GHSA-R29V-JF4C-HPXX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-06 12:30 – Updated: 2026-11-06 12:30The Advanced Members for ACF plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.3.0 via the acf[_amem_local_user_password] parameter of the [advanced-members-account-password] shortcode form submission. This is due to a PHP operator-precedence bug in the pre_update_value function of acf/fields/class-user-password.php that assigns boolean true instead of the resolved user ID to $user_id, causing the _can_edit() authorization check to pass for any logged-in user via PHP loose equality, and causing wp_update_user() to cast 'ID' => true to integer 1 — unconditionally targeting the primary administrator account. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to overwrite the password of user ID 1 (the site's primary administrator) with an attacker-chosen value, granting full administrative access to the site. The intended exclusion guard in Account::process that strips the password field before saving is defeated because amem_save_all_fields() re-reads the full field list from amem()->submission and silently overwrites the caller-supplied excluded fields array with an empty array, ensuring the password field is always processed.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-116624"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-06T12:17:17Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Advanced Members for ACF plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.3.0 via the `acf[_amem_local_user_password]` parameter of the `[advanced-members-account-password]` shortcode form submission. This is due to a PHP operator-precedence bug in the `pre_update_value` function of `acf/fields/class-user-password.php` that assigns boolean `true` instead of the resolved user ID to `$user_id`, causing the `_can_edit()` authorization check to pass for any logged-in user via PHP loose equality, and causing `wp_update_user()` to cast `\u0027ID\u0027 =\u003e true` to integer `1` \u2014 unconditionally targeting the primary administrator account. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to overwrite the password of user ID 1 (the site\u0027s primary administrator) with an attacker-chosen value, granting full administrative access to the site. The intended exclusion guard in `Account::process` that strips the password field before saving is defeated because `amem_save_all_fields()` re-reads the full field list from `amem()-\u003esubmission` and silently overwrites the caller-supplied excluded fields array with an empty array, ensuring the password field is always processed.",
"id": "GHSA-r29v-jf4c-hpxx",
"modified": "2026-11-06T12:30:46Z",
"published": "2026-11-06T12:30:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116624"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.svn.wordpress.org/advanced-members/trunk"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/advanced-members/tags/1.3.0/acf/fields/base/trait-amem-field.php#L30"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/advanced-members/tags/1.3.0/acf/fields/class-user-password.php#L117"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/advanced-members/tags/1.3.0/core/actions/account.php#L227"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/advanced-members/tags/1.3.0/core/functions-forms.php#L105"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3779180/advanced-members/trunk/acf/fields/class-user-password.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/6fc38f0b-bf13-4d01-a4b3-38a43fc726d6?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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