mal-2026-19938
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
Published
2026-11-14 02:29
Modified
2026-11-16 05:41
Summary
Malicious code in testpackage83 (npm)
Details

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (000cea12be23bd792df9085f773c94b79ee13ae70b5154f7d619847bf1b3f0d7)

The package's postinstall script downloads an executable from http://185.212.128.180/chromedriver.bat, writes it to ~/.celest/bin/chrome (or chrome.exe), sets it executable, and later launches it through puppeteer-core. The source is a bare IPv4 address over plain HTTP with no hash, signature, or version pinning, and the URL path is a Windows.bat named 'chromedriver' while the package frames the artifact as a patched Chromium. The same download-and-execute path is also reached from src/browser.js, which calls download() followed by puppeteer.launch({ executablePath }) on first library use, so require()/import of the package will fetch and run the binary even when the postinstall step is skipped via CELEST_SKIP_DOWNLOAD. The destination host is not associated with any legitimate Chromium publisher, and the operator of that host fully controls the bytes that are executed on the installer's machine.

CWE
  • CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
  • CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "cwes": [
          {
            "cweId": "CWE-506",
            "description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
            "name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
          },
          {
            "cweId": "CWE-506",
            "description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
            "name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
          }
        ],
        "indicators": {
          "evidence_files": [
            {
              "path": "src/download2.js",
              "sha256": "7b4f423840e854e9c1ee15c81ed327184d0cd3c20e2fdf275fb29744a39f94b4",
              "tlsh": "634261d925fa22359743fa79918f541ab27a9003340e8e48fe9c43147f82178d7e6eed"
            },
            {
              "path": "src/browser.js",
              "sha256": "b01811754e4f7bf9f008c707017ed9e8328a99a3b4aa8c4196e6ddfc1e8ddc78",
              "tlsh": "5621aaa611fd36905e8318a180ad11733327c94316cdb96274bf1ea06b2e36ca4f9ec9"
            }
          ],
          "package_integrity": [
            {
              "filename": "testpackage83-1.0.0.tgz",
              "hashes": {
                "sha1": "297d94a7f9ee6a0d5017b01cb23435f772675b8d",
                "sha512_sri": "sha512-hDZnq7tQMmAKYG18u0qRd8VhIh/S9EX3zGiU17t9q8SIIUle7vooQIRpgu0bBaXyC34ri2ZbV+1E2dpwbl3Veg=="
              }
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "testpackage83"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1.0.0",
        "1.0.1"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "credits": [
    {
      "contact": [
        "inspector-research@amazon.com"
      ],
      "name": "Amazon Inspector",
      "type": "FINDER"
    },
    {
      "contact": [
        "https://www.invisirisk.com",
        "mailto:research@invisirisk.com"
      ],
      "name": "InvisiRisk, Inc.",
      "type": "FINDER"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "iocs": {
      "files": [
        {
          "digests": {
            "sha256": "2887d1189e8cd9d6abe3dc717be65b0e62bedd68314ab31a259b36a74ee8cca6"
          },
          "note": "1.0.1 downloader; BINARY_API = https://sendit.sh/DAyiB/vZxBj.bat, saved to ~/.celest/bin/chrome(.exe).",
          "paths": [
            "src/download2.js"
          ],
          "source": "PACKAGE_ARCHIVE"
        },
        {
          "digests": {
            "sha256": "b01811754e4f7bf9f008c707017ed9e8328a99a3b4aa8c4196e6ddfc1e8ddc78"
          },
          "note": "Launches the downloaded file through puppeteer-core on first use (same in 1.0.0 and 1.0.1).",
          "paths": [
            "src/browser.js"
          ],
          "source": "PACKAGE_ARCHIVE"
        },
        {
          "digests": {
            "sha256": "7bf41dad9adc51e39bbcd7d42dcd5ab76305926d18a2bc2c62a67f4dc95d9b73"
          },
          "note": "postinstall script: node scripts/install.js",
          "paths": [
            "package.json"
          ],
          "source": "PACKAGE_ARCHIVE"
        },
        {
          "digests": {
            "sha256": "665dab0872efb5f723d70cb4df81a0761833c5a34624ef3683999e2ce101f70e"
          },
          "note": "Executed by the postinstall script of testpackage83@1.0.1.",
          "paths": [
            "scripts/install.js"
          ],
          "source": "PACKAGE_ARCHIVE"
        }
      ],
      "ips": [
        "185.212.128.180"
      ],
      "urls": [
        "http://185.212.128.180/chromedriver.bat",
        "https://sendit.sh/DAyiB/vZxBj.bat"
      ]
    },
    "malicious-packages-origins": [
      {
        "id": "IN-MAL-2026-022781",
        "import_time": "2026-11-14T20:36:15.249212393Z",
        "modified_time": "2026-11-14T20:23:49Z",
        "sha256": "000cea12be23bd792df9085f773c94b79ee13ae70b5154f7d619847bf1b3f0d7",
        "source": "amazon-inspector",
        "versions": [
          "1.0.0"
        ]
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (000cea12be23bd792df9085f773c94b79ee13ae70b5154f7d619847bf1b3f0d7)\nThe package\u0027s postinstall script downloads an executable from http://185.212.128.180/chromedriver.bat, writes it to ~/.celest/bin/chrome (or chrome.exe), sets it executable, and later launches it through puppeteer-core. The source is a bare IPv4 address over plain HTTP with no hash, signature, or version pinning, and the URL path is a Windows.bat named \u0027chromedriver\u0027 while the package frames the artifact as a patched Chromium. The same download-and-execute path is also reached from src/browser.js, which calls download() followed by puppeteer.launch({ executablePath }) on first library use, so require()/import of the package will fetch and run the binary even when the postinstall step is skipped via CELEST_SKIP_DOWNLOAD. The destination host is not associated with any legitimate Chromium publisher, and the operator of that host fully controls the bytes that are executed on the installer\u0027s machine.\n",
  "id": "MAL-2026-19938",
  "modified": "2026-11-16T05:41:21.203068602Z",
  "published": "2026-11-14T02:29:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/testpackage83/v/1.0.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "Malicious code in testpackage83 (npm)"
}



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