mal-2026-19289
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (e4ce1e726810b4fb8b80ccf673b1101c68ee68fa7ee8c8ae92e4c12ba75c779a)
setup.py defines a custom install cmdclass (PostInstall) that runs exec(base64.b64decode(...).decode()) during pip install. The decoded payload enumerates classic installer secrets — ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.env — and cryptocurrency wallet stores (Ethereum keystore, Exodus, MetaMask, Solana, Phantom), plus matching *.json files, base64-encodes portions of each file, and POSTs them to a hardcoded Discord webhook at discord.com/api/webhooks/1570872953443455097/. The base64+exec wrapper exists only to hide the stealer from casual review of setup.py.
Source: kam193 (7bb0be864a1e4a0a1e01ae4fa900052bf2f74c57f9d7ed40b4fae48caa84e746)
During installation package exfiltrates sensitive files used by cryptocurrency wallets and storing cloud credentials.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-11-axiom-dragon-xyz
Reasons (based on the campaign):
-
infostealer
-
The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
-
exfiltration-crypto
-
exfiltration-credentials
-
obfuscation
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"artifacts": [
"axiom_dragon_xyz-1.0.4.tar.gz"
],
"path": "setup.py",
"sha256": "de04335ebfa2001abab357fdef2123b12996f79db713dbf59d0fe8eff9f27a79",
"tlsh": "fb5162090e422e7caf4099928bdd20da263e1b9f25002f8c3bdf8e5593d926290d55ed"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "axiom_dragon_xyz-1.0.4-py3-none-any.whl",
"hashes": {
"blake2b_256": "e6439a053d2c0149cd501d6c2822f14935817b8654f7551185723b029047082b",
"md5": "43d860f819d31f0da0deefdbc1edf53a",
"sha256": "4c52ce6db2c4f900e14b13fa477ab7287b2dd618c5f462a0a036b30a1ab0c07a"
}
},
{
"filename": "axiom_dragon_xyz-1.0.4.tar.gz",
"hashes": {
"blake2b_256": "57ecfd7e75ba08b2e26069260c8c069844d72019a6e1ed37fe216042cb82fda6",
"md5": "b64a2339db30316c25ca836b136d3107",
"sha256": "da0752336b000bb64ac7f7035456ed0ee9ebbfda33d7a5034dd85c61823eca26"
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "axiom-dragon-xyz"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.4"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
},
{
"contact": [
"https://github.com/kam193",
"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"
],
"name": "Kamil Ma\u0144kowski (kam193)",
"type": "REPORTER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"iocs": {
"urls": [
"https://discord.com/api/webhooks/1570872953443455097/oXZEvN0r58Yg_DfQb9DKHDs0S9dlaRaN8bLEU7LyTRlTsCzX7Ore8p-DyrtRq_n7lekK"
]
},
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "pypi/2026-11-axiom-dragon-xyz/axiom-dragon-xyz",
"import_time": "2026-11-13T21:09:25.28401974Z",
"modified_time": "2026-11-13T20:29:40.811338Z",
"sha256": "7bb0be864a1e4a0a1e01ae4fa900052bf2f74c57f9d7ed40b4fae48caa84e746",
"source": "kam193",
"versions": [
"1.0.4"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-022780",
"import_time": "2026-11-14T20:36:15.227416387Z",
"modified_time": "2026-11-14T20:23:05Z",
"sha256": "e4ce1e726810b4fb8b80ccf673b1101c68ee68fa7ee8c8ae92e4c12ba75c779a",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.4"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (e4ce1e726810b4fb8b80ccf673b1101c68ee68fa7ee8c8ae92e4c12ba75c779a)\nsetup.py defines a custom install cmdclass (PostInstall) that runs exec(base64.b64decode(...).decode()) during `pip install`. The decoded payload enumerates classic installer secrets \u2014 ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.env \u2014 and cryptocurrency wallet stores (Ethereum keystore, Exodus, MetaMask, Solana, Phantom), plus matching *.json files, base64-encodes portions of each file, and POSTs them to a hardcoded Discord webhook at discord.com/api/webhooks/1570872953443455097/. The base64+exec wrapper exists only to hide the stealer from casual review of setup.py.\n\n## Source: kam193 (7bb0be864a1e4a0a1e01ae4fa900052bf2f74c57f9d7ed40b4fae48caa84e746)\nDuring installation package exfiltrates sensitive files used by cryptocurrency wallets and storing cloud credentials.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-11-axiom-dragon-xyz\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - infostealer\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n\n\n - exfiltration-crypto\n\n\n - exfiltration-credentials\n\n\n - obfuscation\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-19289",
"modified": "2026-11-14T20:37:55.278691292Z",
"published": "2026-11-13T20:29:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/axiom-dragon-xyz"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/axiom-dragon-xyz/1.0.4/"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in axiom-dragon-xyz (PyPI)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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