RUSTSEC-2026-0389 (CVE-2026-105297)
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-10-20 12:00 – Updated: 2026-10-26 11:14 – Source websitePingora versions prior to 0.8.1 used the h2 crate's default HTTP/2 server limits, a 16 MiB decoded header-list size and no limit on concurrent streams, unless the application set its own. A remote, unauthenticated client can send 1-byte HPACK references to a near-empty header, making the server allocate hundreds of thousands of header fields per stream across an unlimited number of streams on one connection, and use HTTP/2 flow control to keep those streams open. This can exhaust memory and degrade or terminate the Pingora process.
This affects any Pingora service that terminates HTTP/2 (h2 or h2c) without explicitly setting max_header_list_size and max_concurrent_streams. The reporter showed that a single connection could get a Pingora process with a 2 GiB memory limit OOM-killed.
This flaw was corrected in commit d193c8d49b8b7c1c1ede93183759caa4f6906bbd. When no H2Options are supplied, Pingora now advertises and enforces a 64 KiB decoded header-list limit and at most 100 concurrent streams per connection. Users should upgrade to Pingora >= 0.8.1. Applications that supply their own H2Options are not covered by these defaults and must set max_header_list_size and max_concurrent_streams explicitly, or start from pingora_core::protocols::http::v2::server::default_h2_options(). H2Options::default() does not include these limits.
Note: Cloudflare CDN customers were unaffected, as internal Pingora services at Cloudflare do not have HTTP/2 clients.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"categories": [
"denial-of-service"
],
"cvss": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"informational": null
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": null,
"affects": {
"arch": [],
"functions": [],
"os": []
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "pingora-core",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/pingora-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0-0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.8.1"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": []
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-105297",
"GHSA-7gpj-mj4q-x62x"
],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC0-1.0"
},
"details": "Pingora versions prior to 0.8.1 used the h2 crate\u0027s default HTTP/2 server limits, a 16 MiB decoded header-list size and no limit on concurrent streams, unless the application set its own. A remote, unauthenticated client can send 1-byte HPACK references to a near-empty header, making the server allocate hundreds of thousands of header fields per stream across an unlimited number of streams on one connection, and use HTTP/2 flow control to keep those streams open. This can exhaust memory and degrade or terminate the Pingora process.\n\nThis affects any Pingora service that terminates HTTP/2 (h2 or h2c) without explicitly setting `max_header_list_size` and `max_concurrent_streams`. The reporter showed that a single connection could get a Pingora process with a 2 GiB memory limit OOM-killed.\n\nThis flaw was corrected in commit d193c8d49b8b7c1c1ede93183759caa4f6906bbd. When no `H2Options` are supplied, Pingora now advertises and enforces a 64 KiB decoded header-list limit and at most 100 concurrent streams per connection. Users should upgrade to Pingora \u003e= 0.8.1. Applications that supply their own `H2Options` are not covered by these defaults and must set `max_header_list_size` and `max_concurrent_streams` explicitly, or start from `pingora_core::protocols::http::v2::server::default_h2_options()`. `H2Options::default()` does not include these limits.\n\nNote: Cloudflare CDN customers were unaffected, as internal Pingora services at Cloudflare do not have HTTP/2 clients.",
"id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0389",
"modified": "2026-10-26T11:14:38Z",
"published": "2026-10-20T12:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/pingora-core"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0389.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/pingora/commit/d193c8d49b8b7c1c1ede93183759caa4f6906bbd"
}
],
"related": [],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Pingora HTTP/2 server memory exhaustion through unbounded default header-list and concurrent-stream limits"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.