RUSTSEC-2026-0390 (CVE-2026-105299)

Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-10-20 12:00 – Updated: 2026-10-26 11:14 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
Pingora forwards client-nominated Connection headers to HTTP/1 upstreams, allowing ACL bypass in specific chained deployments
Details

Pingora versions prior to 0.9.0 passed the downstream request through upstream_request_filter and wrote it to HTTP/1 upstreams without removing the client's Connection header, other hop-by-hop headers, or the headers Connection nominated, although RFC 9110 Section 7.6.1 requires intermediaries to remove them. The HTTP/2 upstream path already removed Connection and related HTTP/1-specific headers. A client could therefore nominate a header that the application adds in upstream_request_filter (for example, Connection: keep-alive, X-Forwarded-For). A downstream HTTP/1 intermediary that honors Connection would then strip the Pingora-added header before it reached the origin.

This specifically affects chained deployments where an HTTP/1 intermediary between Pingora and the origin processes Connection nominations (for example, Go's net/http/httputil.ReverseProxy) and the origin trusts headers added by that intermediary (for example, X-Forwarded-For for IP-based authorization). A remote, unauthenticated attacker can have those headers removed, potentially bypassing authorization. This is the same class of issue as CVE-2022-31813 in Apache HTTP Server.

This flaw was corrected in commits 28c18e6b6b04dd0bd937234e5950049e6d74cded and ca23f1668eca8e78be7ba62ef0edbd458b40eeee. By default, Pingora now removes hop-by-hop and Connection-nominated headers from upstream requests, and rejects requests whose Connection header nominates Host, X-Forwarded-For, X-Forwarded-Host, X-Forwarded-Proto, or a pseudo-header. This is controlled by PeerOptions::http_upstream_request_policy; HttpUpstreamRequestPolicy::preserve() restores the old passthrough behavior and should not be used if the origin relies on headers added by Pingora. Users should upgrade to Pingora >= 0.9.0.

Note: Cloudflare CDN customers were unaffected, as no such chained deployment as described above exists with internal Pingora services, and Connection headers are sanitized before arriving at Pingora gateways.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [],
        "cvss": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "pingora-proxy",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/pingora-proxy"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-105299",
    "GHSA-vx4q-2c55-cvmg"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "Pingora versions prior to 0.9.0 passed the downstream request through `upstream_request_filter` and wrote it to HTTP/1 upstreams without removing the client\u0027s Connection header, other hop-by-hop headers, or the headers Connection nominated, although RFC 9110 Section 7.6.1 requires intermediaries to remove them. The HTTP/2 upstream path already removed Connection and related HTTP/1-specific headers. A client could therefore nominate a header that the application adds in `upstream_request_filter` (for example, `Connection: keep-alive, X-Forwarded-For`). A downstream HTTP/1 intermediary that honors Connection would then strip the Pingora-added header before it reached the origin.\n\nThis specifically affects chained deployments where an HTTP/1 intermediary between Pingora and the origin processes Connection nominations (for example, Go\u0027s `net/http/httputil.ReverseProxy`) and the origin trusts headers added by that intermediary (for example, X-Forwarded-For for IP-based authorization). A remote, unauthenticated attacker can have those headers removed, potentially bypassing authorization. This is the same class of issue as CVE-2022-31813 in Apache HTTP Server.\n\nThis flaw was corrected in commits 28c18e6b6b04dd0bd937234e5950049e6d74cded and ca23f1668eca8e78be7ba62ef0edbd458b40eeee. By default, Pingora now removes hop-by-hop and Connection-nominated headers from upstream requests, and rejects requests whose Connection header nominates Host, X-Forwarded-For, X-Forwarded-Host, X-Forwarded-Proto, or a pseudo-header. This is controlled by `PeerOptions::http_upstream_request_policy`; `HttpUpstreamRequestPolicy::preserve()` restores the old passthrough behavior and should not be used if the origin relies on headers added by Pingora. Users should upgrade to Pingora \u003e= 0.9.0.\n\nNote: Cloudflare CDN customers were unaffected, as no such chained deployment as described above exists with internal Pingora services, and Connection headers are sanitized before arriving at Pingora gateways.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0390",
  "modified": "2026-10-26T11:14:38Z",
  "published": "2026-10-20T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/pingora-proxy"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0390.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/pingora/commit/28c18e6b6b04dd0bd937234e5950049e6d74cded"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/pingora/commit/ca23f1668eca8e78be7ba62ef0edbd458b40eeee"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Pingora forwards client-nominated Connection headers to HTTP/1 upstreams, allowing ACL bypass in specific chained deployments"
}



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