GHSA-VG83-HCP4-5QCC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 16:10 – Updated: 2026-11-19 16:10
VLAI
Summary
DOMShell: domshell_eval classified as read-tier can execute side-effecting JavaScript without --allow-write
Details

Summary

The domshell_eval MCP tool (and the eval command inside domshell_execute) was classified as read-tier, allowing it to run without the --allow-write server flag. However, eval and the write-tier js command dispatch to the same handler in the extension and call CDP Runtime.evaluate with the raw expression string and no side-effect gate. Any JavaScript expression could therefore mutate DOM, window, or global state through domshell_eval without the operator's --allow-write authorization.

The tool description explicitly promised "(read-only) ... always available in read-only mode" — the misclassification contradicted the documented contract, not just an implicit one.

Impact

No new capability was exposed — the same write access was already available via domshell_js with --allow-write — but the tier misclassification meant:

  • MCP hosts (Claude Desktop, Cursor, etc.) rendered the wrong approval UI (readOnlyHint: true)
  • Server-side tier flags (--allow-write) misrepresented what an AI agent was actually authorized to do
  • Audit logs and deny messages labeled write-tier activity as read-tier
  • Downstream tools and analysis relying on the tier separation could over-trust an eval call

Framing: OWASP LLM Top 10 LLM06 (Excessive Agency), NIST AI RMF (tool permission boundary + human-approval fidelity), CWE-863 (Incorrect Authorization).

The reporter's main framing: the MCP approval UI and server-side permission model can misrepresent the actual agency being granted to an AI agent.

Affected code paths

  • mcp-server/index.ts:113 — WRITE_COMMANDS excluded eval
  • mcp-server/index.ts:879-887 — domshell_eval registered with ANNO_READ and description asserting read-only
  • src/background/index.ts:1849-1854 — js and eval both dispatch to handleJs(rawCode)
  • src/background/index.ts:3282 — handleJs calls cdp.evaluateJs(code)
  • src/background/cdp_client.ts:660-667 — evaluateJs sends Runtime.evaluate with expression: code, returnByValue: true, awaitPromise: true and no throwOnSideEffect gate

Fix

Shipped in @apireno/domshell@2.0.8 (2026-07-08):

  • eval added to WRITE_COMMANDS, aligning tier with actual capability
  • domshell_eval MCP annotation changed from ANNO_READ to ANNO_WRITE
  • Tool description and MCP_INSTRUCTIONS updated to remove read-only language; read-only DOM inspection needs pointed at domshell_cat / domshell_text / domshell_find
  • Server-only patch — no Chrome Web Store submission required; extension code unchanged
  • SECURITY.md added + GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting enabled on the repo

Upgrade path

npm install @apireno/domshell@2.0.8

Or, in a persistent install, restart your MCP server against the new version.

Drives that call eval without --allow-write will start receiving Error: 'eval' requires --allow-write. Options:

  • Add --allow-write to the server flags if eval's write capability is actually needed
  • Migrate read-only inspection to domshell_cat / domshell_text / domshell_find
  • Migrate to domshell_js if the caller already runs with --allow-write (same tier, same capability)

Integrator impact

  • HKUDS/CLI-Anything — unaffected; their harness doesn't invoke eval or js commands (verified by grep).
  • Kgspin QA-UX drives — unaffected; they run with --allow-write for their action gates.
  • Direct Claude Desktop / Cursor sessions — any that called domshell_eval without --allow-write will now be denied, aligning behavior with the documented contract.

Reporter / Credit

Ugur Ozer, AI Risk Management https://airiskmanagement.ca info@airiskmanagement.ca

Source-review-first responsible disclosure via private email to the maintainer on 2026-07-08. Reporter finding id: DOMSHELL-EVAL-READ-TIER-BYPASS-001. Ugur followed the standard disclosure ladder correctly despite the missing SECURITY.md at time of report — that gap has now been closed (repo now has SECURITY.md + GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting enabled).

