GHSA-R7WG-F7R2-8WF7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 20:34 – Updated: 2026-11-19 20:34
VLAI
Summary
Axon: Download of Code Without Integrity Check in axon-mcp
Details

Summary

axon rtk-install downloads a pre-built rtkx binary from GitHub releases and executes it via subprocess.run() on every text-compression call, without verifying its integrity — no checksum, signature, or attestation check anywhere in the download/install path. If the release pipeline or a maintainer token for sammyjdev/rtkx were ever compromised, every axon user who installs or auto-bootstraps rtkx would silently download and execute an unverified binary with the same privileges as the axon process.

Details

The download path lives in src/axon/context/rtk_bootstrap.py:

  • _http_download() fetches the release archive over HTTPS via urllib.request.urlopen() and writes the raw response bytes to disk — no hash comparison against any published value.
  • _extract_binary() unpacks the archive (zip/tar.gz) and sets the executable bit (out.chmod(... S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH)), again with no verification step.
  • There is no reference to checksum, sha256, verify, signature, gpg, cosign, or sigstore anywhere in this file.

The binary is not dead code — it's on the active execution path. src/axon/context/rtk.py::rtk_binary_path() resolves to the bootstrapped binary at ~/.axon/bin/rtkx, and compress_text_with_rtk() invokes it directly:

result = subprocess.run( [path, "read", str(tmp_path)], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout_seconds, )

PoC

This is a missing-control finding rather than an active exploit, so reproduction is by code audit rather than a live payload:

Clone sammyjdev/axon and open src/axon/context/rtk_bootstrap.py. Confirm _http_download() and _extract_binary() perform no hash/signature check before chmod +x. Trace the call chain: bootstrap_rtkx() → _http_download() → _extract_binary() → rtk_binary_path() (in rtk.py) → subprocess.run() in compress_text_with_rtk(). Optionally demonstrate impact safely: point download_url() / the download callable (already injectable per the module's own docstring, "the download step is injectable so the extraction logic is testable offline") at a local HTTP server serving an attacker-controlled archive, and confirm it gets extracted, chmod +x'd, and executed with no rejection.

Impact

Type: CWE-494 (Download of Code Without Integrity Check), leading to potential arbitrary code execution. Who's affected: Any axon user who runs axon rtk-install or triggers auto-bootstrap, if sammyjdev/rtkx's release pipeline or a maintainer's release credentials are ever compromised. Not exploitable today without that precondition, but the missing control removes the last line of defense against a supply-chain compromise of the binary dependency.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "axon-mcp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-76818"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-494"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-19T20:34:53Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-18T22:17:24Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\naxon rtk-install downloads a pre-built rtkx binary from GitHub releases and executes it via subprocess.run() on every text-compression call, without verifying its integrity \u2014 no checksum, signature, or attestation check anywhere in the download/install path. If the release pipeline or a maintainer token for sammyjdev/rtkx were ever compromised, every axon user who installs or auto-bootstraps rtkx would silently download and execute an unverified binary with the same privileges as the axon process.\n\n### Details\nThe download path lives in src/axon/context/rtk_bootstrap.py:\n\n- _http_download() fetches the release archive over HTTPS via urllib.request.urlopen() and writes the raw response bytes to disk \u2014 no hash comparison against any published value.\n- _extract_binary() unpacks the archive (zip/tar.gz) and sets the executable bit (out.chmod(... S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH)), again with no verification step.\n- There is no reference to checksum, sha256, verify, signature, gpg, cosign, or sigstore anywhere in this file.\n\nThe binary is not dead code \u2014 it\u0027s on the active execution path. src/axon/context/rtk.py::rtk_binary_path() resolves to the bootstrapped binary at ~/.axon/bin/rtkx, and compress_text_with_rtk() invokes it directly:\n\n`\nresult = subprocess.run(\n    [path, \"read\", str(tmp_path)],\n    capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout_seconds,\n)`\n\n\n### PoC\nThis is a missing-control finding rather than an active exploit, so reproduction is by code audit rather than a live payload:\n\nClone sammyjdev/axon and open src/axon/context/rtk_bootstrap.py.\nConfirm _http_download() and _extract_binary() perform no hash/signature check before chmod +x.\nTrace the call chain: bootstrap_rtkx() \u2192 _http_download() \u2192 _extract_binary() \u2192 rtk_binary_path() (in rtk.py) \u2192 subprocess.run() in compress_text_with_rtk().\nOptionally demonstrate impact safely: point download_url() / the download callable (already injectable per the module\u0027s own docstring, \"the download step is injectable so the extraction logic is testable offline\") at a local HTTP server serving an attacker-controlled archive, and confirm it gets extracted, chmod +x\u0027d, and executed with no rejection.\n\n### Impact\nType: CWE-494 (Download of Code Without Integrity Check), \nleading to potential arbitrary code execution.\nWho\u0027s affected: Any axon user who runs axon rtk-install or triggers auto-bootstrap, if sammyjdev/rtkx\u0027s release pipeline or a maintainer\u0027s release credentials are ever compromised. Not exploitable today without that precondition, but the missing control removes the last line of defense against a supply-chain compromise of the binary dependency.",
  "id": "GHSA-r7wg-f7r2-8wf7",
  "modified": "2026-11-19T20:34:53Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T20:34:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sammyjdev/axon/security/advisories/GHSA-r7wg-f7r2-8wf7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76818"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sammyjdev/rtkx/pull/2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sammyjdev/rtkx/pull/3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sammyjdev/axon/commit/398e47d5d2b1e1ba88c8d2bac90ac30811a9152b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sammyjdev/axon/commit/c5863e616688c6c60b2716db9ce4b1b522213b8c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sammyjdev/axon/commit/d2cc7bccd99c76ec06ac7f7f04d3b2f765c9e741"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/sammyjdev/axon"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axon: Download of Code Without Integrity Check in axon-mcp"
}



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