in /, the resolver added the slash back to the last component before opening it. With a trailing slash the operating system no longer treats that component as the last one, so O_NOFOLLOW does not apply, the symlink is followed, and the resulting file descriptor was returned without further checks.
A symlink inside the sandbox that points outside it, such as escape -> ../outside or a link to /, can therefore be opened as escape/. If the symlink's own target ends in /, the caller's path does not need a trailing slash at all, so removing trailing slashes from untrusted input is not a workaround. The maintainers' advisory reports reads and writes outside the sandbox through open, open_dir, read_dir and canonicalize, and directory creation, removal and renames outside it through create_dir, remove_dir and rename.
This resolver is used on Windows and macOS, on FreeBSD when O_RESOLVE_BENEATH is not available, and on Linux when openat2 is not available (kernels before 5.6, or a seccomp policy that rejects it). cap-std and other crates built on cap-primitives are affected through it. Wasmtime's WASI filesystem support was affected as well; that is covered by RUSTSEC-2026-0269.
The fix stops re-adding the trailing slash and is in 3.4.6 and 4.0.3.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"categories": [
"file-disclosure"
],
"cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"informational": null
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": null,
"affects": {
"arch": [],
"functions": [],
"os": []
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "cap-primitives",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/cap-primitives"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0-0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.4.6"
},
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.3"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": []
}
],
"aliases": [
"GHSA-hp8f-xmx4-4qrg"
],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC0-1.0"
},
"details": "cap-primitives resolves a path inside a sandboxed directory one component at a time and opens the last component with `O_NOFOLLOW`, so that a symlink there cannot lead out of the directory. When the path ended in `/`, the resolver added the slash back to the last component before opening it. With a trailing slash the operating system no longer treats that component as the last one, so `O_NOFOLLOW` does not apply, the symlink is followed, and the resulting file descriptor was returned without further checks.\n\nA symlink inside the sandbox that points outside it, such as `escape -\u003e ../outside` or a link to `/`, can therefore be opened as `escape/`. If the symlink\u0027s own target ends in `/`, the caller\u0027s path does not need a trailing slash at all, so removing trailing slashes from untrusted input is not a workaround. The maintainers\u0027 advisory reports reads and writes outside the sandbox through `open`, `open_dir`, `read_dir` and `canonicalize`, and directory creation, removal and renames outside it through `create_dir`, `remove_dir` and `rename`.\n\nThis resolver is used on Windows and macOS, on FreeBSD when `O_RESOLVE_BENEATH` is not available, and on Linux when `openat2` is not available (kernels before 5.6, or a seccomp policy that rejects it). cap-std and other crates built on cap-primitives are affected through it. Wasmtime\u0027s WASI filesystem support was affected as well; that is covered by RUSTSEC-2026-0269.\n\nThe fix stops re-adding the trailing slash and is in 3.4.6 and 4.0.3.",
"id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0482",
"modified": "2026-11-11T08:37:09Z",
"published": "2026-08-20T12:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/cap-primitives"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0482.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/bytecodealliance/cap-std/pull/419"
}
],
"related": [
"RUSTSEC-2026-0269"
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Paths or symlinks ending in a slash escape the sandbox"
}
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