GHSA-P2CM-FX34-7984
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-16 12:31 – Updated: 2026-11-16 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: bound mon_command ack decode to front len
handle_command_ack() bounds the decode with msg->front_alloc_len, the size of the reply buffer, instead of msg->front.iov_len, the number of bytes the monitor sent. mon_alloc_msg() routes every CEPH_MSG_MON_COMMAND_ACK to get_generic_reply(), which returns the preallocated ->reply of whichever generic request carries the same tid, so the buffer keeps its fixed size however short the reply is. An ack with hdr.front_len below sizeof(struct ceph_mon_request_header) + sizeof(u32), including 0, still passes ceph_decode_need(), and ceph_decode_32() returns four bytes that were never received: uninitialized slab memory, stale bytes of an earlier message, or bytes the peer planted by sending a reply that lands in the same buffer and is then rejected. The read stays within the allocation, so KASAN does not flag it.
req->result reaches userspace through ceph_monc_do_statfs(), ceph_monc_get_version() and ceph_monc_blocklist_add(); rbd hands it back from write() on /sys/bus/rbd/add_single_major, and rbd_get_client() passes it to ERR_PTR() unchecked, which faults:
rbd: failed to get latest osdmap: -186318427 BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfffe9ca034 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:do_rbd_add (drivers/block/rbd.c:7105) Call Trace: ... kernfs_fop_write_iter (fs/kernfs/file.c:345) vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:595 fs/read_write.c:687) ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:739) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Use msg->front.iov_len, matching handle_subscribe_ack(), handle_statfs_reply(), handle_get_version_reply() and handle_auth_reply(). A well-formed ack has front.iov_len >= 22 and is unaffected; a short one takes the existing bad: path. This applies commit d3c32939fa0e ("libceph: bound get_version reply decode to front len") to the last decode-side use of front_alloc_len in this file.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99296"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-16T10:17:02Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nlibceph: bound mon_command ack decode to front len\n\nhandle_command_ack() bounds the decode with msg-\u003efront_alloc_len, the size\nof the reply buffer, instead of msg-\u003efront.iov_len, the number of bytes the\nmonitor sent. mon_alloc_msg() routes every CEPH_MSG_MON_COMMAND_ACK to\nget_generic_reply(), which returns the preallocated -\u003ereply of whichever\ngeneric request carries the same tid, so the buffer keeps its fixed size\nhowever short the reply is. An ack with hdr.front_len below sizeof(struct\nceph_mon_request_header) + sizeof(u32), including 0, still passes\nceph_decode_need(), and ceph_decode_32() returns four bytes that were never\nreceived: uninitialized slab memory, stale bytes of an earlier message, or\nbytes the peer planted by sending a reply that lands in the same buffer and\nis then rejected. The read stays within the allocation, so KASAN does not\nflag it.\n\nreq-\u003eresult reaches userspace through ceph_monc_do_statfs(),\nceph_monc_get_version() and ceph_monc_blocklist_add(); rbd hands it back\nfrom write() on /sys/bus/rbd/add_single_major, and rbd_get_client() passes\nit to ERR_PTR() unchecked, which faults:\n\n rbd: failed to get latest osdmap: -186318427\n BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfffe9ca034\n Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI\n RIP: 0010:do_rbd_add (drivers/block/rbd.c:7105)\n Call Trace:\n ...\n kernfs_fop_write_iter (fs/kernfs/file.c:345)\n vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:595 fs/read_write.c:687)\n ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:739)\n do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84)\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)\n Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception\n\nUse msg-\u003efront.iov_len, matching handle_subscribe_ack(),\nhandle_statfs_reply(), handle_get_version_reply() and handle_auth_reply().\nA well-formed ack has front.iov_len \u003e= 22 and is unaffected; a short one\ntakes the existing bad: path. This applies commit d3c32939fa0e (\"libceph:\nbound get_version reply decode to front len\") to the last decode-side\nuse of front_alloc_len in this file.",
"id": "GHSA-p2cm-fx34-7984",
"modified": "2026-11-16T12:31:40Z",
"published": "2026-11-16T12:31:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99296"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/04a04953b4828bfd8efd4ea3e7e9ad7dac5b083b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/62b41a16d8603d4d809fda212f15c3e9c783a82b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be9fa57665efae4060d17ab21675c1c033d54a80"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c6696ac94c8c3ad79a9fa57fc334af2dc1a1f72e"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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