GHSA-PGCC-VFMC-7CW5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-13 23:55 – Updated: 2026-07-13 23:55Summary
Kimai 2.56.0 contains authenticated cross-site request forgery issues in its default team creation shortcuts for projects, customers, and activities. These endpoints are exposed through GET routes and directly create or reuse a Team, add the current user as teamlead, and bind the target object to that team.
As a result, an attacker can trick a logged-in user with the required permissions into visiting a malicious page and cause unauthorized changes to team, teamlead, and object-binding relationships. This is a real authorization-structure modification issue rather than a harmless UI shortcut.
Details
The issue affects at least the following routes:
GET /en/admin/project/{id}/create_teamGET /en/admin/customer/{id}/create_teamGET /en/admin/activity/{id}/create_team
Each of these routes is a GET endpoint, yet each performs persistent writes that alter authorization structure:
- create or reuse a
Team - add the current user as
teamlead - bind the target
Project,Customer, orActivityto that team
A PoC was provided, but removed for security reasons.
Impact
This vulnerability allows an attacker to remotely alter permission topology while the victim is logged in. A successful exploit can create or reuse a team, assign the victim as its teamlead, and bind a project, customer, or activity to that team without intentional user action.
The pre-requisite is, that the logged-in user already has access to manage permissions of the object in question.
Because these routes modify authorization structure rather than a simple personal preference, the business impact can extend into visibility rules, assignment scope, team-based access control, reporting, and later privilege-expansion chains. This makes the issue materially more serious than a low-value cosmetic CSRF.
Solution
- The routes have been moved to API
POSTendpoints
See https://www.kimai.org/en/security/ghsa-pgcc-vfmc-7cw5
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.57.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "kimai/kimai"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.58.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49992"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-13T23:55:01Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nKimai 2.56.0 contains authenticated cross-site request forgery issues in its default team creation shortcuts for projects, customers, and activities. These endpoints are exposed through `GET` routes and directly create or reuse a `Team`, add the current user as teamlead, and bind the target object to that team.\n\nAs a result, an attacker can trick a logged-in user with the required permissions into visiting a malicious page and cause unauthorized changes to team, teamlead, and object-binding relationships. This is a real authorization-structure modification issue rather than a harmless UI shortcut.\n\n### Details\n\nThe issue affects at least the following routes:\n\n- `GET /en/admin/project/{id}/create_team`\n- `GET /en/admin/customer/{id}/create_team`\n- `GET /en/admin/activity/{id}/create_team`\n\nEach of these routes is a `GET` endpoint, yet each performs persistent writes that alter authorization structure:\n\n- create or reuse a `Team`\n- add the current user as `teamlead`\n- bind the target `Project`, `Customer`, or `Activity` to that team\n\n*A PoC was provided, but removed for security reasons.*\n\n### Impact\n\nThis vulnerability allows an attacker to remotely alter permission topology while the victim is logged in. A successful exploit can create or reuse a team, assign the victim as its teamlead, and bind a project, customer, or activity to that team without intentional user action.\n\nThe pre-requisite is, that the logged-in user already has access to manage permissions of the object in question.\n\nBecause these routes modify authorization structure rather than a simple personal preference, the business impact can extend into visibility rules, assignment scope, team-based access control, reporting, and later privilege-expansion chains. This makes the issue materially more serious than a low-value cosmetic CSRF.\n\n## Solution\n\n- The routes have been moved to API `POST` endpoints\n\nSee https://www.kimai.org/en/security/ghsa-pgcc-vfmc-7cw5",
"id": "GHSA-pgcc-vfmc-7cw5",
"modified": "2026-07-13T23:55:01Z",
"published": "2026-07-13T23:55:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kimai/kimai/security/advisories/GHSA-pgcc-vfmc-7cw5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/kimai/kimai"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.kimai.org/en/security/ghsa-pgcc-vfmc-7cw5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": " Kimai: Login CSRF in Default Team Creation Endpoints Allows Unauthorized Team and Permission Structure Changes"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.