GHSA-X2VM-CF3P-M2W8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-17 21:06 – Updated: 2026-11-17 21:06Summary
A single gossipsub peer can grow a node's topics map without bound by flooding subscription RPCs, because the default configuration has no global, per-peer, or topic-length cap and peer scoring does not penalise subscription volume. The peer is never greylisted, so the growth continues toward OOM.
Details
handleReceivedSubscription (packages/gossipsub/src/gossipsub.ts:1028, line 1036) runs this.topics.set(topic, new Set()) for every distinct topic string:
private handleReceivedSubscription (from, topic, subscribe) {
let topicSet = this.topics.get(topic)
if (subscribe) {
if (topicSet == null) {
topicSet = new Set()
this.topics.set(topic, topicSet) // no global cap, no per-peer cap
}
topicSet.add(from.toString())
}
}
The only topical gate (gossipsub.ts:981, if (this.allowedTopics != null && !this.allowedTopics.has(topic)) return) is skipped when allowedTopics is null — the default. Subscriptions are unsigned RPC metadata (no signature needed); decodeRpc's per-RPC limit caps count (maxSubscriptions = 5000) but not topic-string length or aggregate size; and the peer-scoring components P1–P7 have no subscription-volume term, so the attacker's score stays at 0 (above the graylistThreshold of −80) and acceptFrom keeps returning true. Verified on js-libp2p commit a04f5e0, where @libp2p/gossipsub reads 16.0.4.
PoC
Full PoC attached (gossipsub-topics-unbounded-growth-poc.tar.gz). Build the js-libp2p monorepo at the affected version (npm install --ignore-scripts && npm run build), extract the package inside the monorepo root (sibling of packages/), then cd gossipsub-topics-unbounded-growth-poc && node attack.mjs. Expected (default config):
[*] sending 300 RPC frames x 4000 unique ~190-byte topic subscriptions (1,200,000 topics total)
[*] progress: 88% sent | victim topics=1,032,000 rss=740MB peers=1
[*] victim quiesced: topics=~1,100,000 rss=~870MB peers=1
[!] Vulnerability reproduced: one connected peer grew the victim's gossipsub topics map to ~1.1M entries (RSS +~900MB) with 300 subscription RPCs — no global, per-peer, or topic-length cap in the default config
Control run (ALLOWED_TOPICS=legit-topic, i.e. node attack.mjs control): the identical flood is rejected at the allowedTopics gate and the topics map stays at 0 entries — confirming the vulnerable condition is the default allowedTopics-unset config. The map grows monotonically with no cap until the victim's own resource pressure trips; on disconnect removePeer performs an O(N) sweep over every topic entry (a secondary CPU cost) while the ~1 GB heap stays committed.
Impact
CWE-400/CWE-770. Every node running default gossipsub is affected; the attacker needs only one connection and is never rate-limited or greylisted. Growth continues toward OOM; on disconnect the O(N) removePeer sweep adds CPU cost. Suggested fix: bound by default (not opt-in) — a global cap on topics.size, a per-peer subscription cap with a P7 behaviour penalty so acceptFrom eventually greylists, a topic-string length cap at decode time, and/or flipping allowedTopics to deny-by-default; make removePeer's topic iteration non-blocking/capped.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@libp2p/gossipsub"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "17.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-119793"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-17T21:06:20Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA single gossipsub peer can grow a node\u0027s `topics` map without bound by flooding subscription RPCs, because the default configuration has no global, per-peer, or topic-length cap and peer scoring does not penalise subscription volume. The peer is never greylisted, so the growth continues toward OOM.\n\n### Details\n`handleReceivedSubscription` (`packages/gossipsub/src/gossipsub.ts:1028`, line 1036) runs `this.topics.set(topic, new Set())` for every distinct topic string:\n\n```ts\nprivate handleReceivedSubscription (from, topic, subscribe) {\n let topicSet = this.topics.get(topic)\n if (subscribe) {\n if (topicSet == null) {\n topicSet = new Set()\n this.topics.set(topic, topicSet) // no global cap, no per-peer cap\n }\n topicSet.add(from.toString())\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe only topical gate (`gossipsub.ts:981`, `if (this.allowedTopics != null \u0026\u0026 !this.allowedTopics.has(topic)) return`) is skipped when `allowedTopics` is null \u2014 the default. Subscriptions are unsigned RPC metadata (no signature needed); `decodeRpc`\u0027s per-RPC limit caps count (`maxSubscriptions = 5000`) but not topic-string length or aggregate size; and the peer-scoring components P1\u2013P7 have no subscription-volume term, so the attacker\u0027s score stays at 0 (above the `graylistThreshold` of \u221280) and `acceptFrom` keeps returning true. Verified on js-libp2p commit `a04f5e0`, where `@libp2p/gossipsub` reads `16.0.4`.\n\n### PoC\nFull PoC attached (`gossipsub-topics-unbounded-growth-poc.tar.gz`). Build the js-libp2p monorepo at the affected version (`npm install --ignore-scripts \u0026\u0026 npm run build`), extract the package inside the monorepo root (sibling of `packages/`), then `cd gossipsub-topics-unbounded-growth-poc \u0026\u0026 node attack.mjs`. Expected (default config):\n\n```\n[*] sending 300 RPC frames x 4000 unique ~190-byte topic subscriptions (1,200,000 topics total)\n[*] progress: 88% sent | victim topics=1,032,000 rss=740MB peers=1\n[*] victim quiesced: topics=~1,100,000 rss=~870MB peers=1\n[!] Vulnerability reproduced: one connected peer grew the victim\u0027s gossipsub topics map to ~1.1M entries (RSS +~900MB) with 300 subscription RPCs \u2014 no global, per-peer, or topic-length cap in the default config\n```\n\nControl run (`ALLOWED_TOPICS=legit-topic`, i.e. `node attack.mjs control`): the identical flood is rejected at the `allowedTopics` gate and the topics map stays at 0 entries \u2014 confirming the vulnerable condition is the default `allowedTopics`-unset config. The map grows monotonically with no cap until the victim\u0027s own resource pressure trips; on disconnect `removePeer` performs an O(N) sweep over every topic entry (a secondary CPU cost) while the ~1 GB heap stays committed.\n\n### Impact\nCWE-400/CWE-770. Every node running default gossipsub is affected; the attacker needs only one connection and is never rate-limited or greylisted. Growth continues toward OOM; on disconnect the O(N) `removePeer` sweep adds CPU cost. Suggested fix: bound by default (not opt-in) \u2014 a global cap on `topics.size`, a per-peer subscription cap with a P7 behaviour penalty so `acceptFrom` eventually greylists, a topic-string length cap at decode time, and/or flipping `allowedTopics` to deny-by-default; make `removePeer`\u0027s topic iteration non-blocking/capped.\n\n[gossipsub-topics-unbounded-growth-poc.tar.gz](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/30452451/gossipsub-topics-unbounded-growth-poc.tar.gz)",
"id": "GHSA-x2vm-cf3p-m2w8",
"modified": "2026-11-17T21:06:20Z",
"published": "2026-11-17T21:06:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/security/advisories/GHSA-x2vm-cf3p-m2w8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/pull/3593"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/commit/d5534174d8b7d23ac1bd45a7e738664fbfb0cf4c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/releases/tag/gossipsub-v17.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "libp2p: gossipsub creates a permanent topics-map entry per distinct subscription with no cap in the default config"
}
Sightings
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|---|
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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