GHSA-Q433-MP6C-8V4F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 22:25 – Updated: 2026-11-19 22:25Summary
In read-only mode (the default), a client that can call the MCP tools can write to the database the server is meant to expose read-only, read other SQLite files, and create new SQLite files anywhere the server process can write. There are two ways in: statement chaining through execute_query, and SQL injection through describe_table.
Details
- Statement chaining in
execute_query. The only check was that the query starts withSELECT. Themodernc.org/sqlitedriver runs every;-separated statement in one call, so anything afterSELECT 1;ran unchecked. - SQL injection in
describe_table. Thetable_nameargument was interpolated intoPRAGMA table_info(%s)with no guard. - Escaping read-only mode. Through either path,
ATTACH DATABASEopens a file read-write regardless of the main connection'smode=ro. Attaching the protected database itself made it writable. Attaching another path read that file, or created it if it did not exist.
Read-write mode is not affected beyond its intended capabilities, apart from ATTACH reaching files other than the configured database.
Impact
- Modify the database that read-only mode is meant to protect.
- Read any SQLite database file the server process can read.
- Create new SQLite-format files anywhere the server process can write, or write to existing SQLite or empty files. Existing non-empty files that are not SQLite databases are refused and left unchanged.
The server has no built-in authentication and, by default, listens on :8080 on all interfaces. Unless it is deployed behind an authenticating proxy, anyone who can reach that port can exploit this.
Patches
Fixed in v0.1.2:
ATTACHis disabled in the engine (SQLITE_LIMIT_ATTACHEDset to 0) on every connection that runs a statement.- Read-only connections set
query_only. execute_queryrejects input that contains more than one statement.describe_tablepasses the table name as a bound parameter.
Workarounds
Upgrade to v0.1.2. If you cannot upgrade, don't expose the server to untrusted clients: keep it on a loopback or private interface, or run it behind an authenticating proxy such as ToolHive. Mount only the database you intend to expose, read-only at the filesystem or container level.
Credits
Reported by @bebold6133.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.1.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-130008"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863",
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-19T22:25:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-18T17:17:38Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nIn read-only mode (the default), a client that can call the MCP tools can write to the database the server is meant to expose read-only, read other SQLite files, and create new SQLite files anywhere the server process can write. There are two ways in: statement chaining through `execute_query`, and SQL injection through `describe_table`.\n\n### Details\n\n- **Statement chaining in `execute_query`.** The only check was that the query starts with `SELECT`. The `modernc.org/sqlite` driver runs every `;`-separated statement in one call, so anything after `SELECT 1;` ran unchecked.\n- **SQL injection in `describe_table`.** The `table_name` argument was interpolated into `PRAGMA table_info(%s)` with no guard.\n- **Escaping read-only mode.** Through either path, `ATTACH DATABASE` opens a file read-write regardless of the main connection\u0027s `mode=ro`. Attaching the protected database itself made it writable. Attaching another path read that file, or created it if it did not exist.\n\nRead-write mode is not affected beyond its intended capabilities, apart from `ATTACH` reaching files other than the configured database.\n\n### Impact\n\n- Modify the database that read-only mode is meant to protect.\n- Read any SQLite database file the server process can read.\n- Create new SQLite-format files anywhere the server process can write, or write to existing SQLite or empty files. Existing non-empty files that are not SQLite databases are refused and left unchanged.\n\nThe server has no built-in authentication and, by default, listens on `:8080` on all interfaces. Unless it is deployed behind an authenticating proxy, anyone who can reach that port can exploit this.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **v0.1.2**:\n\n- `ATTACH` is disabled in the engine (`SQLITE_LIMIT_ATTACHED` set to 0) on every connection that runs a statement.\n- Read-only connections set `query_only`.\n- `execute_query` rejects input that contains more than one statement.\n- `describe_table` passes the table name as a bound parameter.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to v0.1.2. If you cannot upgrade, don\u0027t expose the server to untrusted clients: keep it on a loopback or private interface, or run it behind an authenticating proxy such as ToolHive. Mount only the database you intend to expose, read-only at the filesystem or container level.\n\n### Credits\n\nReported by @bebold6133.",
"id": "GHSA-q433-mp6c-8v4f",
"modified": "2026-11-19T22:25:53Z",
"published": "2026-11-19T22:25:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-q433-mp6c-8v4f"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-130008"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp/pull/112"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp/commit/1da5a6582a4f9d90c778db5687ddcd0c39d2c1ec"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp/commit/3c244d61cc0a9c0cc5e4d74719c1dc83edcfa339"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp/releases/tag/v0.1.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "sqlite-mcp: Read-only mode bypass via statement chaining and SQL injection in describe_table"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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