GHSA-RVFR-CQWQ-RC4J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-17 21:05 – Updated: 2026-11-17 21:05Summary
A remote peer can stall a js-libp2p node's entire event loop for ~4–5 seconds per connection (and transiently allocate ~2 GB) by sending a ~15-byte crafted publicKey inside an Identify message. The malformed key reaches the DER decoder before any peer-id/signature check, so the attack is pre-auth and repeatable indefinitely by reconnecting.
Details
packages/crypto/src/keys/rsa/der.ts readLength() parses DER long-form lengths with no comparison to buf.byteLength, and readInteger() then loops over the attacker-claimed length:
function readInteger (buf, context) {
const length = readLength(buf, context) // attacker-controlled, claims up to 2^64
const end = context.offset + length
for (let i = context.offset; i < end; i++) // runs far past buf.byteLength
vals.push(buf[i]) // pushes `undefined` past the end
}
The blob reaches the parser pre-auth: Identify runs on every connection:open and calls publicKeyFromProtobuf(publicKey) (packages/protocol-identify/src/identify.ts:85) before the connection.remotePeer.equals(id) check at identify.ts:88. The MAX_RSA_JWK_SIZE guard in pkixToRSAPublicKey only bounds the total blob size, not the inner length field, so a 15-byte payload defeats it; the ECDSA path (unmarshalECDSAPublicKey) has no cap at all. The decode runs in a single synchronous tick, so no AbortSignal — including Identify's 5 s timeout — can interrupt it. Verified on js-libp2p commit a04f5e0, where @libp2p/crypto reads 5.1.21.
PoC
Full PoC attached (libp2p-crypto-der-eventloop-dos-poc.tar.gz). Build the js-libp2p monorepo at the affected version (npm install --ignore-scripts && npm run build), extract the package inside the monorepo root (sibling of packages/), then cd libp2p-crypto-der-eventloop-dos-poc && node attack.mjs. Expected:
[*] round 1: payload sent=true, victim event-loop stall = 4s, peak RSS ~1980 MB
[*] round 2: payload sent=true, victim event-loop stall = 4-5s, peak RSS ~1980 MB
[*] round 3: payload sent=true, victim event-loop stall = 4s, peak RSS ~1980 MB
[!] Vulnerability reproduced: 3/3 connections each stalled the victim's event loop for ~4-5s — one crafted ~15-byte Identify publicKey per connection, pre-auth
The stall is measured from the victim's own 1 s heartbeat clock (frozen while the loop is blocked); the ~2 GB transient RSS peak is read from /proc/<pid>/status. The DER RangeError is swallowed by Identify's .catch(() => {}), so the node survives and every new connection re-stalls it; under a container memory limit the ~2 GB spike OOM-kills the process. A node attack.mjs control run (legitimate Identify) shows 0 s stalls.
Impact
CWE-130/CWE-400. Any node running the default Identify service is affected. A single peer can keep the node unresponsive to all of its peers (every new connection adds another multi-second stall — all timers, heartbeats, and protocol timeouts stop) and, in memory-constrained deployments, force an OOM kill. Suggested fix: in readLength, reject any long-form length whose value exceeds buf.byteLength - context.offset; in readInteger/readObjectIdentifier/readBitString/readOctetString, clamp or assert end/finalOffset against buf.byteLength before looping; add an overall DER-element-length sanity cap at decodeDer entry and a byte-length cap in unmarshalECDSAPublicKey.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.1.21"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@libp2p/crypto"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.1.22"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-110789"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-130",
