GHSA-JMV2-QGXF-F995
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-12 22:34 – Updated: 2026-11-12 22:34Summary
The @astrojs/solid-js renderer wraps named slot content passed to Solid components in an <astro-slot> element, and writes the slot name into its name attribute without HTML escaping. A slot name containing " could end the attribute and inject arbitrary HTML into the page.
For example, a page that takes a slot name from the request:
---
import Tabs from '../components/Tabs.jsx';
const tab = Astro.url.searchParams.get('tab');
---
<Tabs client:load active={tab}><div slot={tab}>…</div></Tabs>
rendered with a Solid component that renders a slot by name:
export default function Tabs(props) {
return <div>{props[props.active]}</div>;
}
would output a tab value such as x"><img src=x onerror=alert(1)> as live HTML.
Impact
Reflected cross-site scripting. An attacker who gets a user to open a crafted link can run JavaScript on the site's origin, but only in applications where all of the following are true:
- The page passes request-controlled input (such as a query parameter) as a slot name.
- The Solid component is hydrated with a
client:*directive. For non-hydrated components the slot wrapper is removed from the output, together with itsnameattribute. - The Solid component renders the attacker-chosen slot, which in practice means accessing slot props by a dynamic name. Components that never render the slot only output Astro's already escaped fallback template.
This is the @astrojs/solid-js counterpart of GHSA-8hv8-536x-4wqp (CVE-2026-50146), which fixed the same issue in astro core.
Affected versions
@astrojs/solid-js >= 0.2.0, <= 7.1.1.
Patches
Fixed in @astrojs/solid-js 7.1.2. Slot names are now HTML-escaped in the server renderer.
Workarounds
Upgrade to @astrojs/solid-js 7.1.2 or later. Before upgrading, do not use request-controlled input as a slot name, or map it to a fixed set of known slot names before passing it to a component.
Credits
Reported by @manus-pi.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.1.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@astrojs/solid-js"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.1.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-126363"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-12T22:34:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe `@astrojs/solid-js` renderer wraps named slot content passed to Solid components in an `\u003castro-slot\u003e` element, and writes the slot name into its `name` attribute without HTML escaping. A slot name containing `\"` could end the attribute and inject arbitrary HTML into the page.\n\nFor example, a page that takes a slot name from the request:\n\n```astro\n---\nimport Tabs from \u0027../components/Tabs.jsx\u0027;\nconst tab = Astro.url.searchParams.get(\u0027tab\u0027);\n---\n\u003cTabs client:load active={tab}\u003e\u003cdiv slot={tab}\u003e\u2026\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/Tabs\u003e\n```\n\nrendered with a Solid component that renders a slot by name:\n\n```jsx\nexport default function Tabs(props) {\n\treturn \u003cdiv\u003e{props[props.active]}\u003c/div\u003e;\n}\n```\n\nwould output a `tab` value such as `x\"\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(1)\u003e` as live HTML.\n\n## Impact\n\nReflected cross-site scripting. An attacker who gets a user to open a crafted link can run JavaScript on the site\u0027s origin, but only in applications where all of the following are true:\n\n- The page passes request-controlled input (such as a query parameter) as a slot name.\n- The Solid component is hydrated with a `client:*` directive. For non-hydrated components the slot wrapper is removed from the output, together with its `name` attribute.\n- The Solid component renders the attacker-chosen slot, which in practice means accessing slot props by a dynamic name. Components that never render the slot only output Astro\u0027s already escaped fallback template.\n\nThis is the `@astrojs/solid-js` counterpart of GHSA-8hv8-536x-4wqp (CVE-2026-50146), which fixed the same issue in `astro` core.\n\n## Affected versions\n\n`@astrojs/solid-js` \u003e= 0.2.0, \u003c= 7.1.1.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in `@astrojs/solid-js` 7.1.2. Slot names are now HTML-escaped in the server renderer.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to `@astrojs/solid-js` 7.1.2 or later. Before upgrading, do not use request-controlled input as a slot name, or map it to a fixed set of known slot names before passing it to a component.\n\n## Credits\n\nReported by @manus-pi.",
"id": "GHSA-jmv2-qgxf-f995",
"modified": "2026-11-12T22:34:44Z",
"published": "2026-11-12T22:34:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro/security/advisories/GHSA-jmv2-qgxf-f995"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro/commit/290b196ddb48de11783ff128e2b7272c61490a20"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro/releases/tag/@astrojs/solid-js@7.1.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Astro: Reflected XSS via unescaped slot names in @astrojs/solid-js"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.