GHSA-MM27-MWQ9-FR5G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-15 18:08 – Updated: 2026-10-15 18:08Summary
A security vulnerability has been identified in GitHub CLI that could allow attestation verification bypass when using gh attestation verify with --signer-repo or --signer-workflow flags. GitHub CLI builds the certificate matcher from these flag values without escaping regex metacharacters, so a repository or workflow name is treated as a regular expression rather than a literal string. GitHub permits characters such as . in organization, repository, and workflow path names, and . is a regex wildcard, so a malicious actor can create a lookalike name that satisfies a matcher intended for a different, trusted signer.
Details
GitHub CLI constructs a regular expression from the --signer-repo and --signer-workflow values and matches it against the signing certificate's SAN (Subject Alternative Name) during Sigstore attestation verification. The user-supplied value is interpolated into the pattern without escaping regex metacharacters, so any metacharacter permitted in a GitHub path is interpreted as regex syntax instead of a literal character.
The most practical case is . , which GitHub allows in org/repo names and is a regex wildcard meaning "any single character." For example, an attacker-controlled repository named:
github/artifact.attestations-workflows
matches a verifier configured for the trusted signer:
github/artifact-attestations-workflows
because the unescaped . in the constructed pattern matches the - in the attacker's name (and any other single character at that position). This affected the --signer-repo and --signer-workflow flags but did not affect the --repo and --owner flags which include an exact string comparison.
In v2.97.0, the GitHub CLI escapes the user-supplied signer values before they are incorporated into the SAN matcher, so they are matched as literal strings.
Impact
The practical impact is limited, exploitation requires the attacker to create a plausible lookalike repository name and produce valid Sigstore attestations from it. This could undermine supply chain verification for CI/CD pipelines or policy gates that use these flags to pin trust to a specific signing workflow.
Remediation and Mitigation
- Upgrade
ghtov2.97.0or later, which escapes signer values before matching. - As a workaround, use
--repoor--ownerflags instead of--signer-repoor--signer-workflowwhere applicable. - Manually inspect the signing certificate SAN in attestation output to confirm the signing workflow origin.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/cli/cli/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.97.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64655"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-185"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-15T18:08:20Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-06T22:18:13Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nA security vulnerability has been identified in GitHub CLI that could allow attestation verification bypass when using `gh attestation verify` with `--signer-repo` or `--signer-workflow` flags. GitHub CLI builds the certificate matcher from these flag values without escaping regex metacharacters, so a repository or workflow name is treated as a regular expression rather than a literal string. GitHub permits characters such as \u00a0`.`\u00a0 in organization, repository, and workflow path names, and \u00a0`.`\u00a0 is a regex wildcard, so a malicious actor can create a lookalike name that satisfies a matcher intended for a different, trusted signer.\n\n### Details\n\nGitHub CLI constructs a regular expression from the \u00a0`--signer-repo`\u00a0 and \u00a0`--signer-workflow`\u00a0 values and matches it against the signing certificate\u0027s SAN (Subject Alternative Name) during Sigstore attestation verification. The user-supplied value is interpolated into the pattern without escaping regex metacharacters, so any metacharacter permitted in a GitHub path is interpreted as regex syntax instead of a literal character.\n\nThe most practical case is \u00a0`.`\u00a0, which GitHub allows in org/repo names and is a regex wildcard meaning \"any single character.\" For example, an attacker-controlled repository named:\n\n`github/artifact.attestations-workflows`\n\nmatches a verifier configured for the trusted signer:\n\n`github/artifact-attestations-workflows`\n\nbecause the unescaped \u00a0`.`\u00a0 in the constructed pattern matches the \u00a0`-`\u00a0 in the attacker\u0027s name (and any other single character at that position). This affected the `--signer-repo` and `--signer-workflow` flags but did not affect the `--repo` and `--owner` flags which include an exact string comparison.\n\nIn `v2.97.0`, the GitHub CLI escapes the user-supplied signer values before they are incorporated into the SAN matcher, so they are matched as literal strings.\n\n### Impact\n\nThe practical impact is limited, exploitation requires the attacker to create a plausible lookalike repository name and produce valid Sigstore attestations from it. This could undermine supply chain verification for CI/CD pipelines or policy gates that use these flags to pin trust to a specific signing workflow. \n\n### Remediation and Mitigation\n\n1. Upgrade `gh` to `v2.97.0` or later, which escapes signer values before matching.\n2. As a workaround, use `--repo` or `--owner` flags instead of `--signer-repo` or `--signer-workflow` where applicable.\n3. Manually inspect the signing certificate SAN in attestation output to confirm the signing workflow origin.",
"id": "GHSA-mm27-mwq9-fr5g",
"modified": "2026-10-15T18:08:20Z",
"published": "2026-10-15T18:08:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cli/cli/security/advisories/GHSA-mm27-mwq9-fr5g"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64655"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cli/cli/commit/55dbb4dc6b7edb10b48e3d7fc5bccd32318d1b55"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/cli/cli"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cli/cli/releases/tag/v2.97.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "GitHub CLI allows attestation verification bypass through unescaped regex metacharacters"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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