GHSA-MHFJ-849G-FRGH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-18 18:31 – Updated: 2026-10-24 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ip6t_rt: fix zero-address non-strict match out-of-bounds read
rt_mt6_check() permits rules to be configured with rtinfo->addrnr == 0 even when address matching (IP6T_RT_FST_MASK) is requested.
In the IP6T_RT_FST_NSTRICT path, rt_mt6() evaluates packet routing addresses against rtinfo->addrs[i] and terminates backwards at the bottom of the loop:
if (ipv6_addr_equal(ap, &rtinfo->addrs[i])) {
i++;
}
if (i == rtinfo->addrnr)
break;
When addrnr is 0, if the first packet address matches rtinfo->addrs[0], i is incremented to 1. Because i is now strictly greater than addrnr (0), the loop termination condition (i == rtinfo->addrnr) is bypassed and will never be satisfied.
If a crafted IPv6 packet contains matching routing addresses, i will advance past IP6T_RT_HOPS (16). The subsequent call to ipv6_addr_equal() reads beyond struct ip6t_rt, triggering UBSAN/KASAN out-of-bounds warnings or kernel panics.
Fix this by: 1. Rejecting rules in rt_mt6_check() where IP6T_RT_FST_MASK is set but rtinfo->addrnr is zero. 2. In rt_mt6(), moving the termination condition (i < rtinfo->addrnr) into the for-loop header condition and removing the backwards break at the end of the loop body.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98485"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-18T16:16:59Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: ip6t_rt: fix zero-address non-strict match out-of-bounds read\n\nrt_mt6_check() permits rules to be configured with rtinfo-\u003eaddrnr == 0\neven when address matching (IP6T_RT_FST_MASK) is requested.\n\nIn the IP6T_RT_FST_NSTRICT path, rt_mt6() evaluates packet routing\naddresses against rtinfo-\u003eaddrs[i] and terminates backwards at the bottom\nof the loop:\n\n if (ipv6_addr_equal(ap, \u0026rtinfo-\u003eaddrs[i])) {\n i++;\n }\n if (i == rtinfo-\u003eaddrnr)\n break;\n\nWhen addrnr is 0, if the first packet address matches rtinfo-\u003eaddrs[0],\ni is incremented to 1. Because i is now strictly greater than addrnr (0),\nthe loop termination condition (i == rtinfo-\u003eaddrnr) is bypassed and will\nnever be satisfied.\n\nIf a crafted IPv6 packet contains matching routing addresses, i will\nadvance past IP6T_RT_HOPS (16). The subsequent call to ipv6_addr_equal()\nreads beyond struct ip6t_rt, triggering UBSAN/KASAN out-of-bounds warnings\nor kernel panics.\n\nFix this by:\n1. Rejecting rules in rt_mt6_check() where IP6T_RT_FST_MASK is set but\n rtinfo-\u003eaddrnr is zero.\n2. In rt_mt6(), moving the termination condition (i \u003c rtinfo-\u003eaddrnr)\n into the for-loop header condition and removing the backwards break\n at the end of the loop body.",
"id": "GHSA-mhfj-849g-frgh",
"modified": "2026-10-24T15:32:46Z",
"published": "2026-10-18T18:31:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98485"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/191239b0939692e92459d8d32cad14247fa93f89"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a54f8b7f7fe207a5c14713015a5820588faf1ad"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/82313c169eddc02b1bf5ba6b427803e272d3ec42"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/959d1829d1ce8b91b435b24a923b51bcc8897090"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b89249819a7d6698bed152feafd3bc6c08489d15"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d9cf4ac6f326330e1fe4d95671d36a6ff3593f64"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd55c0ea87bf70e4e4b3b683acd29ef981335b26"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fe336bab13834394320997de8b16ca4a913b4f13"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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