GHSA-PJ7P-238H-76PV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 16:09 – Updated: 2026-11-19 16:09Summary
The Django admin views for moderation comments (CollectionCommentAdmin and RequestCommentAdmin) render the full comment body but scope access only by an attacker-controlled id in the URL and Django's model-level view_*comment permission. They perform no per-object participant check. As a result, any authenticated staff user who holds the comment view permission can read the comments of any collection or moderation request — including ones they are not a participant of — simply by supplying the target object's id.
Comments are documented and intended to be private to the participants of a collection (its author and the moderators assigned to its workflow). This advisory concerns a read/write authorization asymmetry: the write paths already enforced request.user == obj.author, but the read paths did not enforce any participant check.
Details
ModerationRequest.user_can_view_comments() — the gate intended to protect comment reads (author or assigned moderator) — existed in the codebase but was never called by the comment admins. Neither CollectionCommentAdmin nor RequestCommentAdmin overrode get_queryset, and their changelist_view / changeform_view methods resolved the target object directly from the user-supplied id without an authorization check.
The changelists are hard-scoped to a single collection / moderation request (they raise Http404 when no id is present), so the exposure is not "all comments at once," but any specific collection's or request's comments can be retrieved by iterating ids.
list_displayon both admins includes the commentmessage, so the full body is disclosed directly in the changelist HTML.- The individual changeform (
.../<id>/change/) discloses the same content via a direct URL.
Impact
- Type: Information disclosure / broken object-level authorization (IDOR).
- Confidentiality: Comment contents of collections/requests the user does not participate in are exposed. This can include sensitive internal editorial discussion.
- Integrity / Availability: No impact — comment creation, editing, and deletion already enforced author checks and are unaffected.
- Who is affected: Deployments where more than one team/group of staff reviewers holds the
view_collectioncomment/view_requestcommentpermission. A reviewer of collection A can read the comments of collection B.
Workarounds
Restrict the view_collectioncomment and view_requestcomment model permissions to trusted users only, and avoid granting them across teams that must not see each other's moderation comments. This does not fully close the issue but reduces the set of users who can exploit it. Upgrading is the only complete fix.
Remediation
Upgrade to djangocms-moderation 2.4.1.
The fix adds a user_can_view_comments participant gate (author or assigned moderator) to both comment admins, enforced in changelist_view and changeform_view for both the collection and request comment models. A ModerationCollection.user_can_view_comments() method was added to mirror the existing ModerationRequest.user_can_view_comments(). Non-participants now receive an HTTP 403 (PermissionDenied).
Credit
Reported via coordinated disclosure.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.3.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "djangocms-moderation"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-69139"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-639",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-19T16:09:30Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-18T22:17:23Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe Django admin views for moderation comments (`CollectionCommentAdmin` and `RequestCommentAdmin`) render the full comment body but scope access only by an attacker-controlled `id` in the URL and Django\u0027s model-level `view_*comment` permission. They perform no per-object participant check. As a result, any authenticated staff user who holds the comment *view* permission can read the comments of **any** collection or moderation request \u2014 including ones they are not a participant of \u2014 simply by supplying the target object\u0027s id.\n\nComments are documented and intended to be private to the participants of a collection (its author and the moderators assigned to its workflow). This advisory concerns a read/write authorization asymmetry: the write paths already enforced `request.user == obj.author`, but the read paths did not enforce any participant check.\n\n## Details\n\n`ModerationRequest.user_can_view_comments()` \u2014 the gate intended to protect comment reads (author **or** assigned moderator) \u2014 existed in the codebase but was never called by the comment admins. Neither `CollectionCommentAdmin` nor `RequestCommentAdmin` overrode `get_queryset`, and their `changelist_view` / `changeform_view` methods resolved the target object directly from the user-supplied id without an authorization check.\n\nThe changelists are hard-scoped to a single collection / moderation request (they `raise Http404` when no id is present), so the exposure is not \"all comments at once,\" but any specific collection\u0027s or request\u0027s comments can be retrieved by iterating ids.\n\n- `list_display` on both admins includes the comment `message`, so the full body is disclosed directly in the changelist HTML.\n- The individual changeform (`.../\u003cid\u003e/change/`) discloses the same content via a direct URL.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Type:** Information disclosure / broken object-level authorization (IDOR).\n- **Confidentiality:** Comment contents of collections/requests the user does not participate in are exposed. This can include sensitive internal editorial discussion.\n- **Integrity / Availability:** No impact \u2014 comment creation, editing, and deletion already enforced author checks and are unaffected.\n- **Who is affected:** Deployments where more than one team/group of staff reviewers holds the `view_collectioncomment` / `view_requestcomment` permission. A reviewer of collection A can read the comments of collection B.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nRestrict the `view_collectioncomment` and `view_requestcomment` model permissions to trusted users only, and avoid granting them across teams that must not see each other\u0027s moderation comments. This does not fully close the issue but reduces the set of users who can exploit it. Upgrading is the only complete fix.\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade to djangocms-moderation 2.4.1.\n\nThe fix adds a `user_can_view_comments` participant gate (author or assigned moderator) to both comment admins, enforced in `changelist_view` and `changeform_view` for both the collection and request comment models. A `ModerationCollection.user_can_view_comments()` method was added to mirror the existing `ModerationRequest.user_can_view_comments()`. Non-participants now receive an HTTP 403 (`PermissionDenied`).\n\n## Credit\n\nReported via coordinated disclosure.",
"id": "GHSA-pj7p-238h-76pv",
"modified": "2026-11-19T16:09:30Z",
"published": "2026-11-19T16:09:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-moderation/security/advisories/GHSA-pj7p-238h-76pv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69139"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-moderation/pull/374"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-moderation/commit/a044d9c98c127454b73e8a8ada6e59aaa0a8f621"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-moderation"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-moderation/releases/tag/2.4.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "djangocms-moderation: Moderation comments disclosed to non-participant staff via the admin changelist"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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