GHSA-WV9F-QF5H-J5X5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-02 21:32 – Updated: 2026-11-06 18:35
VLAI
Details
The vulnerability is a Use-After-Free (UAF) in the EVS AIDL HAL, arising from a data race on an unsynchronized std::weak_ptr within EvsEnumerator::openCamera(). Specifically, concurrent calls from a privileged UID (e.g., AID_AUTOMOTIVE_EVS) can cause a torn weak_ptr state, leading to a virtual call through a freed object's vtable at cameraObj->getCameraInfo(&desc). This allows for potential arbitrary code execution within the hal_evs_default process.
Severity
6.7 (Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-58927"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-362"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-02T21:17:36Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The vulnerability is a Use-After-Free (UAF) in the EVS AIDL HAL, arising from a data race on an unsynchronized `std::weak_ptr` within `EvsEnumerator::openCamera()`. Specifically, concurrent calls from a privileged UID (e.g., `AID_AUTOMOTIVE_EVS`) can cause a torn `weak_ptr` state, leading to a virtual call through a freed object\u0027s vtable at `cameraObj-\u003egetCameraInfo(\u0026desc)`. This allows for potential arbitrary code execution within the `hal_evs_default` process.",
"id": "GHSA-wv9f-qf5h-j5x5",
"modified": "2026-11-06T18:35:05Z",
"published": "2026-11-02T21:32:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58927"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/aaos/2026/2026-11-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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