mal-2026-17453
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
Published
Modified
2026-10-02 00:00
Summary
Malicious code in gocommunity.io/orderedbtree (Go)
Details
Part of the Graphalgo campaign. The module, first published around 2026-08-11, contains a second-stage remote access trojan in plaintext that runs automatically. The RAT collects system information, executes decrypted Go or JavaScript payloads, and polls two command-and-control channels every 3-10 seconds: an Ethereum smart contract used as a dead drop (Arbitrum Sepolia) and a Slack bot token.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "gocommunity.io/orderedbtree"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"name": "Aikido Security",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"iocs": {
"domains": [
"gocommunity.io",
"gogets.dev",
"portfolio-devs.slack.com",
"portfolio-testers.slack.com",
"mediumstar.slack.com"
],
"files": [
{
"digests": {
"sha256": "5f892a5424e88a21a3eb3d7f82ebf04d8ac31cdb19ada25153be4165df977d0f"
},
"paths": [
"import-resource.sqlite3"
]
}
]
}
},
"details": "Part of the Graphalgo campaign. The module, first published around 2026-08-11, contains a second-stage remote access trojan in plaintext that runs automatically. The RAT collects system information, executes decrypted Go or JavaScript payloads, and polls two command-and-control channels every 3-10 seconds: an Ethereum smart contract used as a dead drop (Arbitrum Sepolia) and a Slack bot token.",
"id": "MAL-2026-17453",
"modified": "2026-10-02T00:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ARTICLE",
"url": "https://www.aikido.dev/blog/graphalgo-terraform-go-modules"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in gocommunity.io/orderedbtree (Go)"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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