GHSA-XHQ9-58FW-859P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 20:42 – Updated: 2026-04-16 20:42
VLAI
Summary
ApostropheCMS: publicApiProjection Bypass via project Query Builder in Piece-Type REST API
Details

Summary

The getRestQuery method in the @apostrophecms/piece-type module checks whether a MongoDB projection has already been set before applying the admin-configured publicApiProjection. An unauthenticated attacker can supply a project query parameter in the REST API request to pre-populate the projection state, causing the security-enforced publicApiProjection to be skipped entirely. This allows disclosure of fields that the site administrator explicitly restricted from public access.

Details

When an unauthenticated user queries the piece-type REST API, the getRestQuery method processes the request at modules/@apostrophecms/piece-type/index.js:1120:

// piece-type/index.js:1120-1137
getRestQuery(req, omitPermissionCheck = false) {
  const query = self.find(req).attachments(true);
  query.applyBuildersSafely(req.query);          // [1] attacker input applied first
  if (!omitPermissionCheck && !self.canAccessApi(req)) {
    if (!self.options.publicApiProjection) {
      query.and({
        _id: null
      });
    } else if (!query.state.project) {            // [2] checks if projection already set
      query.project({
        ...self.options.publicApiProjection,
        cacheInvalidatedAt: 1
      });
    }
  }
  return query;
},

At [1], applyBuildersSafely iterates over all query string parameters and invokes their corresponding builder methods. The project builder exists in @apostrophecms/doc-type with a launder method (doc-type/index.js:1876) that sanitizes values to booleans:

// doc-type/index.js:1875-1889
project: {
  launder (p) {
    if (!p || typeof p !== 'object' || Array.isArray(p)) {
      return {};
    }
    const projection = Object.entries(p).reduce((acc, [ key, val ]) => {
      return {
        ...acc,
        [key]: self.apos.launder.boolean(val)
      };
    }, {});
    return projection;
  },

When a request includes ?project[someField]=1, the builder sets query.state.project to {someField: true}. At [2], the conditional !query.state.project evaluates to false because the state is already populated, so the publicApiProjection is never applied.

For comparison, the @apostrophecms/page module's equivalent method (page/index.js:2953) unconditionally applies the projection:

// page/index.js:2953-2958
} else {
  query.project({
    ...self.options.publicApiProjection,
    cacheInvalidatedAt: 1
  });
}

PoC

Prerequisites: An ApostropheCMS 4.x instance with a piece-type (e.g., article) that has publicApiProjection configured to restrict fields. For example:

// modules/article/index.js
module.exports = {
  extend: '@apostrophecms/piece-type',
  options: {
    publicApiProjection: {
      title: 1,
      _url: 1
    }
  }
};

Step 1: Normal request — observe restricted fields are hidden:

curl 'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/article'

Response returns only title and _url fields per the configured projection.

Step 2: Bypass projection by supplying project query parameter:

curl 'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/article?project[internalNotes]=1&project[title]=1&project[slug]=1&project[createdAt]=1'

Response now includes internalNotes, slug, createdAt, and any other requested fields — bypassing the admin-configured publicApiProjection restriction.

Step 3: Request all default fields by projecting inclusion of sensitive fields:

curl 'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/article?project[_id]=1&project[title]=1&project[slug]=1&project[visibility]=1&project[type]=1&project[createdAt]=1&project[updatedAt]=1'

All requested fields are returned, confirming the publicApiProjection is fully bypassed.

Impact

  • Information Disclosure: An unauthenticated attacker can read any field on documents that are already publicly queryable, bypassing administrator-configured field restrictions. This may expose internal notes, draft content, metadata, or other sensitive fields the administrator intentionally hid from the public API.
  • Scope: Affects all piece-type modules with publicApiProjection configured. The attacker cannot access documents they wouldn't otherwise be able to query (document-level permissions still apply), but they can read any field on accessible documents.
  • Exploitability: Trivial — requires only appending query parameters to a public URL. No authentication, special tools, or chaining required.

Recommended Fix

Remove the conditional check on query.state.project in piece-type/index.js, matching the page module's unconditional behavior. The admin-configured publicApiProjection should always override any user-supplied projection for unauthenticated users:

// modules/@apostrophecms/piece-type/index.js:1123-1134
// BEFORE (vulnerable):
if (!omitPermissionCheck && !self.canAccessApi(req)) {
  if (!self.options.publicApiProjection) {
    query.and({
      _id: null
    });
  } else if (!query.state.project) {
    query.project({
      ...self.options.publicApiProjection,
      cacheInvalidatedAt: 1
    });
  }
}

