GHSA-M932-63JC-4JQQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 22:48 – Updated: 2026-11-19 22:48
VLAI
Summary
k8s-mcp-server: Missing authentication on default SSE/HTTP transport allows unauthenticated Kubernetes tool execution
Details

Summary

When k8s-mcp-server runs in its default SSE transport mode, the MCP tools/call endpoint is dispatched with no authentication, session token, or Origin check. Any client that can reach the listening port can enumerate and invoke the server's Kubernetes tools (including destructive/write tools) without credentials, executing with the server's configured cluster privileges.

Affected

Commit be87a6dd72bb6ec1d4886b8548843b99a4638b12 (Merge PR #130) MCP library: github.com/mark3labs/mcp-go v0.57.0 Default mode: sse (SERVER_MODE default), default port 8080, bind 0.0.0.0

Root cause (static trace: handleSSE -> handleMessage -> tools/call)

  • main.go L129: server.NewSSEServer(s) is created with no auth option and no contextFunc; L130 sse.Start(":"+port) binds all interfaces (0.0.0.0).
  • mcp-go sse.go handleSSE (GET /sse): no auth header check; the server mints a sessionId for any caller. The sessionId is a correlation value, not a credential.
  • handleMessage (POST /message): the only gates are method==POST and a loadable sessionId. No Authorization/Bearer/token/Origin/CSRF check before s.server.HandleMessage(ctx, rawMessage) dispatches to the tools/call handler.
  • Only Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * is present (CORS relaxation, not auth). Write tools (Create/Delete/RolloutRestart, Helm Install/Upgrade/Uninstall/Rollback) are all registered unless -read-only is set (default readOnly=false).

Runtime reproduction (no auth headers on any request)

Started: k8s-mcp-server -mode sse -port 8080 with a dummy non-routable KUBERNETES_SERVER=https://127.0.0.1:1 (no real cluster touched).

GET /sse -> HTTP 200; server mints /message?sessionId=93b3... POST /message initialize -> HTTP 202; result returned over SSE POST /message tools/list -> HTTP 202; FULL tool list returned (incl. destructive) POST /message tools/call getAPIResources -> HTTP 202; handler EXECUTED: error -32603 "... Get https://127.0.0.1:1/api...: dial tcp 127.0.0.1:1: connect"

The tools/call response is NOT HTTP 401/403 but an in-handler cluster-connection error, proving the RPC passed any authorization gate and reached the getAPIResources handler. With a valid kubeconfig, the same path returns real cluster data. ss -ltnp confirms LISTEN *:8080 (all interfaces, externally exposed).

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker with network reach to the port can enumerate tools and invoke Kubernetes operations with the server's privileges — cluster read and, with default readOnly=false, state-changing operations (Create/Delete/Helm). CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function).

Why this is a defect, not by-design

Default mode is HTTP (sse) on 0.0.0.0:8080, containerized deployment is the normal scenario, and there is no "trusted client only" / auth-required note in the docs. MCP HTTP transports are expected to be loopback-only or gated; this one is neither.

Suggested fix

  • Add an authorization gate before tools/call on the HTTP transports: e.g. WithSSEContextFunc to validate an Authorization bearer/token, or fail-closed when no token is configured in HTTP mode.
  • Default the bind to 127.0.0.1 and require explicit opt-in for external binding.
  • Document that HTTP mode must sit behind an authenticating proxy; recommend STDIO by default.

Reproduction was done against the actual built binary and the shipped SSE path (not an extract).

