Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-QFF7-Q5FM-8P76

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-04 21:19 – Updated: 2026-05-04 21:19

Summary

AzuraCast has Missing Permissions Check on Media File Download, Allowing Cross-Station Data Exfiltration

Details

Summary

The GET /api/station/{station_id}/file/{id}/play endpoint, handled by PlayAction, is missing the Middleware\Permissions check that protects all sibling routes in the same /file/{id} route group. Any authenticated user can download media files from any station, regardless of whether they have permissions on that station. In multi-tenant deployments, this enables cross-station media exfiltration.

Details

In backend/config/routes/api_station.php, the /file/{id} route group (lines 407-429) defines four endpoints:

// Line 407-429
$group->group(
    '/file/{id}',
    function (RouteCollectorProxy $group) {
        // GET /file/{id} — has Permissions check ✓
        $group->get('', ...)->add(new Middleware\Permissions(StationPermissions::Media, true));

        // PUT /file/{id} — has Permissions check ✓
        $group->put('', ...)->add(new Middleware\Permissions(StationPermissions::Media, true));

        // DELETE /file/{id} — has Permissions check ✓
        $group->delete('', ...)->add(new Middleware\Permissions(StationPermissions::DeleteMedia, true));

        // GET /file/{id}/play — NO Permissions check ✗
        $group->get('/play', Controller\Api\Stations\Files\PlayAction::class)
            ->setName('api:stations:files:play');
    }
);

The middleware chain for the /play endpoint is: GetStation → RequireStation → RequireLogin → StationSupportsFeature(Media) → PlayAction. The RequireLogin middleware (backend/src/Middleware/RequireLogin.php) only verifies a valid session/API key exists — it does not check station-level permissions.

The controller at backend/src/Controller/Api/Stations/Files/PlayAction.php:84 calls $this->mediaRepo->requireForStation($id, $station), which verifies the media belongs to the station but performs no authorization check. The findForStation method (StationMediaRepository.php:46-66) accepts both auto-increment integer IDs and unique IDs, making enumeration trivial via sequential integers.

This is notably similar to the regression fixed in commit 7fbc7dd (2026-02-26), which restored a missing group-level Permissions middleware on the adjacent /files group. The /play route was missed in that fix.

PoC

# Step 1: Create two stations (Station A and Station B) in a multi-tenant AzuraCast instance.
# Upload media files to Station B.

# Step 2: Create a user with permissions ONLY on Station A. Generate an API key for this user.
API_KEY="user-with-only-station-a-access"

# Step 3: Enumerate and download media from Station B (station_id=2) using sequential IDs
# This should return 403 Forbidden, but instead returns the file content
curl -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" https://target/api/station/2/file/1/play -o stolen1.mp3
# HTTP 200 OK — file downloaded successfully

curl -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" https://target/api/station/2/file/2/play -o stolen2.mp3
# HTTP 200 OK — file downloaded successfully

# Step 4: Verify the same user is correctly blocked on other endpoints in the same group
curl -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" https://target/api/station/2/file/1
# HTTP 403 Forbidden — permission check works here

Impact

Any authenticated user can download the full media library of any station in the instance, regardless of their assigned permissions.
In multi-tenant deployments (e.g., hosting providers running multiple radio stations), a user of Station A can exfiltrate all copyrighted audio content from Station B.
Media IDs use auto-increment integers (HasAutoIncrementId trait on StationMedia), enabling trivial enumeration of all media files.
The confidentiality impact is High: full media file contents (MP3, FLAC, etc.) are exposed.

Recommended Fix

Add the Permissions middleware to the /play route, matching the pattern used by the adjacent routes:

// backend/config/routes/api_station.php, line 426-427
// Before:
$group->get('/play', Controller\Api\Stations\Files\PlayAction::class)
    ->setName('api:stations:files:play');

// After:
$group->get('/play', Controller\Api\Stations\Files\PlayAction::class)
    ->setName('api:stations:files:play')
    ->add(new Middleware\Permissions(StationPermissions::Media, true));

