GHSA-R7W7-VPQ8-C5VV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-16 22:11 – Updated: 2026-11-16 22:11Summary
Two regular expressions used while parsing email headers backtrack polynomially on attacker-controlled input. Parsing a single small, well-formed email can consume minutes to hours of CPU, denying service to any process that parses untrusted mail.
Both are reachable from an ordinary parse_from_string(), parse_from_bytes()
or parse_from_file() call — no special API, option, or malformed structure is
required by the victim.
Details
1. Address-header fallback regex (src/mailparser/utils.py)
get_addresses() falls back to _ADDR_FALLBACK_RE whenever
email.utils.getaddresses(strict=True) yields no usable address. The
alternative ([^<,]*?)\s*<([^>]+)> overlaps a lazy quantifier with an adjacent
\s* — a space matches both. Driven by finditer, which retries at every
offset and rescans the remainder, matching degrades to quadratic on <
padding and cubic on whitespace padding.
The fallback engages on the feature's own happy path, e.g.
From: alice@example.com <bob@example.com>.
Measured (4.6.0, CPython 3.14, macOS arm64; reproduced identically on Linux and on CPython 3.9, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13):
| Padding | Parse time |
|---|---|
| valid address + 750 sp | 0.38 s |
| + 1500 sp | 2.97 s |
| + 3000 sp | 23.4 s (×7.9/2×) |
| + 6 KB sp | 185 s |
| ~100 KB sp | hours |
Fully RFC 5322-compliant folded headers (all lines ≤ 71 octets) trigger the same
blowup, so the input passes normal MTA and library checks. ~100 KB of headers is
within Postfix's default header_size_limit = 102400.
All six address headers parsed by the library (From, To, Cc, Bcc,
Reply-To, Delivered-To) are affected and their cost adds up linearly.
2. Received-header clause splitter (src/mailparser/const.py)
parse_received() splits on _CLAUSE_SPLITTER,
(?:^|\s+)(from|by|via|with|id|for|envelope-from)\s+. Under re.split this
backtracks quadratically over any whitespace run that is not followed by a
clause keyword. The pre-existing normalization collapsed only [\t\n], so
literal spaces — including folded-header padding — reached the splitter intact.
Measured: 24 000 spaces in one Received: header → 22 s; ~100 KB → minutes.
Impact
Availability. A handful of small emails keeps every parsing worker of a mail gateway, ticketing system, quarantine UI, or archiving pipeline permanently busy. No confidentiality or integrity impact.
Anyone who parses email they did not author is affected — which is the library's purpose.
Patches
Fixed in 4.6.1.
- The address fallback is now a linear scan: the header is split into
comma-separated items (quote-aware, in Python), then each item is matched
against a bounded angle-address
<([^<>\s]+)>with the display name derived in Python, falling back to a bare-email match. Each pattern has a single non-nested quantifier over a negated character class → O(n). 2000 padding spaces:3.5 s → <0.01 s. 256 KB padding:hours → 0.087 s. Output is preserved on every previously supported shape. parse_received()collapses whitespace runs to a single space before splitting, so the splitter's\s+only ever matches one character → O(n). The date is extracted from the raw header beforehand, so date formatting is unaffected. 24 000 spaces:22 s → 0.003 s; 200 000 spaces:0.004 s.
Regression tests assert linear-time behaviour for both paths.