Credit

bebold6133

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-130007"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-19T22:48:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-18T17:17:37Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nWhen k8s-mcp-server runs in its default SSE transport mode, the MCP `tools/call`\nendpoint is dispatched with no authentication, session token, or Origin check.\nAny client that can reach the listening port can enumerate and invoke the\nserver\u0027s Kubernetes tools (including destructive/write tools) without credentials,\nexecuting with the server\u0027s configured cluster privileges.\n\n## Affected\nCommit be87a6dd72bb6ec1d4886b8548843b99a4638b12 (Merge PR #130)\nMCP library: github.com/mark3labs/mcp-go v0.57.0\nDefault mode: sse (SERVER_MODE default), default port 8080, bind 0.0.0.0\n\n## Root cause (static trace: handleSSE -\u003e handleMessage -\u003e tools/call)\n- main.go L129: `server.NewSSEServer(s)` is created with no auth option and no\n  contextFunc; L130 `sse.Start(\":\"+port)` binds all interfaces (0.0.0.0).\n- mcp-go sse.go handleSSE (GET /sse): no auth header check; the server mints a\n  sessionId for any caller. The sessionId is a correlation value, not a credential.\n- handleMessage (POST /message): the only gates are method==POST and a loadable\n  sessionId. No Authorization/Bearer/token/Origin/CSRF check before\n  `s.server.HandleMessage(ctx, rawMessage)` dispatches to the tools/call handler.\n- Only `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` is present (CORS relaxation, not auth).\nWrite tools (Create/Delete/RolloutRestart, Helm Install/Upgrade/Uninstall/Rollback)\nare all registered unless `-read-only` is set (default readOnly=false).\n\n## Runtime reproduction (no auth headers on any request)\nStarted: `k8s-mcp-server -mode sse -port 8080` with a dummy non-routable\nKUBERNETES_SERVER=https://127.0.0.1:1 (no real cluster touched).\n\n  GET  /sse                         -\u003e HTTP 200; server mints /message?sessionId=93b3...\n  POST /message initialize          -\u003e HTTP 202; result returned over SSE\n  POST /message tools/list          -\u003e HTTP 202; FULL tool list returned (incl. destructive)\n  POST /message tools/call getAPIResources -\u003e HTTP 202; handler EXECUTED:\n        error -32603 \"... Get https://127.0.0.1:1/api...: dial tcp 127.0.0.1:1: connect\"\n\nThe tools/call response is NOT HTTP 401/403 but an in-handler cluster-connection\nerror, proving the RPC passed any authorization gate and reached the\ngetAPIResources handler. With a valid kubeconfig, the same path returns real\ncluster data. `ss -ltnp` confirms LISTEN *:8080 (all interfaces, externally exposed).\n\n## Impact\nAn unauthenticated attacker with network reach to the port can enumerate tools and\ninvoke Kubernetes operations with the server\u0027s privileges \u2014 cluster read and,\nwith default readOnly=false, state-changing operations (Create/Delete/Helm).\nCWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function).\n\n## Why this is a defect, not by-design\nDefault mode is HTTP (sse) on 0.0.0.0:8080, containerized deployment is the normal\nscenario, and there is no \"trusted client only\" / auth-required note in the docs.\nMCP HTTP transports are expected to be loopback-only or gated; this one is neither.\n\n## Suggested fix\n- Add an authorization gate before tools/call on the HTTP transports: e.g.\n  WithSSEContextFunc to validate an Authorization bearer/token, or fail-closed\n  when no token is configured in HTTP mode.\n- Default the bind to 127.0.0.1 and require explicit opt-in for external binding.\n- Document that HTTP mode must sit behind an authenticating proxy; recommend STDIO\n  by default.\n\nReproduction was done against the actual built binary and the shipped SSE path\n(not an extract). \n\n## Credit \nbebold6133",
  "id": "GHSA-m932-63jc-4jqq",
  "modified": "2026-11-19T22:48:33Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T22:48:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server/security/advisories/GHSA-m932-63jc-4jqq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-130007"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server/issues/131"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server/pull/134"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server/commit/817d81005369837e0c034962785851ca4dec9a76"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server/releases/tag/v1.1.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "k8s-mcp-server: Missing authentication on default SSE/HTTP transport allows unauthenticated Kubernetes tool execution"
}



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