GHSA-XQP5-J42W-5FQ8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-18 18:31 – Updated: 2026-10-24 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: reject invalid and unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG to prevent bc_ackers underflow
Commit 48a5fe38772b ("tipc: fix bc_ackers underflow on duplicate GRP_ACK_MSG") rejected duplicate/stale ACKs in tipc_group_proto_rcv() by returning early when less_eq(acked, m->bc_acked).
However, that check remains incomplete in two ways:
-
When grp->bc_ackers is zero (e.g. on a quiet group, when replicast ACKs were not requested, or after all expected members have already acknowledged), an unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG with acked > m->bc_acked passes less_eq() and unconditionally decrements grp->bc_ackers. Because bc_ackers is a u16, this wraps to 65535, causing tipc_group_bc_cong() to permanently report congestion and blocking all future group broadcasts on the socket.
-
During an active broadcast round (grp->bc_ackers > 0), the sender transmits packet S and advances grp->bc_snd_nxt to S + 1. Receivers increment their expected counter to S + 1 upon consuming packet S, so the only valid ACK value for the current round is strictly acked == grp->bc_snd_nxt.
However, tipc_group_update_bc_members() initializes each member's m->bc_acked to prev = grp->bc_snd_nxt - 1 (S - 1 before increment). This leaves a 2-sequence gap (S - 1 to S + 1) in sequence space. An incoming ACK is therefore neither rejected as duplicate nor prevented from decrementing grp->bc_ackers if an unexpected or stale value (such as S) is received. A member sending acked = S followed by acked = S + 1 could decrement grp->bc_ackers twice in the same round, prematurely clearing bc_ackers or underflowing it.
Fix this by: - Dropping GRP_ACK_MSG immediately if grp->bc_ackers is zero. - Requiring acked == grp->bc_snd_nxt and rejecting duplicates where m->bc_acked == acked. Because replicast broadcast rounds are strictly sequential, only grp->bc_snd_nxt can be acknowledged, and each member can acknowledge at most once per round.
Note that a related pre-existing issue in tipc_group_delete_member() (where grp->bc_ackers decrementing to zero upon member departure does not restore *grp->open or trigger a socket wakeup) will be addressed in a separate patch.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98550"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-18T16:17:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntipc: reject invalid and unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG to prevent bc_ackers underflow\n\nCommit 48a5fe38772b (\"tipc: fix bc_ackers underflow on duplicate\nGRP_ACK_MSG\") rejected duplicate/stale ACKs in tipc_group_proto_rcv()\nby returning early when less_eq(acked, m-\u003ebc_acked).\n\nHowever, that check remains incomplete in two ways:\n\n1. When grp-\u003ebc_ackers is zero (e.g. on a quiet group, when replicast\n ACKs were not requested, or after all expected members have already\n acknowledged), an unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG with acked \u003e m-\u003ebc_acked\n passes less_eq() and unconditionally decrements grp-\u003ebc_ackers.\n Because bc_ackers is a u16, this wraps to 65535, causing\n tipc_group_bc_cong() to permanently report congestion and blocking\n all future group broadcasts on the socket.\n\n2. During an active broadcast round (grp-\u003ebc_ackers \u003e 0), the sender\n transmits packet S and advances grp-\u003ebc_snd_nxt to S + 1. Receivers\n increment their expected counter to S + 1 upon consuming packet S,\n so the only valid ACK value for the current round is strictly\n acked == grp-\u003ebc_snd_nxt.\n\n However, tipc_group_update_bc_members() initializes each member\u0027s\n m-\u003ebc_acked to prev = grp-\u003ebc_snd_nxt - 1 (S - 1 before increment).\n This leaves a 2-sequence gap (S - 1 to S + 1) in sequence space.\n An incoming ACK is therefore neither rejected as duplicate nor\n prevented from decrementing grp-\u003ebc_ackers if an unexpected or stale\n value (such as S) is received. A member sending acked = S followed\n by acked = S + 1 could decrement grp-\u003ebc_ackers twice in the same\n round, prematurely clearing bc_ackers or underflowing it.\n\nFix this by:\n- Dropping GRP_ACK_MSG immediately if grp-\u003ebc_ackers is zero.\n- Requiring acked == grp-\u003ebc_snd_nxt and rejecting duplicates where\n m-\u003ebc_acked == acked. Because replicast broadcast rounds are strictly\n sequential, only grp-\u003ebc_snd_nxt can be acknowledged, and each member\n can acknowledge at most once per round.\n\nNote that a related pre-existing issue in tipc_group_delete_member()\n(where grp-\u003ebc_ackers decrementing to zero upon member departure does\nnot restore *grp-\u003eopen or trigger a socket wakeup) will be addressed\nin a separate patch.",
"id": "GHSA-xqp5-j42w-5fq8",
"modified": "2026-10-24T15:32:47Z",
"published": "2026-10-18T18:31:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98550"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/12cc3a1eac5a2a06b67a7b85f0f48ff241a94d1b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/478fb08d0c2a53002a721d22b8d6681ec971d90f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/507a27435b2bb1f22e3a3674f6a6553eb815021b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/80a9ccfc24d3776ef6753a57315e726475fac7d7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99cc2a62e07a44a22254d7beca9ef1f8ad886d0d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b94a90651e1fa573c6ac6a5a6b269d5874df2c0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b0e517961f09b9f60d338d1ea4e17aacdbf206f0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/edc6593c442278fceff0120e8cc58bc592168c35"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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