GHSA-PP4V-XC4H-7X6M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-27 15:33 – Updated: 2026-05-30 12:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: acomp - fix wrong pointer stored by acomp_save_req()
acomp_save_req() stores &req->chain in req->base.data. When acomp_reqchain_done() is invoked on asynchronous completion, it receives &req->chain as the data argument but casts it directly to struct acomp_req. Since data points to the chain member, all subsequent field accesses are at a wrong offset, resulting in memory corruption.
The issue occurs when an asynchronous hardware implementation, such as the QAT driver, completes a request that uses the DMA virtual address interface (e.g. acomp_request_set_src_dma()). This combination causes crypto_acomp_compress() to enter the acomp_do_req_chain() path, which sets acomp_reqchain_done() as the completion callback via acomp_save_req().
With KASAN enabled, this manifests as a general protection fault in acomp_reqchain_done():
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe000040000000000 KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000400000000000-0x0000400000000007] RIP: 0010:acomp_reqchain_done+0x15b/0x4e0 Call Trace: qat_comp_alg_callback+0x5d/0xa0 [intel_qat] adf_ring_response_handler+0x376/0x8b0 [intel_qat] adf_response_handler+0x60/0x170 [intel_qat] tasklet_action_common+0x223/0x820 handle_softirqs+0x1ab/0x640
Fix this by storing the request itself in req->base.data instead of &req->chain, so that acomp_reqchain_done() receives the correct pointer. Simplify acomp_restore_req() accordingly to access req->chain directly.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46081"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-787"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T14:17:29Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: acomp - fix wrong pointer stored by acomp_save_req()\n\nacomp_save_req() stores \u0026req-\u003echain in req-\u003ebase.data. When\nacomp_reqchain_done() is invoked on asynchronous completion, it receives\n\u0026req-\u003echain as the data argument but casts it directly to struct\nacomp_req. Since data points to the chain member, all subsequent field\naccesses are at a wrong offset, resulting in memory corruption.\n\nThe issue occurs when an asynchronous hardware implementation, such as\nthe QAT driver, completes a request that uses the DMA virtual address\ninterface (e.g. acomp_request_set_src_dma()). This combination causes\ncrypto_acomp_compress() to enter the acomp_do_req_chain() path, which\nsets acomp_reqchain_done() as the completion callback via\nacomp_save_req().\n\nWith KASAN enabled, this manifests as a general protection fault in\nacomp_reqchain_done():\n\n general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe000040000000000\n KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000400000000000-0x0000400000000007]\n RIP: 0010:acomp_reqchain_done+0x15b/0x4e0\n Call Trace:\n \u003cIRQ\u003e\n qat_comp_alg_callback+0x5d/0xa0 [intel_qat]\n adf_ring_response_handler+0x376/0x8b0 [intel_qat]\n adf_response_handler+0x60/0x170 [intel_qat]\n tasklet_action_common+0x223/0x820\n handle_softirqs+0x1ab/0x640\n \u003c/IRQ\u003e\n\nFix this by storing the request itself in req-\u003ebase.data instead of\n\u0026req-\u003echain, so that acomp_reqchain_done() receives the correct pointer.\nSimplify acomp_restore_req() accordingly to access req-\u003echain directly.",
"id": "GHSA-pp4v-xc4h-7x6m",
"modified": "2026-05-30T12:30:24Z",
"published": "2026-05-27T15:33:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46081"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1a2785e5985627f2265ba7775949601a29ba0d1e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/343a5bf68a8ff9affcf2b70677ea4cf40c195ee4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7e20b9bd6c990773cf0c09e2642250b8a70263d"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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