// AFTER (fixed):
if (!omitPermissionCheck && !self.canAccessApi(req)) {
  if (!self.options.publicApiProjection) {
    query.and({
      _id: null
    });
  } else {
    query.project({
      ...self.options.publicApiProjection,
      cacheInvalidatedAt: 1
    });
  }
}
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "apostrophe"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.29.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33888"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T20:42:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-15T20:16:35Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `getRestQuery` method in the `@apostrophecms/piece-type` module checks whether a MongoDB projection has already been set before applying the admin-configured `publicApiProjection`. An unauthenticated attacker can supply a `project` query parameter in the REST API request to pre-populate the projection state, causing the security-enforced `publicApiProjection` to be skipped entirely. This allows disclosure of fields that the site administrator explicitly restricted from public access.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen an unauthenticated user queries the piece-type REST API, the `getRestQuery` method processes the request at `modules/@apostrophecms/piece-type/index.js:1120`:\n\n```javascript\n// piece-type/index.js:1120-1137\ngetRestQuery(req, omitPermissionCheck = false) {\n  const query = self.find(req).attachments(true);\n  query.applyBuildersSafely(req.query);          // [1] attacker input applied first\n  if (!omitPermissionCheck \u0026\u0026 !self.canAccessApi(req)) {\n    if (!self.options.publicApiProjection) {\n      query.and({\n        _id: null\n      });\n    } else if (!query.state.project) {            // [2] checks if projection already set\n      query.project({\n        ...self.options.publicApiProjection,\n        cacheInvalidatedAt: 1\n      });\n    }\n  }\n  return query;\n},\n```\n\nAt **[1]**, `applyBuildersSafely` iterates over all query string parameters and invokes their corresponding builder methods. The `project` builder exists in `@apostrophecms/doc-type` with a `launder` method (`doc-type/index.js:1876`) that sanitizes values to booleans:\n\n```javascript\n// doc-type/index.js:1875-1889\nproject: {\n  launder (p) {\n    if (!p || typeof p !== \u0027object\u0027 || Array.isArray(p)) {\n      return {};\n    }\n    const projection = Object.entries(p).reduce((acc, [ key, val ]) =\u003e {\n      return {\n        ...acc,\n        [key]: self.apos.launder.boolean(val)\n      };\n    }, {});\n    return projection;\n  },\n```\n\nWhen a request includes `?project[someField]=1`, the builder sets `query.state.project` to `{someField: true}`. At **[2]**, the conditional `!query.state.project` evaluates to `false` because the state is already populated, so the `publicApiProjection` is never applied.\n\nFor comparison, the `@apostrophecms/page` module\u0027s equivalent method (`page/index.js:2953`) unconditionally applies the projection:\n\n```javascript\n// page/index.js:2953-2958\n} else {\n  query.project({\n    ...self.options.publicApiProjection,\n    cacheInvalidatedAt: 1\n  });\n}\n```\n\n## PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** An ApostropheCMS 4.x instance with a piece-type (e.g., `article`) that has `publicApiProjection` configured to restrict fields. For example:\n\n```javascript\n// modules/article/index.js\nmodule.exports = {\n  extend: \u0027@apostrophecms/piece-type\u0027,\n  options: {\n    publicApiProjection: {\n      title: 1,\n      _url: 1\n    }\n  }\n};\n```\n\n**Step 1:** Normal request \u2014 observe restricted fields are hidden:\n\n```bash\ncurl \u0027http://localhost:3000/api/v1/article\u0027\n```\n\nResponse returns only `title` and `_url` fields per the configured projection.\n\n**Step 2:** Bypass projection by supplying `project` query parameter:\n\n```bash\ncurl \u0027http://localhost:3000/api/v1/article?project[internalNotes]=1\u0026project[title]=1\u0026project[slug]=1\u0026project[createdAt]=1\u0027\n```\n\nResponse now includes `internalNotes`, `slug`, `createdAt`, and any other requested fields \u2014 bypassing the admin-configured `publicApiProjection` restriction.\n\n**Step 3:** Request all default fields by projecting inclusion of sensitive fields:\n\n```bash\ncurl \u0027http://localhost:3000/api/v1/article?project[_id]=1\u0026project[title]=1\u0026project[slug]=1\u0026project[visibility]=1\u0026project[type]=1\u0026project[createdAt]=1\u0026project[updatedAt]=1\u0027\n```\n\nAll requested fields are returned, confirming the `publicApiProjection` is fully bypassed.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Information Disclosure:** An unauthenticated attacker can read any field on documents that are already publicly queryable, bypassing administrator-configured field restrictions. This may expose internal notes, draft content, metadata, or other sensitive fields the administrator intentionally hid from the public API.\n- **Scope:** Affects all piece-type modules with `publicApiProjection` configured. The attacker cannot access documents they wouldn\u0027t otherwise be able to query (document-level permissions still apply), but they can read any field on accessible documents.\n- **Exploitability:** Trivial \u2014 requires only appending query parameters to a public URL. No authentication, special tools, or chaining required.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nRemove the conditional check on `query.state.project` in `piece-type/index.js`, matching the page module\u0027s unconditional behavior. The admin-configured `publicApiProjection` should always override any user-supplied projection for unauthenticated users:\n\n```javascript\n// modules/@apostrophecms/piece-type/index.js:1123-1134\n// BEFORE (vulnerable):\nif (!omitPermissionCheck \u0026\u0026 !self.canAccessApi(req)) {\n  if (!self.options.publicApiProjection) {\n    query.and({\n      _id: null\n    });\n  } else if (!query.state.project) {\n    query.project({\n      ...self.options.publicApiProjection,\n      cacheInvalidatedAt: 1\n    });\n  }\n}\n\n// AFTER (fixed):\nif (!omitPermissionCheck \u0026\u0026 !self.canAccessApi(req)) {\n  if (!self.options.publicApiProjection) {\n    query.and({\n      _id: null\n    });\n  } else {\n    query.project({\n      ...self.options.publicApiProjection,\n      cacheInvalidatedAt: 1\n    });\n  }\n}\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-xhq9-58fw-859p",
  "modified": "2026-04-16T20:42:21Z",
  "published": "2026-04-16T20:42:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/security/advisories/GHSA-xhq9-58fw-859p"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33888"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/00d472804bb622df36a761b6f2cf2b33b2d4ce80"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/6c2b548dec2e3f7a82e8e16736603f4cd17525aa"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ApostropheCMS: publicApiProjection Bypass via project Query Builder in Piece-Type REST API"
}



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