Timeline

  • 2026-07-08 — Report received by maintainer via private email
  • 2026-07-08 — Source-side claims verified against main at 2d63dab; fix planned
  • 2026-07-08 — @apireno/domshell@2.0.8 released to npm and the MCP registry; SECURITY.md added; GitHub PVR enabled
  • 2026-07-08 — This advisory published
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@apireno/domshell"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-75518"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-266",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-19T16:10:53Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-18T22:17:24Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe `domshell_eval` MCP tool (and the `eval` command inside `domshell_execute`) was classified as **read-tier**, allowing it to run without the `--allow-write` server flag. However, `eval` and the write-tier `js` command dispatch to the same handler in the extension and call CDP `Runtime.evaluate` with the raw expression string and no side-effect gate. Any JavaScript expression could therefore mutate DOM, window, or global state through `domshell_eval` without the operator\u0027s `--allow-write` authorization.\n\nThe tool description explicitly promised \"(read-only) ... always available in read-only mode\" \u2014 the misclassification contradicted the documented contract, not just an implicit one.\n\n### Impact\n\nNo new capability was exposed \u2014 the same write access was already available via `domshell_js` with `--allow-write` \u2014 but the tier misclassification meant:\n\n- MCP hosts (Claude Desktop, Cursor, etc.) rendered the wrong approval UI (`readOnlyHint: true`)\n- Server-side tier flags (`--allow-write`) misrepresented what an AI agent was actually authorized to do\n- Audit logs and deny messages labeled write-tier activity as read-tier\n- Downstream tools and analysis relying on the tier separation could over-trust an `eval` call\n\nFraming: OWASP LLM Top 10 LLM06 (Excessive Agency), NIST AI RMF (tool permission boundary + human-approval fidelity), CWE-863 (Incorrect Authorization).\n\nThe reporter\u0027s main framing: **the MCP approval UI and server-side permission model can misrepresent the actual agency being granted to an AI agent.**\n\n### Affected code paths\n\n- `mcp-server/index.ts:113` \u2014 `WRITE_COMMANDS` excluded `eval`\n- `mcp-server/index.ts:879-887` \u2014 `domshell_eval` registered with `ANNO_READ` and description asserting read-only\n- `src/background/index.ts:1849-1854` \u2014 `js` and `eval` both dispatch to `handleJs(rawCode)`\n- `src/background/index.ts:3282` \u2014 `handleJs` calls `cdp.evaluateJs(code)`\n- `src/background/cdp_client.ts:660-667` \u2014 `evaluateJs` sends `Runtime.evaluate` with `expression: code, returnByValue: true, awaitPromise: true` and no `throwOnSideEffect` gate\n\n### Fix\n\nShipped in `@apireno/domshell@2.0.8` (2026-07-08):\n\n- `eval` added to `WRITE_COMMANDS`, aligning tier with actual capability\n- `domshell_eval` MCP annotation changed from `ANNO_READ` to `ANNO_WRITE`\n- Tool description and `MCP_INSTRUCTIONS` updated to remove read-only language; read-only DOM inspection needs pointed at `domshell_cat` / `domshell_text` / `domshell_find`\n- Server-only patch \u2014 no Chrome Web Store submission required; extension code unchanged\n- `SECURITY.md` added + GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting enabled on the repo\n\n### Upgrade path\n\n```\nnpm install @apireno/domshell@2.0.8\n```\n\nOr, in a persistent install, restart your MCP server against the new version.\n\nDrives that call `eval` without `--allow-write` will start receiving `Error: \u0027eval\u0027 requires --allow-write`. Options:\n\n- Add `--allow-write` to the server flags if `eval`\u0027s write capability is actually needed\n- Migrate read-only inspection to `domshell_cat` / `domshell_text` / `domshell_find`\n- Migrate to `domshell_js` if the caller already runs with `--allow-write` (same tier, same capability)\n\n### Integrator impact\n\n- **HKUDS/CLI-Anything** \u2014 unaffected; their harness doesn\u0027t invoke `eval` or `js` commands (verified by grep).\n- **Kgspin QA-UX drives** \u2014 unaffected; they run with `--allow-write` for their action gates.\n- **Direct Claude Desktop / Cursor sessions** \u2014 any that called `domshell_eval` without `--allow-write` will now be denied, aligning behavior with the documented contract.\n\n### Reporter / Credit\n\n**Ugur Ozer, AI Risk Management**\n\u003chttps://airiskmanagement.ca\u003e\n\u003cinfo@airiskmanagement.ca\u003e\n\nSource-review-first responsible disclosure via private email to the maintainer on 2026-07-08. Reporter finding id: `DOMSHELL-EVAL-READ-TIER-BYPASS-001`. Ugur followed the standard disclosure ladder correctly despite the missing SECURITY.md at time of report \u2014 that gap has now been closed (repo now has SECURITY.md + GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting enabled).\n\n### Timeline\n\n- 2026-07-08 \u2014 Report received by maintainer via private email\n- 2026-07-08 \u2014 Source-side claims verified against `main` at `2d63dab`; fix planned\n- 2026-07-08 \u2014 `@apireno/domshell@2.0.8` released to npm and the MCP registry; `SECURITY.md` added; GitHub PVR enabled\n- 2026-07-08 \u2014 This advisory published",
  "id": "GHSA-vg83-hcp4-5qcc",
  "modified": "2026-11-19T16:10:53Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T16:10:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apireno/DOMShell/security/advisories/GHSA-vg83-hcp4-5qcc"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75518"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apireno/DOMShell/commit/03c1d7625e220297aff0dde37613d65cfe6f9a36"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/apireno/DOMShell"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apireno/DOMShell/releases/tag/mcp-v2.0.8"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "DOMShell: domshell_eval classified as read-tier can execute side-effecting JavaScript without --allow-write"
}



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