GHSA-H26J-4VP7-X9W2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-03 16:37 – Updated: 2026-11-03 16:38Summary
Metalama uses a local named-pipe channel to communicate between its Visual Studio processes — the Visual Studio UI process (devenv), the out-of-process Roslyn code-analysis process, and the CodeLens process. This channel deserialized messages from the pipe without restricting which CLR types could be instantiated. A local process able to write to the pipe can send a crafted message that instantiates arbitrary .NET types — a deserialization primitive in the same class as BinaryFormatter (CWE-502), and a well-known gadget-chain code-execution vector.
The flaw is present, via two successive serializers, in every Metalama release from the first public version (2023.0) up to and including 2026.1.18, and is fixed in 2026.1.19.
The pipe name is predictable: Metalama_{role}_{processId}_{hash(PackageVersion)}, derived from the public package version and a locally-enumerable process id. This channel is used by the Visual Studio integration only (Windows named pipes); it is not used for command-line / MSBuild builds.
Mechanisms
JSON era — Metalama 2023.0 through 2026.0.x (Newtonsoft.Json). The pipe formatter enabled polymorphic type embedding:
formatter.JsonSerializer.TypeNameHandling = TypeNameHandling.All; // ServiceEndpoint.cs (early), later BaseEndpoint.cs
The accompanying SerializationBinder (added later for multi-version assembly support) only remapped assembly names; its BindToType resolved any type name from the wire (assembly.GetType(typeName)) with no type allow-list. TypeNameHandling.All is the canonical unsafe-deserialization setting and has publicly available gadget chains (e.g. ysoserial.net), so this era is at least as exploitable as the later one. (Introduced by commit 0554368737, first shipped in release/2023.0.101-rc.)
MessagePack era — Metalama 2026.1.0 through 2026.1.18. The 2026.1 line migrated the pipe serialization to MessagePack (PR #1299, commit 117b607805, 2026-01-29), using typeless MessagePack (TypelessObjectResolver), which likewise embeds CLR type names on the wire and instantiates arbitrary types on receipt — again with no allow-list.
Both mechanisms share the same channel, the same predictable pipe name, the same impact, and the same access preconditions.
Impact
Potential arbitrary code execution inside the Visual Studio process that hosts the affected component (the UI process, the code-analysis process, or the CodeLens process), with full loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability within that process.
Mitigating factor (limits practical severity to Medium): the pipe is created with the default Windows ACL (no explicit PipeSecurity), which permits only same-user processes to write. All of the Visual Studio processes involved run as the same logged-in developer, so exploitation requires the attacker to already be executing code as that same user. There is no privilege escalation and no crossing of a security boundary; the practical value is code execution inside the developer's Visual Studio session (lateral movement / persistence within an already same-user-compromised context). This is why the practical severity is Medium despite the CVSS base score.
Severity
CVSS v3.1: AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 7.3 (High) base score; practical severity Medium, because the attacker gains no privilege beyond what they already had (same user, same Visual Studio session).
CVSS v4.0 cross-check: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N = 7.0 (High). The Subsequent-System metrics are None because no security boundary is crossed.
Affected products and remediation
All affected products are part of the Visual Studio integration.
| Product | Affected | Remediation |
|---|---|---|
NuGet Metalama.Framework |
all < 2026.1.19 |
upgrade to 2026.1.19 (no backports) |
VS extension PostSharpTechnologies.PostSharp ("Metalama + PostSharp", maintained) |
2024.1 - 2026.1.4 | update to 2026.1.5 (bundles Metalama 2026.1.19) |
VS extension PostSharpTechnologies.Metalama (retired) |
all versions | uninstall / migrate to PostSharp >= 2026.1.5 |
VS extension PostSharpTechnologies.caravela (retired) |
all versions | uninstall / migrate to PostSharp >= 2026.1.5 |
The PostSharp extension was a separate, Metalama-free product before the 2024.1 merge (Metalama.Vsx issue #33843), so earlier PostSharp versions are not affected. GitHub has no Visual Studio Marketplace ecosystem, so only the NuGet package appears in the structured "Affected products" list.
