GHSA-Q7PG-9PR4-MRP2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-12 21:11 – Updated: 2025-09-12 21:11
VLAI
Summary
httpsig-rs: HMAC verification is vulnerable to timing attack
Details

Summary

HMAC signature comparison is not timing-safe and is vulnerable to timing attacks.

Details

SharedKey::sign() returns a Vec<u8> which has a non-constant-time equality implementation.

Hmac::finalize() returns a constant-time wrapper (CtOutput) which was discarded. Alternatively, Hmac has a constant-time verify() method.

The problem reported here is due to the following lines in SharedKey::sign() of the previous code:

let mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(key).unwrap();
mac.update(data);
Ok(mac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec())

and the merged update changes the third line to directly verify with verify_slice.

Impact

Anyone who uses HS256 signature verification is vulnerably to Timing Attack that allows the attacker to forge a signature.

Severity
5.9 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "httpsig"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.19"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-59058"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-208"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-12T21:11:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-12T14:15:41Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nHMAC signature comparison is not timing-safe and is vulnerable to timing attacks.\n\n### Details\n`SharedKey::sign()` returns a `Vec\u003cu8\u003e` which has a non-constant-time equality implementation.\n\n`Hmac::finalize()` returns a constant-time wrapper ([`CtOutput`](https://docs.rs/digest/0.10.7/digest/struct.CtOutput.html)) which was discarded. Alternatively, `Hmac` has a constant-time `verify()` method.\n\nThe problem reported here is due to the following lines in `SharedKey::sign()` of the previous code:\n```rust\nlet mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(key).unwrap();\nmac.update(data);\nOk(mac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec())\n```\nand the merged update changes the third line to directly verify with `verify_slice`.\n\n### Impact\n\nAnyone who uses HS256 signature verification is vulnerably to Timing Attack that allows the attacker to forge a signature.",
  "id": "GHSA-q7pg-9pr4-mrp2",
  "modified": "2025-09-12T21:11:13Z",
  "published": "2025-09-12T21:11:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/junkurihara/httpsig-rs/security/advisories/GHSA-q7pg-9pr4-mrp2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59058"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/junkurihara/httpsig-rs/commit/fc095b6ce6043bb808f5d9c4379cf697899cb458"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/junkurihara/httpsig-rs"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "httpsig-rs: HMAC verification is vulnerable to timing attack"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.





Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.