GHSA-PQ7J-F95F-QFCV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-15 20:22 – Updated: 2026-10-15 20:22
VLAI
Summary
Claude Code: Plugin Hash Pin Bypass Allows Bypass of Hash Pinning
Details

The plugin install flow in Claude Code and Claude Desktop checked out a marketplace's pinned commit SHA using git checkout without verifying that the resulting HEAD matched the pinned SHA. An attacker controlling a plugin's upstream repository could create a branch named identically to the pinned 40-character SHA, causing the checkout to silently resolve to the attacker's branch tip instead of the reviewed commit, resulting in attacker-controlled code being installed bypassing the pinned hash. Exploitation required a user to install a malicious plugin, pin to a safe hash, and for the plugin source to be hosted on a git host that permitted SHA-shaped branch names.

Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version.

Thank you to Or Nevo Michrowski of Air Security for reporting this issue.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@anthropic-ai/claude-code"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.179"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-86063"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-494",
      "CWE-829"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-15T20:22:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-13T19:21:21Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The plugin install flow in Claude Code and Claude Desktop checked out a marketplace\u0027s pinned commit SHA using `git checkout` without verifying that the resulting HEAD matched the pinned SHA. An attacker controlling a plugin\u0027s upstream repository could create a branch named identically to the pinned 40-character SHA, causing the checkout to silently resolve to the attacker\u0027s branch tip instead of the reviewed commit, resulting in attacker-controlled code being installed bypassing the pinned hash. Exploitation required a user to install a malicious plugin, pin to a safe hash, and for the plugin source to be hosted on a git host that permitted SHA-shaped branch names.\n\nUsers on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version.\n\nThank you to Or Nevo Michrowski of Air Security for reporting this issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-pq7j-f95f-qfcv",
  "modified": "2026-10-15T20:22:07Z",
  "published": "2026-10-15T20:22:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/security/advisories/GHSA-pq7j-f95f-qfcv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86063"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/releases/tag/v2.1.179"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Claude Code: Plugin Hash Pin Bypass Allows Bypass of Hash Pinning"
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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