mal-2026-19938
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (000cea12be23bd792df9085f773c94b79ee13ae70b5154f7d619847bf1b3f0d7)
The package's postinstall script downloads an executable from http://185.212.128.180/chromedriver.bat, writes it to ~/.celest/bin/chrome (or chrome.exe), sets it executable, and later launches it through puppeteer-core. The source is a bare IPv4 address over plain HTTP with no hash, signature, or version pinning, and the URL path is a Windows.bat named 'chromedriver' while the package frames the artifact as a patched Chromium. The same download-and-execute path is also reached from src/browser.js, which calls download() followed by puppeteer.launch({ executablePath }) on first library use, so require()/import of the package will fetch and run the binary even when the postinstall step is skipped via CELEST_SKIP_DOWNLOAD. The destination host is not associated with any legitimate Chromium publisher, and the operator of that host fully controls the bytes that are executed on the installer's machine.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "src/download2.js",
"sha256": "7b4f423840e854e9c1ee15c81ed327184d0cd3c20e2fdf275fb29744a39f94b4",
"tlsh": "634261d925fa22359743fa79918f541ab27a9003340e8e48fe9c43147f82178d7e6eed"
},
{
"path": "src/browser.js",
"sha256": "b01811754e4f7bf9f008c707017ed9e8328a99a3b4aa8c4196e6ddfc1e8ddc78",
"tlsh": "5621aaa611fd36905e8318a180ad11733327c94316cdb96274bf1ea06b2e36ca4f9ec9"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "testpackage83-1.0.0.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "297d94a7f9ee6a0d5017b01cb23435f772675b8d",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-hDZnq7tQMmAKYG18u0qRd8VhIh/S9EX3zGiU17t9q8SIIUle7vooQIRpgu0bBaXyC34ri2ZbV+1E2dpwbl3Veg=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "testpackage83"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.0",
"1.0.1"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
},
{
"contact": [
"https://www.invisirisk.com",
"mailto:research@invisirisk.com"
],
"name": "InvisiRisk, Inc.",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"iocs": {
"files": [
{
"digests": {
"sha256": "2887d1189e8cd9d6abe3dc717be65b0e62bedd68314ab31a259b36a74ee8cca6"
},
"note": "1.0.1 downloader; BINARY_API = https://sendit.sh/DAyiB/vZxBj.bat, saved to ~/.celest/bin/chrome(.exe).",
"paths": [
"src/download2.js"
],
"source": "PACKAGE_ARCHIVE"
},
{
"digests": {
"sha256": "b01811754e4f7bf9f008c707017ed9e8328a99a3b4aa8c4196e6ddfc1e8ddc78"
},
"note": "Launches the downloaded file through puppeteer-core on first use (same in 1.0.0 and 1.0.1).",
"paths": [
"src/browser.js"
],
"source": "PACKAGE_ARCHIVE"
},
{
"digests": {
"sha256": "7bf41dad9adc51e39bbcd7d42dcd5ab76305926d18a2bc2c62a67f4dc95d9b73"
},
"note": "postinstall script: node scripts/install.js",
"paths": [
"package.json"
],
"source": "PACKAGE_ARCHIVE"
},
{
"digests": {
"sha256": "665dab0872efb5f723d70cb4df81a0761833c5a34624ef3683999e2ce101f70e"
},
"note": "Executed by the postinstall script of testpackage83@1.0.1.",
"paths": [
"scripts/install.js"
],
"source": "PACKAGE_ARCHIVE"
}
],
"ips": [
"185.212.128.180"
],
"urls": [
"http://185.212.128.180/chromedriver.bat",
"https://sendit.sh/DAyiB/vZxBj.bat"
]
},
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-022781",
"import_time": "2026-11-14T20:36:15.249212393Z",
"modified_time": "2026-11-14T20:23:49Z",
"sha256": "000cea12be23bd792df9085f773c94b79ee13ae70b5154f7d619847bf1b3f0d7",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (000cea12be23bd792df9085f773c94b79ee13ae70b5154f7d619847bf1b3f0d7)\nThe package\u0027s postinstall script downloads an executable from http://185.212.128.180/chromedriver.bat, writes it to ~/.celest/bin/chrome (or chrome.exe), sets it executable, and later launches it through puppeteer-core. The source is a bare IPv4 address over plain HTTP with no hash, signature, or version pinning, and the URL path is a Windows.bat named \u0027chromedriver\u0027 while the package frames the artifact as a patched Chromium. The same download-and-execute path is also reached from src/browser.js, which calls download() followed by puppeteer.launch({ executablePath }) on first library use, so require()/import of the package will fetch and run the binary even when the postinstall step is skipped via CELEST_SKIP_DOWNLOAD. The destination host is not associated with any legitimate Chromium publisher, and the operator of that host fully controls the bytes that are executed on the installer\u0027s machine.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-19938",
"modified": "2026-11-16T05:41:21.203068602Z",
"published": "2026-11-14T02:29:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/testpackage83/v/1.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in testpackage83 (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
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