GHSA-MX6P-3FG7-V6PJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 20:41 – Updated: 2026-11-19 20:41When obsidian-sync-mcp runs without MCP_AUTH_TOKEN (the documented no-auth mode for local use), the HTTP MCP endpoint does not validate the Host or Origin header before dispatching MCP methods (CWE-350). The no-auth mode's "local network only" assumption therefore does not hold: a malicious web page the operator visits can use DNS rebinding to resolve an attacker-controlled hostname to 127.0.0.1 (or the operator's LAN/VPN/Docker-published address) and issue requests the server accepts as trusted local calls, reaching the full tool surface (read_note, write_note, edit_note, delete_note, move_note, list_notes, list_folders, list_tags, get_note_metadata).
Affected versions: <= 0.5.6 Patched version: 0.5.7
Impact
Any deployment running without MCP_AUTH_TOKEN — including the README "Filesystem mode (simplest)" quickstart and the self-hosted docker-compose setup (where MCP_AUTH_TOKEN defaults to empty)" — is exposed to any website the operator visits while the server is running. That page's JavaScript can silently read the entire vault and create/overwrite/delete/move notes, with no credentials and no prompt. In CouchDB/Self-hosted LiveSync mode, the same code path applies, so vault content in CouchDB is equally reachable. Deployments that set MCP_AUTH_TOKEN are not affected — a bearer token is not attached by browsers, so a forged request returns HTTP 401.
Remediation
Upgrade to 0.5.7, which validates both the Host and Origin headers in no-auth mode: any request whose Host is not localhost/127.0.0.1/::1 (or a value in the new MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS), or that carries a cross-origin Origin not in that allowlist, is rejected before any MCP method runs. The Host check defeats DNS rebinding; the Origin check defeats the related bypass where a page directly fetches http://127.0.0.1:/mcp (genuine loopback Host, attacker Origin) — the transport's wildcard CORS would otherwise expose the response. Non-browser MCP clients send no Origin, so they are unaffected. These checks block browser-delivered attacks only; a direct non-browser network client can still forge both headers, so on untrusted networks set MCP_AUTH_TOKEN.
Workaround (any version): set MCP_AUTH_TOKEN to require authentication — this closes the path immediately.
Technical detail
In no-auth mode serverOptions.authenticate was never installed, so FastMCP dispatched every request with no per-request check. Even with a token, only the Authorization header was inspected — nothing in the server, fastmcp, or mcp-proxy validated Host/Origin. Two browser-reachable variants follow: (1) classic DNS rebinding, where the browser sends the attacker's hostname in Host; and (2) a direct cross-origin fetch() to the loopback address, where Host is genuinely 127.0.0.1 but Origin is attacker-controlled and the transport's wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * exposes the response — no rebinding required. The 0.5.7 fix adds an application-layer Host+Origin check in authenticate that rejects such requests before dispatch; it is a compensating control and does not alter the wildcard CORS header itself (the rejection happens before any response body is produced).
Proof of concept (mitigated in 0.5.7)
# No-auth server (per the README quickstart)
VAULT_PATH=/tmp/demo-vault HOST=127.0.0.1 PORT=8787 npx tsx src/main.ts
# Forged Host/Origin (what a DNS-rebinding page's fetch() sends) reaches the tools with no credential:
curl -s -i http://127.0.0.1:8787/mcp \
-H "Host: attacker.example" -H "Origin: http://attacker.example" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Accept: application/json, text/event-stream" \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-06-18","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"poc","version":"1.0"}}}'
