{
  "document": {
    "category": "csaf_vex",
    "csaf_version": "2.0",
    "distribution": {
      "text": "Public",
      "tlp": {
        "label": "WHITE",
        "url": "https://www.first.org/tlp/"
      }
    },
    "lang": "en-US",
    "notes": [
      {
        "category": "general",
        "text": "To determine the support lifecycle for your software, see the Microsoft Support Lifecycle: https://support.microsoft.com/lifecycle",
        "title": "Additional Resources"
      },
      {
        "category": "legal_disclaimer",
        "text": "The information provided in the Microsoft Knowledge Base is provided \\\"as is\\\" without warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply.",
        "title": "Disclaimer"
      }
    ],
    "publisher": {
      "category": "vendor",
      "contact_details": "secure@microsoft.com",
      "name": "Microsoft Security Response Center",
      "namespace": "https://msrc.microsoft.com"
    },
    "references": [
      {
        "category": "self",
        "summary": "CVE-2026-80212 An issue was discovered in the resolv gem before 0.7.2 for Ruby. Resolv::DNS::Resource.get_class, Resolv::DNS::Resource::Generic.create, and Resolv::DNS::SvcParam::Generic.create generate a new class for each unknown DNS resource record (type, class) pair, or each unknown SvcParamKey, encountered while decoding a response. Each generated class was permanently registered both as a constant on Resource (or SvcParam::Generic) and as an entry in a class-lookup hash (ClassHash), and thus the class remained reachable through that constant after the response was discarded. Type and class are each 16-bit values, and thus an attacker controlling DNS responses (a spoofed response, or a malicious or hijacked upstream DNS server) has roughly 2^32 distinct (type, class) pairs to choose from. A single response of a few hundred kilobytes carrying tens of thousands of distinct unknown types permanently grows process memory by tens of megabytes; repeated responses accumulate without bound and are never - VEX",
        "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/csaf/vex/2026/msrc_cve-2026-80212.json"
      },
      {
        "category": "external",
        "summary": "Microsoft Support Lifecycle",
        "url": "https://support.microsoft.com/lifecycle"
      },
      {
        "category": "external",
        "summary": "Common Vulnerability Scoring System",
        "url": "https://www.first.org/cvss"
      }
    ],
    "title": "An issue was discovered in the resolv gem before 0.7.2 for Ruby. Resolv::DNS::Resource.get_class, Resolv::DNS::Resource::Generic.create, and Resolv::DNS::SvcParam::Generic.create generate a new class for each unknown DNS resource record (type, class) pair, or each unknown SvcParamKey, encountered while decoding a response. Each generated class was permanently registered both as a constant on Resource (or SvcParam::Generic) and as an entry in a class-lookup hash (ClassHash), and thus the class remained reachable through that constant after the response was discarded. Type and class are each 16-bit values, and thus an attacker controlling DNS responses (a spoofed response, or a malicious or hijacked upstream DNS server) has roughly 2^32 distinct (type, class) pairs to choose from. A single response of a few hundred kilobytes carrying tens of thousands of distinct unknown types permanently grows process memory by tens of megabytes; repeated responses accumulate without bound and are never",
    "tracking": {
      "current_release_date": "2026-08-31T14:03:22.000Z",
      "generator": {
        "date": "2026-10-02T07:01:26.677Z",
        "engine": {
          "name": "MSRC Generator",
          "version": "1.0"
        }
      },
      "id": "msrc_CVE-2026-80212",
      "initial_release_date": "2026-08-31T14:03:22.000Z",
      "revision_history": [
        {
          "date": "2026-08-31T14:03:22.000Z",
          "legacy_version": "1",
          "number": "1",
          "summary": "Information published."
        }
      ],
      "status": "final",
      "version": "1"
    }
  },
  "product_tree": {
    "branches": [
      {
        "branches": [
          {
            "branches": [
              {
                "category": "product_version",
                "name": "3.0",
                "product": {
                  "name": "Azure Linux 3.0",
                  "product_id": "17084"
                }
              }
            ],
            "category": "product_name",
            "name": "Azure Linux"
          },
          {
            "category": "product_name",
            "name": "azl3 ruby 0:3.3.5-8.azl3",
            "product": {
              "name": "azl3 ruby 0:3.3.5-8.azl3",
              "product_id": "1"
            }
          }
        ],
        "category": "vendor",
        "name": "Microsoft"
      }
    ],
    "relationships": [
      {
        "category": "default_component_of",
        "full_product_name": {
          "name": "azl3 ruby 0:3.3.5-8.azl3 as a component of Azure Linux 3.0",
          "product_id": "17084-1"
        },
        "product_reference": "1",
        "relates_to_product_reference": "17084"
      }
    ]
  },
  "vulnerabilities": [
    {
      "cve": "CVE-2026-80212",
      "cwe": {
        "id": "CWE-770",
        "name": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling"
      },
      "notes": [
        {
          "category": "general",
          "text": "mitre",
          "title": "Assigning CNA"
        }
      ],
      "product_status": {
        "under_investigation": [
          "17084-1"
        ]
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "category": "self",
          "summary": "CVE-2026-80212 An issue was discovered in the resolv gem before 0.7.2 for Ruby. Resolv::DNS::Resource.get_class, Resolv::DNS::Resource::Generic.create, and Resolv::DNS::SvcParam::Generic.create generate a new class for each unknown DNS resource record (type, class) pair, or each unknown SvcParamKey, encountered while decoding a response. Each generated class was permanently registered both as a constant on Resource (or SvcParam::Generic) and as an entry in a class-lookup hash (ClassHash), and thus the class remained reachable through that constant after the response was discarded. Type and class are each 16-bit values, and thus an attacker controlling DNS responses (a spoofed response, or a malicious or hijacked upstream DNS server) has roughly 2^32 distinct (type, class) pairs to choose from. A single response of a few hundred kilobytes carrying tens of thousands of distinct unknown types permanently grows process memory by tens of megabytes; repeated responses accumulate without bound and are never - VEX",
          "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/csaf/vex/2026/msrc_cve-2026-80212.json"
        }
      ],
      "title": "An issue was discovered in the resolv gem before 0.7.2 for Ruby. Resolv::DNS::Resource.get_class, Resolv::DNS::Resource::Generic.create, and Resolv::DNS::SvcParam::Generic.create generate a new class for each unknown DNS resource record (type, class) pair, or each unknown SvcParamKey, encountered while decoding a response. Each generated class was permanently registered both as a constant on Resource (or SvcParam::Generic) and as an entry in a class-lookup hash (ClassHash), and thus the class remained reachable through that constant after the response was discarded. Type and class are each 16-bit values, and thus an attacker controlling DNS responses (a spoofed response, or a malicious or hijacked upstream DNS server) has roughly 2^32 distinct (type, class) pairs to choose from. A single response of a few hundred kilobytes carrying tens of thousands of distinct unknown types permanently grows process memory by tens of megabytes; repeated responses accumulate without bound and are never"
    }
  ]
}