GHSA-MM27-MWQ9-FR5G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-15 18:08 – Updated: 2026-10-15 18:08
VLAI
Summary
GitHub CLI allows attestation verification bypass through unescaped regex metacharacters
Details

Summary

A security vulnerability has been identified in GitHub CLI that could allow attestation verification bypass when using gh attestation verify with --signer-repo or --signer-workflow flags. GitHub CLI builds the certificate matcher from these flag values without escaping regex metacharacters, so a repository or workflow name is treated as a regular expression rather than a literal string. GitHub permits characters such as  .  in organization, repository, and workflow path names, and  .  is a regex wildcard, so a malicious actor can create a lookalike name that satisfies a matcher intended for a different, trusted signer.

Details

GitHub CLI constructs a regular expression from the  --signer-repo  and  --signer-workflow  values and matches it against the signing certificate's SAN (Subject Alternative Name) during Sigstore attestation verification. The user-supplied value is interpolated into the pattern without escaping regex metacharacters, so any metacharacter permitted in a GitHub path is interpreted as regex syntax instead of a literal character.

The most practical case is  . , which GitHub allows in org/repo names and is a regex wildcard meaning "any single character." For example, an attacker-controlled repository named:

github/artifact.attestations-workflows

matches a verifier configured for the trusted signer:

github/artifact-attestations-workflows

because the unescaped  .  in the constructed pattern matches the  -  in the attacker's name (and any other single character at that position). This affected the --signer-repo and --signer-workflow flags but did not affect the --repo and --owner flags which include an exact string comparison.

In v2.97.0, the GitHub CLI escapes the user-supplied signer values before they are incorporated into the SAN matcher, so they are matched as literal strings.

Impact

The practical impact is limited, exploitation requires the attacker to create a plausible lookalike repository name and produce valid Sigstore attestations from it. This could undermine supply chain verification for CI/CD pipelines or policy gates that use these flags to pin trust to a specific signing workflow.

Remediation and Mitigation

  1. Upgrade gh to v2.97.0 or later, which escapes signer values before matching.
  2. As a workaround, use --repo or --owner flags instead of --signer-repo or --signer-workflow where applicable.
  3. Manually inspect the signing certificate SAN in attestation output to confirm the signing workflow origin.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/cli/cli/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.97.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-64655"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-185"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-15T18:08:20Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-06T22:18:13Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA security vulnerability has been identified in GitHub CLI that could allow attestation verification bypass when using `gh attestation verify` with `--signer-repo` or `--signer-workflow` flags. GitHub CLI builds the certificate matcher from these flag values without escaping regex metacharacters, so a repository or workflow name is treated as a regular expression rather than a literal string. GitHub permits characters such as \u00a0`.`\u00a0 in organization, repository, and workflow path names, and \u00a0`.`\u00a0 is a regex wildcard, so a malicious actor can create a lookalike name that satisfies a matcher intended for a different, trusted signer.\n\n### Details\n\nGitHub CLI constructs a regular expression from the \u00a0`--signer-repo`\u00a0 and \u00a0`--signer-workflow`\u00a0 values and matches it against the signing certificate\u0027s SAN (Subject Alternative Name) during Sigstore attestation verification. The user-supplied value is interpolated into the pattern without escaping regex metacharacters, so any metacharacter permitted in a GitHub path is interpreted as regex syntax instead of a literal character.\n\nThe most practical case is \u00a0`.`\u00a0, which GitHub allows in org/repo names and is a regex wildcard meaning \"any single character.\" For example, an attacker-controlled repository named:\n\n`github/artifact.attestations-workflows`\n\nmatches a verifier configured for the trusted signer:\n\n`github/artifact-attestations-workflows`\n\nbecause the unescaped \u00a0`.`\u00a0 in the constructed pattern matches the \u00a0`-`\u00a0 in the attacker\u0027s name (and any other single character at that position). This affected the `--signer-repo` and `--signer-workflow` flags but did not affect the `--repo` and `--owner` flags which include an exact string comparison.\n\nIn `v2.97.0`, the GitHub CLI escapes the user-supplied signer values before they are incorporated into the SAN matcher, so they are matched as literal strings.\n\n### Impact\n\nThe practical impact is limited, exploitation requires the attacker to create a plausible lookalike repository name and produce valid Sigstore attestations from it. This could undermine supply chain verification for CI/CD pipelines or policy gates that use these flags to pin trust to a specific signing workflow. \n\n### Remediation and Mitigation\n\n1. Upgrade `gh` to `v2.97.0` or later, which escapes signer values before matching.\n2. As a workaround, use `--repo` or `--owner` flags instead of `--signer-repo` or `--signer-workflow` where applicable.\n3. Manually inspect the signing certificate SAN in attestation output to confirm the signing workflow origin.",
  "id": "GHSA-mm27-mwq9-fr5g",
  "modified": "2026-10-15T18:08:20Z",
  "published": "2026-10-15T18:08:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cli/cli/security/advisories/GHSA-mm27-mwq9-fr5g"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64655"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cli/cli/commit/55dbb4dc6b7edb10b48e3d7fc5bccd32318d1b55"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cli/cli"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cli/cli/releases/tag/v2.97.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "GitHub CLI allows attestation verification bypass through unescaped regex metacharacters"
}



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