Fix
Fixed in Metalama 2026.1.19 (commit d97f52e1b5, PR #1651): the type-name deserialization is wrapped in RpcContractMessagePackOptions, which enforces a [RpcContract] type allow-list on the wire; pipe access is restricted to the current user. The fix reaches the maintained Visual Studio extension in version 2026.1.5. The retired Caravela and Metalama extensions will not be fixed.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Metalama.Framework"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2026.1.0-preview"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.1.19"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Metalama.Framework"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2025.1.18"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Metalama.Framework"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2026.0.1-preview"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.0.25"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-62848"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502",
"CWE-913"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-03T16:37:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-30T21:17:13Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nMetalama uses a local named-pipe channel to communicate between its Visual Studio processes \u2014 the Visual Studio UI process (`devenv`), the out-of-process Roslyn code-analysis process, and the CodeLens process. This channel deserialized messages from the pipe **without restricting which CLR types could be instantiated**. A local process able to write to the pipe can send a crafted message that instantiates arbitrary .NET types \u2014 a deserialization primitive in the same class as `BinaryFormatter` (CWE-502), and a well-known gadget-chain code-execution vector.\n\nThe flaw is present, via two successive serializers, in **every Metalama release from the first public version (2023.0) up to and including 2026.1.18**, and is fixed in **2026.1.19**.\n\nThe pipe name is predictable: `Metalama_{role}_{processId}_{hash(PackageVersion)}`, derived from the public package version and a locally-enumerable process id. This channel is used by the Visual Studio integration only (Windows named pipes); it is not used for command-line / MSBuild builds.\n\n## Mechanisms\n\n**JSON era \u2014 Metalama 2023.0 through 2026.0.x (Newtonsoft.Json).** The pipe formatter enabled polymorphic type embedding:\n```csharp\nformatter.JsonSerializer.TypeNameHandling = TypeNameHandling.All; // ServiceEndpoint.cs (early), later BaseEndpoint.cs\n```\nThe accompanying `SerializationBinder` (added later for multi-version assembly support) only **remapped assembly names**; its `BindToType` resolved **any** type name from the wire (`assembly.GetType(typeName)`) with **no type allow-list**. `TypeNameHandling.All` is the canonical unsafe-deserialization setting and has publicly available gadget chains (e.g. ysoserial.net), so this era is at least as exploitable as the later one. (Introduced by commit `0554368737`, first shipped in `release/2023.0.101-rc`.)\n\n**MessagePack era \u2014 Metalama 2026.1.0 through 2026.1.18.** The 2026.1 line migrated the pipe serialization to MessagePack (PR #1299, commit `117b607805`, 2026-01-29), using **typeless** MessagePack (`TypelessObjectResolver`), which likewise embeds CLR type names on the wire and instantiates arbitrary types on receipt \u2014 again with no allow-list.\n\nBoth mechanisms share the same channel, the same predictable pipe name, the same impact, and the same access preconditions.\n\n## Impact\n\nPotential arbitrary code execution inside the Visual Studio process that hosts the affected component (the UI process, the code-analysis process, or the CodeLens process), with full loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability within that process.\n\n**Mitigating factor (limits practical severity to Medium):** the pipe is created with the default Windows ACL (no explicit `PipeSecurity`), which permits **only same-user processes to write**. All of the Visual Studio processes involved run as the same logged-in developer, so exploitation requires the attacker to already be executing code as that same user. There is **no privilege escalation** and no crossing of a security boundary; the practical value is code execution inside the developer\u0027s Visual Studio session (lateral movement / persistence within an already same-user-compromised context). This is why the practical severity is **Medium** despite the CVSS base score.\n\n## Severity\n\nCVSS v3.1: `AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` = **7.3 (High)** base score; **practical severity Medium**, because the attacker gains no privilege beyond what they already had (same user, same Visual Studio session).\n\nCVSS v4.0 cross-check: `CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` = 7.0 (High). The Subsequent-System metrics are None because no security boundary is crossed.\n\n## Affected products and remediation\n\nAll affected products are part of the Visual Studio integration.\n\n| Product | Affected | Remediation |\n|---|---|---|\n| NuGet `Metalama.Framework` | all `\u003c 2026.1.19` | upgrade to **2026.1.19** (no backports) |\n| VS extension `PostSharpTechnologies.PostSharp` (\"Metalama + PostSharp\", maintained) | **2024.1 - 2026.1.4** | update to **2026.1.5** (bundles Metalama 2026.1.19) |\n| VS extension `PostSharpTechnologies.Metalama` (retired) | all versions | uninstall / migrate to PostSharp `\u003e= 2026.1.5` |\n| VS extension `PostSharpTechnologies.caravela` (retired) | all versions | uninstall / migrate to PostSharp `\u003e= 2026.1.5` |\n\nThe PostSharp extension was a separate, Metalama-free product before the 2024.1 merge (Metalama.Vsx issue #33843), so earlier PostSharp versions are not affected. GitHub has no Visual Studio Marketplace ecosystem, so only the NuGet package appears in the structured \"Affected products\" list.\n\n## Fix\n\nFixed in Metalama **2026.1.19** (commit `d97f52e1b5`, PR #1651): the type-name deserialization is wrapped in `RpcContractMessagePackOptions`, which enforces a `[RpcContract]` type allow-list on the wire; pipe access is restricted to the current user. The fix reaches the maintained Visual Studio extension in version **2026.1.5**. The retired Caravela and Metalama extensions will not be fixed.",
"id": "GHSA-h26j-4vp7-x9w2",
"modified": "2026-11-03T16:38:09Z",
"published": "2026-11-03T16:37:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/metalama/Metalama/security/advisories/GHSA-h26j-4vp7-x9w2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62848"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/metalama/Metalama/pull/1651"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/metalama/Metalama/commit/5b4ced29f2b25631cc2e44d05b0fd5fe838b6cbe"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/metalama/Metalama/commit/d97f52e1b53ffe4176b2b05c56ffdf1ccd2f53a9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/metalama/Metalama"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/metalama/Metalama/releases/tag/release/2025.1.18"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/metalama/Metalama/releases/tag/release/2026.0.25"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/metalama/Metalama/releases/tag/release/2026.1.19"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Metalama: Unsafe deserialization over Metalama\u0027s Visual Studio inter-process named pipe enables local code execution"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.