RUSTSEC-2023-0068 (CVE-2024-21530)

Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2023-10-15 12:00 – Updated: 2025-10-28 06:02 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
Sequential calls of encryption API (`encrypt`, `wrap`, and `dump`) result in nonce reuse
Details

Problem: Trying to create a new encrypted message with the same cocoon object generates the same ciphertext. It mostly affects MiniCocoon and Cocoon objects with custom seeds and RNGs (where StdRng is used under the hood).

Note: The issue does NOT affect objects created with Cocoon::new which utilizes ThreadRng.

Cause: StdRng produces the same nonce because StdRng::clone resets its state.

Measure: Make encryption API mutable (encrypt, wrap, and dump).

Workaround: Create a new cocoon object with a new seed per each encryption.

How to Reproduce

let cocoon = MiniCocoon::from_password(b"password", &[1; 32]);
let mut data1 = "my secret data".to_owned().into_bytes();
let _ = cocoon.encrypt(&mut data1)?;

let mut data2 = "my secret data".to_owned().into_bytes();
let _ = cocoon.encrypt(&mut data2)?;

// data1: [23, 217, 251, 151, 179, 62, 85, 15, 253, 92, 192, 112, 200, 52]
// data2: [23, 217, 251, 151, 179, 62, 85, 15, 253, 92, 192, 112, 200, 52]

Workaround

For cocoon <= 0.3.3, create a new cocoon with a different seed per each encrypt/wrap/dump call.

let cocoon = MiniCocoon::from_password(b"password", &[1; 32]);
let mut data1 = "my secret data".to_owned().into_bytes();
let _ = cocoon.encrypt(&mut data1)?;

// Another seed: &[2; 32].
let cocoon = MiniCocoon::from_password(b"password", &[2; 32]);
let mut data2 = "my secret data".to_owned().into_bytes();
let _ = cocoon.encrypt(&mut data2)?;

// data1: [23, 217, 251, 151, 179, 62, 85, 15, 253, 92, 192, 112, 200, 52]
// data2: [53, 223, 209, 96, 130, 99, 209, 108, 83, 189, 123, 81, 19, 1]
Severity
4.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "crypto-failure"
        ],
        "cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [
            "cocoon::Cocoon::dump",
            "cocoon::Cocoon::encrypt",
            "cocoon::Cocoon::wrap",
            "cocoon::MiniCocoon::dump",
            "cocoon::MiniCocoon::encrypt",
            "cocoon::MiniCocoon::wrap"
          ],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "cocoon",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/cocoon"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-21530",
    "GHSA-6878-6wc2-pf5h",
    "GHSA-r2jw-c95q-rj29"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "**Problem**: Trying to create a new encrypted message with the same cocoon\nobject generates the same ciphertext. It mostly affects `MiniCocoon` and\n`Cocoon` objects with custom seeds and RNGs (where `StdRng` is used under\nthe hood).\n\n**Note**: The issue does **NOT** affect objects created with **`Cocoon::new`**\nwhich utilizes `ThreadRng`.\n\n**Cause**: `StdRng` produces the same nonce because `StdRng::clone` resets its\nstate.\n\n**Measure**: Make encryption API mutable (`encrypt`, `wrap`, and `dump`).\n\n**Workaround**: Create a new cocoon object with a new **seed** per each\nencryption.\n\n## How to Reproduce\n\n```rust\nlet cocoon = MiniCocoon::from_password(b\"password\", \u0026[1; 32]);\nlet mut data1 = \"my secret data\".to_owned().into_bytes();\nlet _ = cocoon.encrypt(\u0026mut data1)?;\n\nlet mut data2 = \"my secret data\".to_owned().into_bytes();\nlet _ = cocoon.encrypt(\u0026mut data2)?;\n\n// data1: [23, 217, 251, 151, 179, 62, 85, 15, 253, 92, 192, 112, 200, 52]\n// data2: [23, 217, 251, 151, 179, 62, 85, 15, 253, 92, 192, 112, 200, 52]\n```\n\n## Workaround\n\nFor `cocoon \u003c= 0.3.3`, create a new cocoon with a different **seed**\nper each `encrypt`/`wrap`/`dump` call.\n\n```rust\nlet cocoon = MiniCocoon::from_password(b\"password\", \u0026[1; 32]);\nlet mut data1 = \"my secret data\".to_owned().into_bytes();\nlet _ = cocoon.encrypt(\u0026mut data1)?;\n\n// Another seed: \u0026[2; 32].\nlet cocoon = MiniCocoon::from_password(b\"password\", \u0026[2; 32]);\nlet mut data2 = \"my secret data\".to_owned().into_bytes();\nlet _ = cocoon.encrypt(\u0026mut data2)?;\n\n// data1: [23, 217, 251, 151, 179, 62, 85, 15, 253, 92, 192, 112, 200, 52]\n// data2: [53, 223, 209, 96, 130, 99, 209, 108, 83, 189, 123, 81, 19, 1]\n```",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2023-0068",
  "modified": "2025-10-28T06:02:18Z",
  "published": "2023-10-15T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/cocoon"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2023-0068.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/fadeevab/cocoon/issues/22"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Sequential calls of encryption API (`encrypt`, `wrap`, and `dump`) result in nonce reuse"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.





Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.