GHSA-JV6M-V86W-343P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-24 15:32 – Updated: 2026-07-14 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: fix integer underflow in chain mode
The jumbo_frm() chain-mode implementation unconditionally computes
len = nopaged_len - bmax;
where nopaged_len = skb_headlen(skb) (linear bytes only) and bmax is BUF_SIZE_8KiB or BUF_SIZE_2KiB. However, the caller stmmac_xmit() decides to invoke jumbo_frm() based on skb->len (total length including page fragments):
is_jumbo = stmmac_is_jumbo_frm(priv, skb->len, enh_desc);
When a packet has a small linear portion (nopaged_len <= bmax) but a large total length due to page fragments (skb->len > bmax), the subtraction wraps as an unsigned integer, producing a huge len value (~0xFFFFxxxx). This causes the while (len != 0) loop to execute hundreds of thousands of iterations, passing skb->data + bmax * i pointers far beyond the skb buffer to dma_map_single(). On IOMMU-less SoCs (the typical deployment for stmmac), this maps arbitrary kernel memory to the DMA engine, constituting a kernel memory disclosure and potential memory corruption from hardware.
Fix this by introducing a buf_len local variable clamped to min(nopaged_len, bmax). Computing len = nopaged_len - buf_len is then always safe: it is zero when the linear portion fits within a single descriptor, causing the while (len != 0) loop to be skipped naturally, and the fragment loop in stmmac_xmit() handles page fragments afterward.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-31649"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-190"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-24T15:16:44Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: stmmac: fix integer underflow in chain mode\n\nThe jumbo_frm() chain-mode implementation unconditionally computes\n\n len = nopaged_len - bmax;\n\nwhere nopaged_len = skb_headlen(skb) (linear bytes only) and bmax is\nBUF_SIZE_8KiB or BUF_SIZE_2KiB. However, the caller stmmac_xmit()\ndecides to invoke jumbo_frm() based on skb-\u003elen (total length including\npage fragments):\n\n is_jumbo = stmmac_is_jumbo_frm(priv, skb-\u003elen, enh_desc);\n\nWhen a packet has a small linear portion (nopaged_len \u003c= bmax) but a\nlarge total length due to page fragments (skb-\u003elen \u003e bmax), the\nsubtraction wraps as an unsigned integer, producing a huge len value\n(~0xFFFFxxxx). This causes the while (len != 0) loop to execute\nhundreds of thousands of iterations, passing skb-\u003edata + bmax * i\npointers far beyond the skb buffer to dma_map_single(). On IOMMU-less\nSoCs (the typical deployment for stmmac), this maps arbitrary kernel\nmemory to the DMA engine, constituting a kernel memory disclosure and\npotential memory corruption from hardware.\n\nFix this by introducing a buf_len local variable clamped to\nmin(nopaged_len, bmax). Computing len = nopaged_len - buf_len is then\nalways safe: it is zero when the linear portion fits within a single\ndescriptor, causing the while (len != 0) loop to be skipped naturally,\nand the fragment loop in stmmac_xmit() handles page fragments afterward.",
"id": "GHSA-jv6m-v86w-343p",
"modified": "2026-07-14T15:31:54Z",
"published": "2026-04-24T15:32:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31649"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-019113.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-082556.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/10d12b9240ebf96c785f0e2e4228318cd5f3a3eb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/275bdf762e82082f064e60a92448fa2ac43cf95b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2c91b39912278d0878f9ba60ba04d2518b18a08d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/513e06735f5be575b409d195822195348b164e48"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/51f4e090b9f87b40c21b6daadb5c06e6c0a07b67"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6fca757c20396dc2e604dcc61922264e9e3dc803"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a2b68a9a476b9544ff31f1fbcd5d80867a8a5e2f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b7b8012193fd98236d7ae05d4b553f010a77b2ef"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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