Workarounds
None within the library. Upgrade to 4.6.1.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should cap total header size before parsing and enforce a wall-clock timeout around each parse.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "mail-parser"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-129295"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1333"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-16T22:11:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-16T18:17:30Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nTwo regular expressions used while parsing email headers backtrack\npolynomially on attacker-controlled input. Parsing a single small, well-formed\nemail can consume minutes to hours of CPU, denying service to any process that\nparses untrusted mail.\n\nBoth are reachable from an ordinary `parse_from_string()`, `parse_from_bytes()`\nor `parse_from_file()` call \u2014 no special API, option, or malformed structure is\nrequired by the victim.\n\n### Details\n\n**1. Address-header fallback regex (`src/mailparser/utils.py`)**\n\n`get_addresses()` falls back to `_ADDR_FALLBACK_RE` whenever\n`email.utils.getaddresses(strict=True)` yields no usable address. The\nalternative `([^\u003c,]*?)\\s*\u003c([^\u003e]+)\u003e` overlaps a lazy quantifier with an adjacent\n`\\s*` \u2014 a space matches both. Driven by `finditer`, which retries at every\noffset and rescans the remainder, matching degrades to **quadratic** on `\u003c`\npadding and **cubic** on whitespace padding.\n\nThe fallback engages on the feature\u0027s own happy path, e.g.\n`From: alice@example.com \u003cbob@example.com\u003e`.\n\nMeasured (4.6.0, CPython 3.14, macOS arm64; reproduced identically on Linux and\non CPython 3.9, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13):\n\n| Padding | Parse time |\n| ---------------------- | ------------------ |\n| valid address + 750 sp | 0.38 s |\n| + 1500 sp | 2.97 s |\n| + 3000 sp | 23.4 s (\u00d77.9/2\u00d7) |\n| + 6 KB sp | 185 s |\n| ~100 KB sp | hours |\n\nFully RFC 5322-compliant folded headers (all lines \u2264 71 octets) trigger the same\nblowup, so the input passes normal MTA and library checks. ~100 KB of headers is\nwithin Postfix\u0027s default `header_size_limit = 102400`.\n\nAll six address headers parsed by the library (`From`, `To`, `Cc`, `Bcc`,\n`Reply-To`, `Delivered-To`) are affected and their cost adds up linearly.\n\n**2. Received-header clause splitter (`src/mailparser/const.py`)**\n\n`parse_received()` splits on `_CLAUSE_SPLITTER`,\n`(?:^|\\s+)(from|by|via|with|id|for|envelope-from)\\s+`. Under `re.split` this\nbacktracks **quadratically** over any whitespace run that is not followed by a\nclause keyword. The pre-existing normalization collapsed only `[\\t\\n]`, so\nliteral spaces \u2014 including folded-header padding \u2014 reached the splitter intact.\n\nMeasured: 24 000 spaces in one `Received:` header \u2192 22 s; ~100 KB \u2192 minutes.\n\n### Impact\n\nAvailability. A handful of small emails keeps every parsing worker of a mail\ngateway, ticketing system, quarantine UI, or archiving pipeline permanently\nbusy. No confidentiality or integrity impact.\n\nAnyone who parses email they did not author is affected \u2014 which is the library\u0027s\npurpose.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **4.6.1**.\n\n- The address fallback is now a linear scan: the header is split into\n comma-separated items (quote-aware, in Python), then each item is matched\n against a bounded angle-address `\u003c([^\u003c\u003e\\s]+)\u003e` with the display name derived\n in Python, falling back to a bare-email match. Each pattern has a single\n non-nested quantifier over a negated character class \u2192 O(n).\n 2000 padding spaces: `3.5 s \u2192 \u003c0.01 s`. 256 KB padding: `hours \u2192 0.087 s`.\n Output is preserved on every previously supported shape.\n- `parse_received()` collapses whitespace runs to a single space before\n splitting, so the splitter\u0027s `\\s+` only ever matches one character \u2192 O(n).\n The date is extracted from the raw header beforehand, so date formatting is\n unaffected. 24 000 spaces: `22 s \u2192 0.003 s`; 200 000 spaces: `0.004 s`.\n\nRegression tests assert linear-time behaviour for both paths.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone within the library. Upgrade to `4.6.1`.\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately should cap total header size before\nparsing and enforce a wall-clock timeout around each parse.",
"id": "GHSA-r7w7-vpq8-c5vv",
"modified": "2026-11-16T22:11:08Z",
"published": "2026-11-16T22:11:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-r7w7-vpq8-c5vv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129295"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/pull/166"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/commit/037293158cb291caa96635a54449243d32cd4d96"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/commit/5aab122f0d763991604d2c2bcc807c6bf2489464"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/commit/85e53f820d78ae7c955dafbbcd0e20989a735c2c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/releases/tag/4.6.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "mail-parser is vulnerable to polynomial ReDoS in email header parsing"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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