GHSA-Q8V2-3J4H-XG2P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 16:18 – Updated: 2026-11-19 16:18Summary
jane-php (open-api-3) builds PHP via nikic/php-parser (AST), so string literals are escaped -- but PHPDoc comment text is emitted RAW. The generated Client/Endpoint method docblocks embed the query parameter name verbatim in a @param array{ "<name>"?: ... } block. A */ in the query name closes the /** ... */ docblock early and lands in class-body position; because the name is a raw string key (not identifier-mangled), the */ and following PHP survive. Injecting */ public function __construct(){ <code> } /* adds an attacker-controlled __construct to the generated Client class, which runs when the client is instantiated -> RCE (CWE-94). Verified 7.11.2/PHP8.1.
Impact
Generating a client from an attacker-influenced OpenAPI document and using the generated SDK (instantiating the client, which apps do on every call) runs attacker PHP. CWE-94/95/116.
PoC
reproduce.sh (+ make_spec.py, gen.php): scaffolds a composer project with jane-php/open-api-3, generates, instantiates the generated Client, shows the marker.
Suggested fix
Neutralize */ (e.g. */->* /) in all generated PHPDoc text (parameter names, descriptions). Regression-test with a parameter name/description containing */.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "jane-php/open-api-3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.12.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-63412"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116",
"CWE-94",
"CWE-95"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-19T16:18:45Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-18T22:17:22Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\njane-php (open-api-3) builds PHP via nikic/php-parser (AST), so string literals are escaped -- but PHPDoc comment text is emitted RAW. The generated Client/Endpoint method docblocks embed the query parameter name verbatim in a `@param array{ \"\u003cname\u003e\"?: ... }` block. A `*/` in the query name closes the `/** ... */` docblock early and lands in class-body position; because the name is a raw string key (not identifier-mangled), the `*/` and following PHP survive. Injecting `*/ public function __construct(){ \u003ccode\u003e } /*` adds an attacker-controlled __construct to the generated Client class, which runs when the client is instantiated -\u003e RCE (CWE-94). Verified 7.11.2/PHP8.1.\n\n### Impact\nGenerating a client from an attacker-influenced OpenAPI document and using the generated SDK (instantiating the client, which apps do on every call) runs attacker PHP. CWE-94/95/116.\n\n### PoC\n`reproduce.sh` (+ `make_spec.py`, `gen.php`): scaffolds a composer project with jane-php/open-api-3, generates, instantiates the generated Client, shows the marker.\n\n### Suggested fix\nNeutralize `*/` (e.g. `*/`-\u003e`* /`) in all generated PHPDoc text (parameter names, descriptions). Regression-test with a parameter name/description containing `*/`.\n\n[maintainer-report.txt](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29497099/maintainer-report.txt)\n[reproduce.sh](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29497102/reproduce.sh)\n[gen.php](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29497103/gen.php)\n[make_spec.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29497104/make_spec.py)",
"id": "GHSA-q8v2-3j4h-xg2p",
"modified": "2026-11-19T16:18:45Z",
"published": "2026-11-19T16:18:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/janephp/janephp/security/advisories/GHSA-q8v2-3j4h-xg2p"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63412"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/janephp/janephp/pull/960"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/janephp/janephp/commit/0ea379deab5689475d62653b408de62ad3611c7a"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/janephp/janephp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/janephp/janephp/releases/tag/v7.12.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Jane: Instantiation RCE via query parameter name -\u003e raw PHPDoc */ breakout (jane-php/open-api-3)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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