Severity

6.5 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.23.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "azuracast/azuracast"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.23.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-04T21:19:24Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `GET /api/station/{station_id}/file/{id}/play` endpoint, handled by `PlayAction`, is missing the `Middleware\\Permissions` check that protects all sibling routes in the same `/file/{id}` route group. Any authenticated user can download media files from any station, regardless of whether they have permissions on that station. In multi-tenant deployments, this enables cross-station media exfiltration.\n\n## Details\n\nIn `backend/config/routes/api_station.php`, the `/file/{id}` route group (lines 407-429) defines four endpoints:\n\n```php\n// Line 407-429\n$group-\u003egroup(\n    \u0027/file/{id}\u0027,\n    function (RouteCollectorProxy $group) {\n        // GET /file/{id} \u2014 has Permissions check \u2713\n        $group-\u003eget(\u0027\u0027, ...)-\u003eadd(new Middleware\\Permissions(StationPermissions::Media, true));\n\n        // PUT /file/{id} \u2014 has Permissions check \u2713\n        $group-\u003eput(\u0027\u0027, ...)-\u003eadd(new Middleware\\Permissions(StationPermissions::Media, true));\n\n        // DELETE /file/{id} \u2014 has Permissions check \u2713\n        $group-\u003edelete(\u0027\u0027, ...)-\u003eadd(new Middleware\\Permissions(StationPermissions::DeleteMedia, true));\n\n        // GET /file/{id}/play \u2014 NO Permissions check \u2717\n        $group-\u003eget(\u0027/play\u0027, Controller\\Api\\Stations\\Files\\PlayAction::class)\n            -\u003esetName(\u0027api:stations:files:play\u0027);\n    }\n);\n```\n\nThe middleware chain for the `/play` endpoint is: `GetStation \u2192 RequireStation \u2192 RequireLogin \u2192 StationSupportsFeature(Media) \u2192 PlayAction`. The `RequireLogin` middleware (`backend/src/Middleware/RequireLogin.php`) only verifies a valid session/API key exists \u2014 it does not check station-level permissions.\n\nThe controller at `backend/src/Controller/Api/Stations/Files/PlayAction.php:84` calls `$this-\u003emediaRepo-\u003erequireForStation($id, $station)`, which verifies the media belongs to the station but performs no authorization check. The `findForStation` method (`StationMediaRepository.php:46-66`) accepts both auto-increment integer IDs and unique IDs, making enumeration trivial via sequential integers.\n\nThis is notably similar to the regression fixed in commit `7fbc7dd` (2026-02-26), which restored a missing group-level `Permissions` middleware on the adjacent `/files` group. The `/play` route was missed in that fix.\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Create two stations (Station A and Station B) in a multi-tenant AzuraCast instance.\n# Upload media files to Station B.\n\n# Step 2: Create a user with permissions ONLY on Station A. Generate an API key for this user.\nAPI_KEY=\"user-with-only-station-a-access\"\n\n# Step 3: Enumerate and download media from Station B (station_id=2) using sequential IDs\n# This should return 403 Forbidden, but instead returns the file content\ncurl -H \"X-API-Key: $API_KEY\" https://target/api/station/2/file/1/play -o stolen1.mp3\n# HTTP 200 OK \u2014 file downloaded successfully\n\ncurl -H \"X-API-Key: $API_KEY\" https://target/api/station/2/file/2/play -o stolen2.mp3\n# HTTP 200 OK \u2014 file downloaded successfully\n\n# Step 4: Verify the same user is correctly blocked on other endpoints in the same group\ncurl -H \"X-API-Key: $API_KEY\" https://target/api/station/2/file/1\n# HTTP 403 Forbidden \u2014 permission check works here\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- Any authenticated user can download the full media library of any station in the instance, regardless of their assigned permissions.\n- In multi-tenant deployments (e.g., hosting providers running multiple radio stations), a user of Station A can exfiltrate all copyrighted audio content from Station B.\n- Media IDs use auto-increment integers (`HasAutoIncrementId` trait on `StationMedia`), enabling trivial enumeration of all media files.\n- The confidentiality impact is High: full media file contents (MP3, FLAC, etc.) are exposed.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd the `Permissions` middleware to the `/play` route, matching the pattern used by the adjacent routes:\n\n```php\n// backend/config/routes/api_station.php, line 426-427\n// Before:\n$group-\u003eget(\u0027/play\u0027, Controller\\Api\\Stations\\Files\\PlayAction::class)\n    -\u003esetName(\u0027api:stations:files:play\u0027);\n\n// After:\n$group-\u003eget(\u0027/play\u0027, Controller\\Api\\Stations\\Files\\PlayAction::class)\n    -\u003esetName(\u0027api:stations:files:play\u0027)\n    -\u003eadd(new Middleware\\Permissions(StationPermissions::Media, true));\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-qff7-q5fm-8p76",
  "modified": "2026-05-04T21:19:24Z",
  "published": "2026-05-04T21:19:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/security/advisories/GHSA-qff7-q5fm-8p76"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/commit/ba92dc3f0ea15a9c0ba0f4557d99a9a26004108f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AzuraCast has Missing Permissions Check on Media File Download, Allowing Cross-Station Data Exfiltration"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-QFF7-Q5FM-8P76

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Recommended Fix

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour