GHSA-PP95-GC86-JQ6Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-02 22:35 – Updated: 2026-10-02 22:35
VLAI
Summary
Trigger.dev: Missing Authentication in Run Replay Action Allows Cross-Organization Task Execution (IDOR)
Details

Summary

The run replay action function at apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.taskruns.$runParam.replay.ts has no authentication or authorization check. While the loader (GET) in the same file properly calls requireUser(request) and scopes queries to the user's organizations, the action (POST) at line 166 does neither — allowing any authenticated user to replay task runs from any organization by knowing the run's friendlyId.

Details

Vulnerable file: apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.taskruns.$runParam.replay.ts

The loader (line 28-29) — properly authenticated:

export async function loader({ request, params }: LoaderFunctionArgs) {
  const user = await requireUser(request);  // ✓ Auth check
  const userId = user.id;
  // ... queries scoped to user's orgs
}

The action (line 166-193) — NO authentication:

export const action: ActionFunction = async ({ request, params }) => {
  const { runParam } = ParamSchema.parse(params);
  // ✗ NO requireUser() call
  // ✗ NO requireUserId() call
  // ✗ NO org membership check

  const taskRun = await prisma.taskRun.findFirst({
    where: {
      friendlyId: runParam,  // Queries ANY run, no org scoping
    },
    include: {
      runtimeEnvironment: { select: { slug: true } },
      project: { include: { organization: true } },
    },
  });

  // ... proceeds to replay the run in the victim's environment
  const replayRunService = new ReplayTaskRunService();

The Prisma query at line 177 fetches the run by friendlyId only — no userId or organization filter. The ReplayTaskRunService then creates a new task run in the victim's environment, executing with the victim's environment variables and secrets.

Same bug class exists in: apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.batches.$batchId.check-completion.ts (line 17) — the action has zero authentication, allowing any user to trigger batch completion for any batch ID.

PoC

Run replay IDOR:

# Any authenticated user can replay any org's task run
POST /resources/taskruns/run_abc123def/replay
Cookie: <any-valid-session>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

environmentId=<victim-env-id>&failedRedirect=/

The friendlyId values (e.g., run_abc123def) are short, incrementing strings that can be enumerated.

Batch completion (same bug class):

# Any authenticated user can trigger batch completion for any batch
POST /resources/batches/<batchId>/check-completion
Cookie: <any-valid-session>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

redirectUrl=/

Impact

  • Cross-organization task execution: An attacker can replay task runs belonging to other organizations, executing tasks in the victim's environment with the victim's secrets and API keys
  • Secret exposure: Replayed tasks run with the victim organization's environment variables, which may contain database credentials, API keys, and other secrets
  • Resource consumption: Attacker consumes the victim's compute quota by replaying their tasks
  • Data integrity: The batch completion endpoint can prematurely resume parent tasks waiting for batch results, causing data integrity issues
  • Low attack complexity: friendlyId values are short, predictable strings — enumeration is feasible
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.5.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "trigger.dev"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.5.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-02T22:35:24Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe run replay `action` function at `apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.taskruns.$runParam.replay.ts` has no authentication or authorization check. While the `loader` (GET) in the same file properly calls `requireUser(request)` and scopes queries to the user\u0027s organizations, the `action` (POST) at line 166 does neither \u2014 allowing any authenticated user to replay task runs from any organization by knowing the run\u0027s `friendlyId`.\n\n### Details\n\n**Vulnerable file:** `apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.taskruns.$runParam.replay.ts`\n\n**The `loader` (line 28-29) \u2014 properly authenticated:**\n```typescript\nexport async function loader({ request, params }: LoaderFunctionArgs) {\n  const user = await requireUser(request);  // \u2713 Auth check\n  const userId = user.id;\n  // ... queries scoped to user\u0027s orgs\n}\n```\n\n**The `action` (line 166-193) \u2014 NO authentication:**\n```typescript\nexport const action: ActionFunction = async ({ request, params }) =\u003e {\n  const { runParam } = ParamSchema.parse(params);\n  // \u2717 NO requireUser() call\n  // \u2717 NO requireUserId() call\n  // \u2717 NO org membership check\n\n  const taskRun = await prisma.taskRun.findFirst({\n    where: {\n      friendlyId: runParam,  // Queries ANY run, no org scoping\n    },\n    include: {\n      runtimeEnvironment: { select: { slug: true } },\n      project: { include: { organization: true } },\n    },\n  });\n\n  // ... proceeds to replay the run in the victim\u0027s environment\n  const replayRunService = new ReplayTaskRunService();\n```\n\nThe Prisma query at line 177 fetches the run by `friendlyId` only \u2014 no `userId` or organization filter. The `ReplayTaskRunService` then creates a new task run in the victim\u0027s environment, executing with the victim\u0027s environment variables and secrets.\n\n**Same bug class exists in:** `apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.batches.$batchId.check-completion.ts` (line 17) \u2014 the `action` has zero authentication, allowing any user to trigger batch completion for any batch ID.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Run replay IDOR:**\n```bash\n# Any authenticated user can replay any org\u0027s task run\nPOST /resources/taskruns/run_abc123def/replay\nCookie: \u003cany-valid-session\u003e\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n\nenvironmentId=\u003cvictim-env-id\u003e\u0026failedRedirect=/\n```\n\nThe `friendlyId` values (e.g., `run_abc123def`) are short, incrementing strings that can be enumerated.\n\n**Batch completion (same bug class):**\n```bash\n# Any authenticated user can trigger batch completion for any batch\nPOST /resources/batches/\u003cbatchId\u003e/check-completion\nCookie: \u003cany-valid-session\u003e\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n\nredirectUrl=/\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Cross-organization task execution:** An attacker can replay task runs belonging to other organizations, executing tasks in the victim\u0027s environment with the victim\u0027s secrets and API keys\n- **Secret exposure:** Replayed tasks run with the victim organization\u0027s environment variables, which may contain database credentials, API keys, and other secrets\n- **Resource consumption:** Attacker consumes the victim\u0027s compute quota by replaying their tasks\n- **Data integrity:** The batch completion endpoint can prematurely resume parent tasks waiting for batch results, causing data integrity issues\n- **Low attack complexity:** `friendlyId` values are short, predictable strings \u2014 enumeration is feasible",
  "id": "GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q",
  "modified": "2026-10-02T22:35:24Z",
  "published": "2026-10-02T22:35:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/security/advisories/GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/4199"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/commit/34b1a181c2a1d33a53ebab88f84b05f81fea4254"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/releases/tag/v4.5.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Trigger.dev: Missing Authentication in Run Replay Action Allows Cross-Organization Task Execution (IDOR)"
}



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