GHSA-JJ3R-FWQ6-HV5V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-18 18:32 – Updated: 2026-11-18 18:32The Magic Login Mail or QR Code plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Administrator Account Takeover in versions up to, and including, 2.07. This is due to the curpageurl() function falling back to the raw $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'] value — with no validation against the site's configured origin via home_url() or site_url() — when get_the_permalink() returns empty or false, allowing an attacker-controlled Host header to become the URL origin of the magic-login link generated by generate_url() and delivered to the target via wp_mail(). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to intercept the one-time uid and token pair sent to a targeted Administrator's email and replay them against the real site, causing autologin_via_url() to call wp_set_auth_cookie() and establish a full Administrator session on the targeted account. Exploitation requires the [magic_login] shortcode to render on a path where get_the_permalink() returns empty or false (such as a 404 page or a block-theme header template part), the web server to forward non-canonical Host headers, the attacker to know the target administrator's email address, and the administrator to click the attacker-originated magic-login link. Successful exploitation gives the attacker control of a distinct, already-privileged Administrator account; it does not promote the attacker's original account. Successful exploitation additionally requires an action by an administrator — the attacker cannot trigger the vulnerability on their own.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-126721"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-18T16:18:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Magic Login Mail or QR Code plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Administrator Account Takeover in versions up to, and including, 2.07. This is due to the `curpageurl()` function falling back to the raw `$_SERVER[\u0027HTTP_HOST\u0027]` value \u2014 with no validation against the site\u0027s configured origin via `home_url()` or `site_url()` \u2014 when `get_the_permalink()` returns empty or false, allowing an attacker-controlled Host header to become the URL origin of the magic-login link generated by `generate_url()` and delivered to the target via `wp_mail()`. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to intercept the one-time uid and token pair sent to a targeted Administrator\u0027s email and replay them against the real site, causing `autologin_via_url()` to call `wp_set_auth_cookie()` and establish a full Administrator session on the targeted account. Exploitation requires the `[magic_login]` shortcode to render on a path where `get_the_permalink()` returns empty or false (such as a 404 page or a block-theme header template part), the web server to forward non-canonical Host headers, the attacker to know the target administrator\u0027s email address, and the administrator to click the attacker-originated magic-login link. Successful exploitation gives the attacker control of a distinct, already-privileged Administrator account; it does not promote the attacker\u0027s original account. Successful exploitation additionally requires an action by an administrator \u2014 the attacker cannot trigger the vulnerability on their own.",
"id": "GHSA-jj3r-fwq6-hv5v",
"modified": "2026-11-18T18:32:02Z",
"published": "2026-11-18T18:32:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-126721"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/magic-login-mail/tags/2.07/lib/class-magicloginmail.php#L172"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/magic-login-mail/tags/2.07/lib/class-magicloginmail.php#L198"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/magic-login-mail/tags/2.07/lib/class-magicloginmail.php#L269"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/magic-login-mail/tags/2.07/lib/class-magicloginmail.php#L414"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/magic-login-mail/tags/2.07/lib/class-magicloginmail.php#L76"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026old=3797196%40magic-login-mail\u0026new=3797196%40magic-login-mail"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/6059c493-fcdd-49c0-9a32-7e47cd76e2a3?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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