GHSA-H748-767H-VM7P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-06 09:31 – Updated: 2026-10-07 09:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm: RCU-free the scheduler-containing ring and VM objects
Both struct msm_ringbuffer and struct msm_gem_vm embed a struct drm_gpu_scheduler. msm_ringbuffer_destroy() and the VM free callback msm_gem_vm_free() call drm_sched_fini() on the embedded scheduler and then free the containing object with plain kfree().
drm_sched_fence_get_timeline_name() returns fence->sched->name, and the scheduler fence keeps a .release callback so it is not ops-detached on signalling. A finished fence exported to userspace (the submit out-fence, or a VM_BIND fence, via sync_file / drm_syncobj) keeps pointing at the embedded scheduler after the ring/VM is freed, so a later get_timeline_name() -- reachable unprivileged through SYNC_IOC_FILE_INFO -- dereferences freed slab memory (KASAN slab-use-after-free read).
Per the dma-fence lifetime contract the exporter must keep the data backing a signalled fence alive for an RCU grace period. Free the scheduler-containing objects with kfree_rcu() instead of kfree().
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/750234/
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98180"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-06T09:18:01Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/msm: RCU-free the scheduler-containing ring and VM objects\n\nBoth struct msm_ringbuffer and struct msm_gem_vm embed a struct\ndrm_gpu_scheduler. msm_ringbuffer_destroy() and the VM free callback\nmsm_gem_vm_free() call drm_sched_fini() on the embedded scheduler and then\nfree the containing object with plain kfree().\n\ndrm_sched_fence_get_timeline_name() returns fence-\u003esched-\u003ename, and the\nscheduler fence keeps a .release callback so it is not ops-detached on\nsignalling. A finished fence exported to userspace (the submit out-fence, or\na VM_BIND fence, via sync_file / drm_syncobj) keeps pointing at the embedded\nscheduler after the ring/VM is freed, so a later get_timeline_name() --\nreachable unprivileged through SYNC_IOC_FILE_INFO -- dereferences freed slab\nmemory (KASAN slab-use-after-free read).\n\nPer the dma-fence lifetime contract the exporter must keep the data backing a\nsignalled fence alive for an RCU grace period. Free the scheduler-containing\nobjects with kfree_rcu() instead of kfree().\n\nPatchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/750234/",
"id": "GHSA-h748-767h-vm7p",
"modified": "2026-10-07T09:32:13Z",
"published": "2026-10-06T09:31:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98180"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/01c8d1f385f788f1bbbbb7687c4386d614281218"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/713abac5c04ccbae67f9ac68c3921845535388e7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d81bf4581903b0cba0698cd4d1c07fc6be21754a"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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