Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-WJ7F-468M-6MV8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-01 22:46 – Updated: 2023-12-01 22:46

Summary

Environment variables still accessible through /proc

Details

Impact

Environment variables can be read from procfs unless a new process is started.

PoC

use birdcage::{Birdcage, Sandbox};
use std::{env, fs};

fn main() {
    Birdcage::new().lock().unwrap();

    assert_eq!(env::var_os("SECRET"), None);

    let environ = fs::read_to_string("/proc/self/environ").unwrap();
    assert!(!environ.contains("SECRET"), "ENVIRON CONTAINS SECRET:\n{environ}");
}

$ SECRET=test cargo run thread 'main' panicked at src/main.rs:10:5: ENVIRON CONTAINS SECRET: [truncated]

Possible Solutions

The simplest solution would be relying on the ptrace isolation and always spawning a new process by changing birdcage's API to create a new command. With an additional PID namespace the guarantees could be even further reinforced.

Severity

4.0 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "birdcage"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.7.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-12-01T22:46:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nEnvironment variables can be read from procfs unless a new process is started.\n\n### PoC\n\n```\nuse birdcage::{Birdcage, Sandbox};\nuse std::{env, fs};\n\nfn main() {\n    Birdcage::new().lock().unwrap();\n\n    assert_eq!(env::var_os(\"SECRET\"), None);\n\n    let environ = fs::read_to_string(\"/proc/self/environ\").unwrap();\n    assert!(!environ.contains(\"SECRET\"), \"ENVIRON CONTAINS SECRET:\\n{environ}\");\n}\n```\n\n```\n$  SECRET=test cargo run\nthread \u0027main\u0027 panicked at src/main.rs:10:5:\nENVIRON CONTAINS SECRET:\n [truncated]\n ```\n\n### Possible Solutions\n\nThe simplest solution would be relying on the ptrace isolation and **always** spawning a new process by changing birdcage\u0027s API to create a new command. With an additional PID namespace the guarantees could be even further reinforced.\n",
  "id": "GHSA-wj7f-468m-6mv8",
  "modified": "2023-12-01T22:46:37Z",
  "published": "2023-12-01T22:46:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/phylum-dev/birdcage/security/advisories/GHSA-wj7f-468m-6mv8"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/phylum-dev/birdcage"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Environment variables still accessible through /proc"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

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