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-17T21:05:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA remote peer can stall a js-libp2p node\u0027s entire event loop for ~4\u20135 seconds per connection (and transiently allocate ~2 GB) by sending a ~15-byte crafted `publicKey` inside an Identify message. The malformed key reaches the DER decoder before any peer-id/signature check, so the attack is pre-auth and repeatable indefinitely by reconnecting.\n\n### Details\n`packages/crypto/src/keys/rsa/der.ts` `readLength()` parses DER long-form lengths with no comparison to `buf.byteLength`, and `readInteger()` then loops over the attacker-claimed length:\n\n```ts\nfunction readInteger (buf, context) {\n const length = readLength(buf, context) // attacker-controlled, claims up to 2^64\n const end = context.offset + length\n for (let i = context.offset; i \u003c end; i++) // runs far past buf.byteLength\n vals.push(buf[i]) // pushes `undefined` past the end\n}\n```\n\nThe blob reaches the parser pre-auth: Identify runs on every `connection:open` and calls `publicKeyFromProtobuf(publicKey)` (`packages/protocol-identify/src/identify.ts:85`) before the `connection.remotePeer.equals(id)` check at `identify.ts:88`. The `MAX_RSA_JWK_SIZE` guard in `pkixToRSAPublicKey` only bounds the total blob size, not the inner length field, so a 15-byte payload defeats it; the ECDSA path (`unmarshalECDSAPublicKey`) has no cap at all. The decode runs in a single synchronous tick, so no `AbortSignal` \u2014 including Identify\u0027s 5 s timeout \u2014 can interrupt it. Verified on js-libp2p commit `a04f5e0`, where `@libp2p/crypto` reads `5.1.21`.\n\n### PoC\nFull PoC attached (`libp2p-crypto-der-eventloop-dos-poc.tar.gz`). Build the js-libp2p monorepo at the affected version (`npm install --ignore-scripts \u0026\u0026 npm run build`), extract the package inside the monorepo root (sibling of `packages/`), then `cd libp2p-crypto-der-eventloop-dos-poc \u0026\u0026 node attack.mjs`. Expected:\n\n```\n[*] round 1: payload sent=true, victim event-loop stall = 4s, peak RSS ~1980 MB\n[*] round 2: payload sent=true, victim event-loop stall = 4-5s, peak RSS ~1980 MB\n[*] round 3: payload sent=true, victim event-loop stall = 4s, peak RSS ~1980 MB\n[!] Vulnerability reproduced: 3/3 connections each stalled the victim\u0027s event loop for ~4-5s \u2014 one crafted ~15-byte Identify publicKey per connection, pre-auth\n```\n\nThe stall is measured from the victim\u0027s own 1 s heartbeat clock (frozen while the loop is blocked); the ~2 GB transient RSS peak is read from `/proc/\u003cpid\u003e/status`. The DER `RangeError` is swallowed by Identify\u0027s `.catch(() =\u003e {})`, so the node survives and every new connection re-stalls it; under a container memory limit the ~2 GB spike OOM-kills the process. A `node attack.mjs control` run (legitimate Identify) shows 0 s stalls.\n\n### Impact\nCWE-130/CWE-400. Any node running the default Identify service is affected. A single peer can keep the node unresponsive to all of its peers (every new connection adds another multi-second stall \u2014 all timers, heartbeats, and protocol timeouts stop) and, in memory-constrained deployments, force an OOM kill. Suggested fix: in `readLength`, reject any long-form length whose value exceeds `buf.byteLength - context.offset`; in `readInteger`/`readObjectIdentifier`/`readBitString`/`readOctetString`, clamp or assert `end`/`finalOffset` against `buf.byteLength` before looping; add an overall DER-element-length sanity cap at `decodeDer` entry and a byte-length cap in `unmarshalECDSAPublicKey`.\n\n[libp2p-crypto-der-eventloop-dos-poc.tar.gz](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/30452369/libp2p-crypto-der-eventloop-dos-poc.tar.gz)",
"id": "GHSA-rvfr-cqwq-rc4j",
"modified": "2026-11-17T21:05:08Z",
"published": "2026-11-17T21:05:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/security/advisories/GHSA-rvfr-cqwq-rc4j"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/pull/3587"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/commit/ef6e1851cb00511a4793a5e68948e0cdad385332"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/releases/tag/crypto-v5.1.22"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "libp2p: ASN.1 DER decoder drives an unbounded synchronous loop on attacker-controlled length fields, stalling the Node event loop pre-auth"
}
Sightings
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