GHSA-HVR4-PGGG-CR56
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-11 09:31 – Updated: 2026-11-11 09:31Improper link resolution in the Windows installer of Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.0.0 through 6.3.7 allows a local authenticated user to run code as the mail server's service account or as an administrator when the path to the program folder passes through a junction, a symbolic link or a mount point that the user controls or that every user may change, such as a junction made at the root of a drive, which takes the root's permissions, or through a folder that every user may rename. Setup installed the programs through any such link without first checking who controls it, or whether a folder above the program folder may be renamed, and the service is registered to run the programs by that path, so the programs are installed where a link another account controls leads, or that account can later make the path lead to a folder it controls; the service, which runs as LocalSystem or as its virtual account, and the programs administrators run from Bin are then started from there. 6.3.7's fix for CVE-2026-107571 does not cover this: its hardening of the program folder, Bin and ControlPanel does not change a folder reached through a link that the administrators do not alone control, and setup does not refuse such a path: it installs through the link and at most reports afterwards that the folders could not be hardened. The default installation under Program Files is not affected.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-126612"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-11T09:17:13Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper link resolution in the Windows installer of Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.0.0 through 6.3.7 allows a local authenticated user to run code as the mail server\u0027s service account or as an administrator when the path to the program folder passes through a junction, a symbolic link or a mount point that the user controls or that every user may change, such as a junction made at the root of a drive, which takes the root\u0027s permissions, or through a folder that every user may rename. Setup installed the programs through any such link without first checking who controls it, or whether a folder above the program folder may be renamed, and the service is registered to run the programs by that path, so the programs are installed where a link another account controls leads, or that account can later make the path lead to a folder it controls; the service, which runs as LocalSystem or as its virtual account, and the programs administrators run from Bin are then started from there. 6.3.7\u0027s fix for CVE-2026-107571 does not cover this: its hardening of the program folder, Bin and ControlPanel does not change a folder reached through a link that the administrators do not alone control, and setup does not refuse such a path: it installs through the link and at most reports afterwards that the folders could not be hardened. The default installation under Program Files is not affected.",
"id": "GHSA-hvr4-pggg-cr56",
"modified": "2026-11-11T09:31:29Z",
"published": "2026-11-11T09:31:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-126612"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/hmailserver/hmailserver/-/releases/v6.3.8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/hmailserver/hmailserver/-/work_items/78"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-107571"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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