GHSA-VF85-8FF2-3R9W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-18 21:20 – Updated: 2026-11-18 21:20
VLAI
Summary
django-filer: Missing per-object authorization on `discard` and `edit_redirect` version transitions
Details

Summary

When django-filer's optional per-folder permission system is enabled (FILER_ENABLE_PERMISSIONS=True), the "Delete files and/or folders" admin action does not enforce per-folder edit permissions the way every other mutating action does. A staff user who is scoped read-only on a folder via FolderPermission (can_edit = DENY), but who holds the global Django model-level delete_* permission, can delete files and entire subfolders inside that folder — even though their move, rename, copy, and resize actions on the same folder are correctly denied.

This is an integrity / edit-control gap (unauthorized deletion). It is not a read-confidentiality issue: filer files are world-downloadable by design, so no confidentiality claim is made.

Affected versions

  • django-filer <= 3.4.4 (verified end-to-end on 3.4.4 and on master prior to the fix).

Only installations running with FILER_ENABLE_PERMISSIONS = True (the optional per-folder FolderPermission system) are affected. Deployments that leave permissions disabled (the default) rely solely on Django model-level permissions and are not impacted by this specific gap.

Patched versions

  • Fixed in PR #1605. Upgrade to the first release containing that commit (3.5.0 or later).

Details

The delete_files_or_folders admin action in filer/admin/folderadmin.py authorized deletion using only:

  1. self.has_delete_permission(request) — which returns True for obj=None, and
  2. the Django model-level delete_file / delete_folder / delete_image permission (enforced downstream by the admin delete machinery).

It never called check_folder_edit_permissions or check_files_edit_permissions. Every sibling mutating action — move, rename, copy, resize — does call these helpers, which walk the selected objects (and their descendants) and enforce the per-folder can_edit grant from FolderPermission.

Because FolderPermission has no dedicated can_delete field, deletion is treated as an edit/management operation and is gated elsewhere on can_edit. The delete action's omission therefore let a folder-scoped read-only user bypass the per-folder control that constrains all their other write operations.

Precondition

The attacker must hold the Django model-level delete_file / delete_folder / delete_image permission. A purely read-only user (no model-level delete perm) receives 403 and cannot exploit this. This precondition matches the standard folder-scoped-staff deployment model, where staff hold model-level permissions and are further constrained per-folder by FolderPermission.

Mitigation

  • Upgrade to the patched release.
  • Until upgrading, avoid granting the model-level delete_file / delete_folder / delete_image permission to staff who are meant to be read-only on specific folders via FolderPermission.

Credit

Reported through coordinated disclosure. Fixed in PR #1605.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.4.4"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "django-filer"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.5.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-69131"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-18T21:20:42Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nWhen django-filer\u0027s optional per-folder permission system is enabled (`FILER_ENABLE_PERMISSIONS=True`), the \"Delete files and/or folders\" admin action does **not** enforce per-folder edit permissions the way every other mutating action does. A staff user who is scoped **read-only** on a folder via `FolderPermission` (`can_edit = DENY`), but who holds the global Django model-level `delete_*` permission, can delete files and entire subfolders inside that folder \u2014 even though their move, rename, copy, and resize actions on the same folder are correctly denied.\n\nThis is an integrity / edit-control gap (unauthorized deletion). It is **not** a read-confidentiality issue: filer files are world-downloadable by design, so no confidentiality claim is made.\n\n## Affected versions\n\n- django-filer `\u003c= 3.4.4` (verified end-to-end on 3.4.4 and on `master` prior to   the fix).\n\nOnly installations running with `FILER_ENABLE_PERMISSIONS = True` (the optional per-folder `FolderPermission` system) are affected. Deployments that leave permissions disabled (the default) rely solely on Django model-level permissions and are not impacted by this specific gap.\n\n## Patched versions\n\n- Fixed in PR [#1605](https://github.com/django-cms/django-filer/pull/1605).   Upgrade to the first release containing that commit (`3.5.0` or later).\n\n## Details\n\nThe `delete_files_or_folders` admin action in `filer/admin/folderadmin.py` authorized deletion using only:\n\n1. `self.has_delete_permission(request)` \u2014 which returns `True` for `obj=None`, and\n2. the Django model-level `delete_file` / `delete_folder` / `delete_image`    permission (enforced downstream by the admin delete machinery).\n\nIt never called `check_folder_edit_permissions` or `check_files_edit_permissions`. Every sibling mutating action \u2014 move, rename, copy, resize \u2014 *does* call these helpers, which walk the selected objects (and their descendants) and enforce the per-folder `can_edit` grant from `FolderPermission`.\n\nBecause `FolderPermission` has no dedicated `can_delete` field, deletion is treated as an edit/management operation and is gated elsewhere on `can_edit`. The delete action\u0027s omission therefore let a folder-scoped read-only user bypass the per-folder control that constrains all their other write operations.\n\n### Precondition \n\nThe attacker must hold the Django model-level `delete_file` / `delete_folder` / `delete_image` permission. A purely read-only user (no model-level delete perm) receives `403` and cannot exploit this. This precondition matches the standard folder-scoped-staff deployment model, where staff hold model-level permissions and are further constrained per-folder by `FolderPermission`. \n\n## Mitigation\n\n- Upgrade to the patched release.\n- Until upgrading, avoid granting the model-level `delete_file` /\n  `delete_folder` / `delete_image` permission to staff who are meant to be\n  read-only on specific folders via `FolderPermission`.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported through coordinated disclosure. Fixed in PR #1605.",
  "id": "GHSA-vf85-8ff2-3r9w",
  "modified": "2026-11-18T21:20:42Z",
  "published": "2026-11-18T21:20:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/django-cms/django-filer/security/advisories/GHSA-vf85-8ff2-3r9w"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/django-cms/django-filer/pull/1605"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/django-cms/django-filer/commit/29d20ec0de13d7f77fa2cea93166f8d50a3f508d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/django-cms/django-filer/commit/742ba4c3094dd75e586ca3a05e6ad2703de4553b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/django-cms/django-filer"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/django-cms/django-filer/releases/tag/3.5.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "django-filer: Missing per-object authorization on `discard` and `edit_redirect` version transitions"
}



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