# -> HTTP 200; a follow-up tools/call to write_note creates a file in the vault, no Authorization header.
# The same sequence against a server with MCP_AUTH_TOKEN set returns HTTP 401.
# Variant 2 — no rebinding needed: real loopback Host, attacker Origin.
# In <= 0.5.6 this returns 200 and executes tools; in 0.5.7 it returns 403.
curl -s -i http://127.0.0.1:8787/mcp \
-H "Host: 127.0.0.1:8787" -H "Origin: http://attacker.example" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Accept: application/json, text/event-stream" \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-06-18","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"poc","version":"1.0"}}}'
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.5.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "obsidian-sync-mcp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.5.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-77283"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-350"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-19T20:41:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-18T23:17:21Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "When obsidian-sync-mcp runs without MCP_AUTH_TOKEN (the documented no-auth mode for local use), the HTTP MCP endpoint does not validate the Host or Origin header before dispatching MCP methods (CWE-350). The no-auth mode\u0027s \"local network only\" assumption therefore does not hold: a malicious web page the operator visits can use DNS rebinding to resolve an attacker-controlled hostname to 127.0.0.1 (or the operator\u0027s LAN/VPN/Docker-published address) and issue requests the server accepts as trusted local calls, reaching the full tool surface (read_note, write_note, edit_note, delete_note, move_note, list_notes, list_folders, list_tags, get_note_metadata).\n\nAffected versions: \u003c= 0.5.6\nPatched version: 0.5.7\n\n## Impact\n\nAny deployment running without MCP_AUTH_TOKEN \u2014 including the README \"Filesystem mode (simplest)\" quickstart and the self-hosted docker-compose setup (where MCP_AUTH_TOKEN defaults to empty)\" \u2014 is exposed to any website the operator visits while the server is running. That page\u0027s JavaScript can silently read the entire vault and create/overwrite/delete/move notes, with no credentials and no prompt. In CouchDB/Self-hosted LiveSync mode, the same code path applies, so vault content in CouchDB is equally reachable. Deployments that set MCP_AUTH_TOKEN are not affected \u2014 a bearer token is not attached by browsers, so a forged request returns HTTP 401.\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade to 0.5.7, which validates both the Host and Origin headers in no-auth mode: any request whose Host is not localhost/127.0.0.1/::1 (or a value in the new MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS), or that carries a cross-origin Origin not in that allowlist, is rejected before any MCP method runs. The Host check defeats DNS rebinding; the Origin check defeats the related bypass where a page directly fetches http://127.0.0.1:\u003cport\u003e/mcp (genuine loopback Host, attacker Origin) \u2014 the transport\u0027s wildcard CORS would otherwise expose the response. Non-browser MCP clients send no Origin, so they are unaffected. These checks block browser-delivered attacks only; a direct non-browser network client can still forge both headers, so on untrusted networks set MCP_AUTH_TOKEN.\n\nWorkaround (any version): set MCP_AUTH_TOKEN to require authentication \u2014 this closes the path immediately.\n\n## Technical detail\n\nIn no-auth mode serverOptions.authenticate was never installed, so FastMCP dispatched every request with no per-request check. Even with a token, only the Authorization header was inspected \u2014 nothing in the server, fastmcp, or mcp-proxy validated Host/Origin. Two browser-reachable variants follow: (1) classic DNS rebinding, where the browser sends the attacker\u0027s hostname in Host; and (2) a direct cross-origin fetch() to the loopback address, where Host is genuinely 127.0.0.1 but Origin is attacker-controlled and the transport\u0027s wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * exposes the response \u2014 no rebinding required. The 0.5.7 fix adds an application-layer Host+Origin check in authenticate that rejects such requests before dispatch; it is a compensating control and does not alter the wildcard CORS header itself (the rejection happens before any response body is produced).\n\n## Proof of concept (mitigated in 0.5.7)\n```\n# No-auth server (per the README quickstart)\nVAULT_PATH=/tmp/demo-vault HOST=127.0.0.1 PORT=8787 npx tsx src/main.ts\n\n# Forged Host/Origin (what a DNS-rebinding page\u0027s fetch() sends) reaches the tools with no credential:\ncurl -s -i http://127.0.0.1:8787/mcp \\\n -H \"Host: attacker.example\" -H \"Origin: http://attacker.example\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"Accept: application/json, text/event-stream\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"initialize\",\"params\":{\"protocolVersion\":\"2025-06-18\",\"capabilities\":{},\"clientInfo\":{\"name\":\"poc\",\"version\":\"1.0\"}}}\u0027\n# -\u003e HTTP 200; a follow-up tools/call to write_note creates a file in the vault, no Authorization header.\n# The same sequence against a server with MCP_AUTH_TOKEN set returns HTTP 401.\n```\n\n```\n# Variant 2 \u2014 no rebinding needed: real loopback Host, attacker Origin.\n# In \u003c= 0.5.6 this returns 200 and executes tools; in 0.5.7 it returns 403.\ncurl -s -i http://127.0.0.1:8787/mcp \\\n -H \"Host: 127.0.0.1:8787\" -H \"Origin: http://attacker.example\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -H \"Accept: application/json, text/event-stream\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"initialize\",\"params\":{\"protocolVersion\":\"2025-06-18\",\"capabilities\":{},\"clientInfo\":{\"name\":\"poc\",\"version\":\"1.0\"}}}\u0027\n```",
"id": "GHSA-mx6p-3fg7-v6pj",
"modified": "2026-11-19T20:41:18Z",
"published": "2026-11-19T20:41:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/es617/obsidian-sync-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-mx6p-3fg7-v6pj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77283"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/es617/obsidian-sync-mcp/commit/d4d2cbbb02ffadaecf1d6252902b8d08610c7018"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/es617/obsidian-sync-mcp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/es617/obsidian-sync-mcp/releases/tag/v0.5.7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "obsidian-sync-mcp: Missing Host/Origin validation lets a public website drive a victim\u0027s Obsidian vault via DNS rebinding (no-auth mode)"
}
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