GHSA-VMHM-3CG3-FM3J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-10 18:31 – Updated: 2026-11-10 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_byteorder: remove multi-register support
64bit byteorder conversion is broken when several registers need to be converted because the source register array advances in steps for 4 bytes instead of 8:
for (i = ... src64 = nft_reg_load64(&src[i]); ~~~~~ u32 *src nft_reg_store64(&dst64[i],
Remove the multi-register support, it has other issues as well:
Pablo points out that commit caf3ef7468f7 ("netfilter: nf_tables: prevent OOB access in nft_byteorder_eval") alters semantics: before the loop operated on registers, i.e. for ( ... ) dst32[i] = htons((u16)src32[i])
.. but after the patch it will operate on bytes, which makes this useless to convert e.g. concatenations, which store each compound in its own register.
Multi-convert of u32 has one theoretical application:
ct mark . meta mark . tcp dport @intervalset
Because ct mark and meta mark are host byte order, use with intervals has to convert the byteorder for ct/meta mark value to network byte order (bigendian).
nftables emits this: [ meta load mark => reg 1 ] [ byteorder reg 1 = hton(reg 1, 4, 4) ] [ ct load mark => reg 9 ] [ byteorder reg 9 = hton(reg 9, 4, 4) ] ...
I.e. two separate calls. Theoretically it could be changed to do: [ meta load mark => reg 1 ] [ ct load mark => reg 9 ] [ byteorder reg 1 = htonl(reg 1, 4, 8) ] ...
But then all it would take to change the set to meta mark . tcp dport . ct mark
... and we'd be back to two "byteorder" calls. IOW, support to convert a range of registers is both dysfunctional and dubious.
Simplify this: remove the feature.
Pablo Neira Ayuso points out that nftables before 1.1.0 can generate incorrect byteorder conversions, see 9fe58952c45a, "evaluate: skip byteorder conversion for selector smaller than 2 bytes" in nftables.git). Affected rulesets fail to load with this change and old userspace due to 'len != size' check.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99285"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-10T18:17:49Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: nft_byteorder: remove multi-register support\n\n64bit byteorder conversion is broken when several registers need to be\nconverted because the source register array advances in steps for 4 bytes\ninstead of 8:\n\n for (i = ...\n src64 = nft_reg_load64(\u0026src[i]);\n ~~~~~ u32 *src\n nft_reg_store64(\u0026dst64[i],\n\nRemove the multi-register support, it has other issues as well:\n\nPablo points out that commit\ncaf3ef7468f7 (\"netfilter: nf_tables: prevent OOB access in nft_byteorder_eval\")\nalters semantics: before the loop operated on registers, i.e.\n for ( ... )\n dst32[i] = htons((u16)src32[i])\n\n .. but after the patch it will operate on bytes, which makes this\n useless to convert e.g. concatenations, which store each compound\n in its own register.\n\nMulti-convert of u32 has one theoretical application:\n\nct mark . meta mark . tcp dport @intervalset\n\nBecause ct mark and meta mark are host byte order, use with\nintervals has to convert the byteorder for ct/meta mark value\nto network byte order (bigendian).\n\nnftables emits this:\n [ meta load mark =\u003e reg 1 ]\n [ byteorder reg 1 = hton(reg 1, 4, 4) ]\n [ ct load mark =\u003e reg 9 ]\n [ byteorder reg 9 = hton(reg 9, 4, 4) ]\n ...\n\nI.e. two separate calls. Theoretically it could be changed to do:\n [ meta load mark =\u003e reg 1 ]\n [ ct load mark =\u003e reg 9 ]\n [ byteorder reg 1 = htonl(reg 1, 4, 8) ]\n ...\n\nBut then all it would take to change the set to\nmeta mark . tcp dport . ct mark\n\n... and we\u0027d be back to two \"byteorder\" calls. IOW, support to\nconvert a range of registers is both dysfunctional and dubious.\n\nSimplify this: remove the feature.\n\nPablo Neira Ayuso points out that nftables before 1.1.0 can generate\nincorrect byteorder conversions, see 9fe58952c45a,\n\"evaluate: skip byteorder conversion for selector smaller than 2 bytes\"\nin nftables.git). Affected rulesets fail to load with this change and\nold userspace due to \u0027len != size\u0027 check.",
"id": "GHSA-vmhm-3cg3-fm3j",
"modified": "2026-11-10T18:31:54Z",
"published": "2026-11-10T18:31:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99285"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3c5fb3a6c8118d15e60295e76fb5b879021eef43"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bb061d3de41707415269be75ebf700efb03ec212"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc29c0478b8564feb9371e715b5a0016eb8903fd"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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