GHSA-PVR5-J3RG-W9P8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-12 18:31 – Updated: 2026-11-12 18:31A flaw was found in the interaction between systemd-gpt-auto-generator and confidential computing guest VM images in OpenShift Sandboxed Containers (confidential peer pods). systemd-gpt-auto-generator automatically discovers and mounts GPT partitions by type GUID at boot with no user confirmation. In the confidential computing threat model, where the host/hypervisor is the adversary, a malicious host can inject partitions into the guest's virtual disk. Most critically, injecting a swap partition causes the guest kernel to page out TEE-encrypted memory to a host-controlled block device, breaking the confidentiality guarantee of the hardware TEE (AMD SEV-SNP, Intel TDX).
The PodVM images use a GPT-partitioned disk with dm-verity on the root partition. However, the roothash= kernel parameter only disables root auto-discovery — non-root partitions (swap, /home, /var, /srv, /var/tmp) are still auto-discovered and mounted. The generator is shipped unmasked in the RHEL systemd-udev subpackage, and no kernel command line parameter in the measured UKI addon disables it. Additionally, the PodVM measurement script captures PCRs 3, 9, 11, and 12, but not PCR 5 (GPT partition table), so partition table modifications are not detected by remote attestation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-121876"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-359"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-12T17:17:29Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in the interaction between systemd-gpt-auto-generator and \nconfidential computing guest VM images in OpenShift Sandboxed Containers \n(confidential peer pods). systemd-gpt-auto-generator automatically discovers \nand mounts GPT partitions by type GUID at boot with no user confirmation. In \nthe confidential computing threat model, where the host/hypervisor is the \nadversary, a malicious host can inject partitions into the guest\u0027s virtual \ndisk. Most critically, injecting a swap partition causes the guest kernel to \npage out TEE-encrypted memory to a host-controlled block device, breaking the \nconfidentiality guarantee of the hardware TEE (AMD SEV-SNP, Intel TDX).\n\nThe PodVM images use a GPT-partitioned disk with dm-verity on the root \npartition. However, the roothash= kernel parameter only disables root \nauto-discovery \u2014 non-root partitions (swap, /home, /var, /srv, /var/tmp) are \nstill auto-discovered and mounted. The generator is shipped unmasked in the \nRHEL systemd-udev subpackage, and no kernel command line parameter in the \nmeasured UKI addon disables it. Additionally, the PodVM measurement script \ncaptures PCRs 3, 9, 11, and 12, but not PCR 5 (GPT partition table), so \npartition table modifications are not detected by remote attestation.",
"id": "GHSA-pvr5-j3rg-w9p8",
"modified": "2026-11-12T18:31:47Z",
"published": "2026-11-12T18:31:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-121876"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-121876"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2558210"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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