GHSA-J3XG-QWQJ-HQ74
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-29 06:30 – Updated: 2026-10-29 06:30The Wild Apricot Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via SSO Email-Collision Account Binding in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.18. When no WildApricot contact-ID mapping is found for an incoming SSO login, the plugin falls back to a network-global get_user_by('email', ...) lookup in Module.php to resolve a WordPress user, then UserSynchronizer::syncWaContact() binds and Controller::login() issues a session cookie via wp_set_auth_cookie() for that resolved user — both guarded only by is_super_admin() — without ever requiring proof of ownership of the matched WordPress account such as a password, local account-linking confirmation, inbox verification, or administrator approval. This makes it possible for attackers with custom-level WildApricot membership access to authenticate as an existing WordPress subsite administrator on a path-based Multisite network, obtaining a valid network-global authentication cookie for the victim without their credentials. Exploitation requires that the attacker control a WildApricot contact whose email address matches the target WordPress administrator's email — achievable via a public zero-fee membership application on the connected WildApricot organization — and that they complete the SSO flow on any subsite where Wild Apricot Login is active; because WordPress user identities and authentication cookies are network-global, the cookie issued on that subsite is equally valid on any other subsite where the victim user holds an administrator role.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-93757"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-29T04:18:43Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Wild Apricot Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via SSO Email-Collision Account Binding in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.18. When no WildApricot contact-ID mapping is found for an incoming SSO login, the plugin falls back to a network-global `get_user_by(\u0027email\u0027, ...)` lookup in `Module.php` to resolve a WordPress user, then `UserSynchronizer::syncWaContact()` binds and `Controller::login()` issues a session cookie via `wp_set_auth_cookie()` for that resolved user \u2014 both guarded only by `is_super_admin()` \u2014 without ever requiring proof of ownership of the matched WordPress account such as a password, local account-linking confirmation, inbox verification, or administrator approval. This makes it possible for attackers with custom-level WildApricot membership access to authenticate as an existing WordPress subsite administrator on a path-based Multisite network, obtaining a valid network-global authentication cookie for the victim without their credentials. Exploitation requires that the attacker control a WildApricot contact whose email address matches the target WordPress administrator\u0027s email \u2014 achievable via a public zero-fee membership application on the connected WildApricot organization \u2014 and that they complete the SSO flow on any subsite where Wild Apricot Login is active; because WordPress user identities and authentication cookies are network-global, the cookie issued on that subsite is equally valid on any other subsite where the victim user holds an administrator role.",
"id": "GHSA-j3xg-qwqj-hq74",
"modified": "2026-10-29T06:30:36Z",
"published": "2026-10-29T06:30:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93757"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wild-apricot-login/tags/1.0.18/Modules/Authorization/WaLogin/Controller.php#L347"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wild-apricot-login/tags/1.0.18/Modules/Core/Module.php#L112"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wild-apricot-login/tags/1.0.18/Modules/Core/Module.php#L159"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wild-apricot-login/tags/1.0.18/Modules/Core/WaApi/Client.php#L22"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wild-apricot-login/tags/1.0.18/Modules/Synchronization/UserSynchronizer.php#L36"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/9adbe55e-f1a1-4fa8-b28d-539d90d81c68?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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