GHSA-GWM4-F7GJ-P7VJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-16 12:31 – Updated: 2026-11-16 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix integer overflow in the snap trace bounds check
ceph_update_snap_trace() bounds the two encoded snapid arrays that follow a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm with sizeof(u64) * (num_snaps + num_prior_parent_snaps). Both counts come straight off the wire as __le32, so the addition is evaluated in unsigned int and wraps before sizeof(u64) promotes it to size_t: an MDS sending num_snaps = 1 and num_prior_parent_snaps = 0xffffffff makes the sum zero and the check degenerates to ceph_decode_need(&p, e, 0, bad), which always passes. dup_array() then reads num_snaps * 8 bytes past the end of the message front, which ceph_msg_new2() allocates at exactly front_len bytes. An unsolicited CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_SNAP reaches this from a malicious or compromised MDS with no client-side action, as do the snaptraces carried in an MDS reply and in a cap import.
Compute the length with size_add()/size_mul() so it saturates at SIZE_MAX instead of wrapping, in the style fs/ceph/mdsmap.c already uses for num_export_targets.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dup_array (include/linux/unaligned.h:28 fs/ceph/snap.c:500) Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880102a16c8 by task kworker/1:2/129 Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) dup_array (include/linux/unaligned.h:28 fs/ceph/snap.c:500) ceph_update_snap_trace (fs/ceph/snap.c:836) ceph_handle_snap (fs/ceph/snap.c:1155) mds_dispatch (fs/ceph/mds_client.c:7234) ceph_con_process_message (net/ceph/messenger.c:1424) ceph_con_v1_try_read (net/ceph/messenger_v1.c:1430) ceph_con_workfn (net/ceph/messenger.c:1576) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3396) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3479 kernel/workqueue.c:3560) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) ... The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 72-byte region [ffff8880102a1680, ffff8880102a16c8)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99304"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-16T10:17:04Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nceph: fix integer overflow in the snap trace bounds check\n\nceph_update_snap_trace() bounds the two encoded snapid arrays that follow a\nstruct ceph_mds_snap_realm with sizeof(u64) * (num_snaps +\nnum_prior_parent_snaps). Both counts come straight off the wire as __le32,\nso the addition is evaluated in unsigned int and wraps before sizeof(u64)\npromotes it to size_t: an MDS sending num_snaps = 1 and\nnum_prior_parent_snaps = 0xffffffff makes the sum zero and the check\ndegenerates to ceph_decode_need(\u0026p, e, 0, bad), which always passes.\ndup_array() then reads num_snaps * 8 bytes past the end of the message\nfront, which ceph_msg_new2() allocates at exactly front_len bytes. An\nunsolicited CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_SNAP reaches this from a malicious or\ncompromised MDS with no client-side action, as do the snaptraces carried in\nan MDS reply and in a cap import.\n\nCompute the length with size_add()/size_mul() so it saturates at SIZE_MAX\ninstead of wrapping, in the style fs/ceph/mdsmap.c already uses for\nnum_export_targets.\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dup_array (include/linux/unaligned.h:28 fs/ceph/snap.c:500)\n Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880102a16c8 by task kworker/1:2/129\n Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn\n Call Trace:\n dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120)\n print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482)\n kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)\n dup_array (include/linux/unaligned.h:28 fs/ceph/snap.c:500)\n ceph_update_snap_trace (fs/ceph/snap.c:836)\n ceph_handle_snap (fs/ceph/snap.c:1155)\n mds_dispatch (fs/ceph/mds_client.c:7234)\n ceph_con_process_message (net/ceph/messenger.c:1424)\n ceph_con_v1_try_read (net/ceph/messenger_v1.c:1430)\n ceph_con_workfn (net/ceph/messenger.c:1576)\n process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3396)\n worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3479 kernel/workqueue.c:3560)\n kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)\n ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)\n ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)\n ...\n The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of\n allocated 72-byte region [ffff8880102a1680, ffff8880102a16c8)",
"id": "GHSA-gwm4-f7gj-p7vj",
"modified": "2026-11-16T12:31:40Z",
"published": "2026-11-16T12:31:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99304"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/25ae51760b751d170e29425b7851ee577e2cd5ba"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b3bf89767e3ca9506f1c7167cac97c41ec254d42"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf8f13872959af1d87e36b7d27096a09fdcf6e47"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f0dbd6b9b05e919ebab668f3479aebbcd2431fce"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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